University of Missouri, St. Louis

IRL @ UMSL
Dissertations

UMSL Graduate Works

11-22-2017

Does Truth Promote Peace? Toward a Greater
Understanding of Truth Commissions as
Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Post-Conflict
Countries
Eric Royer
ebr3m4@mail.umsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation
Part of the International Relations Commons
Recommended Citation
Royer, Eric, "Does Truth Promote Peace? Toward a Greater Understanding of Truth Commissions as Transitional Justice Mechanisms
in Post-Conflict Countries" (2017). Dissertations. 720.
https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation/720

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the UMSL Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.

Does Truth Promote Peace? Toward a Greater Understanding of Truth Commissions
as Transitional Justice Mechanisms.

Eric Royer
M.A., Political Science, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 2015
M.A., International Relations, Webster University, 2010
B.S., Political Science, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, 2008

A Dissertation Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri-St.
Louis
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

December
2017

Advisory Committee
Robert Barnidge, Ph.D.
David Kimball, Ph.D.
David Robertson, Ph.D.
J. Martin Rochester, Ph.D.
Chairperson

©Copyright 2017
By
Eric Bruce Royer
All Rights Reserved
2

For Stephanie and Elliott

3

ABSTRACT
Does Truth Promote Peace? Toward a Greater Understanding of Truth Commissions as
Transitional Justice Mechanisms.
This study explores the societal effects of transitional justice mechanisms in postconflict countries. In particular, an emphasis is placed on exploring whether truth
commissions, which are suggested in virtually all post-conflict situations today, have a
positive or negative effect on key indicators, such as democracy, human rights, economic
development, and the durability of peace. Three central research questions are examined.
First, do truth and reconciliation commissions “work”? In other words, are they
associated with a reduction in communal violence and improvements in democratic
institutions, human rights protections, and economic development? Second, must truth
commissions be coupled with transitional justice mechanisms that are retributive in
nature in order to exhibit a positive societal effect? For example, if policymakers couple a
truth commission with a human rights criminal tribunal, will this increase its efficiency
and societal effect? Third, and finally, are top-down approaches to transitional justice,
such as truth commissions, becoming increasingly obsolete in the 21st century in
comparison to more localized, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms?
A mixed-method approach is used to explore these three central research puzzles.
The quantitative section of this study uses a dataset on more than 1,100 transitional
justice mechanisms between 1970 and 2010 to examine the first two research questions.
The qualitative aspect of this study uses Rwanda’s gacaca courts as a case study to
explore the effectiveness of bottom-up versus top-down approaches to transitional justice.
These community-based courts were the face of Rwanda’s ambitious transitional justice
project and charged with investigating all crimes committed during the genocide. To
assess their effect, survey and interview data are used to draw connections and an overall
picture of public perceptions toward gacaca and other forms of transitional justice in
post-genocide Rwanda.
This study finds evidence to suggest that truth commissions are unlikely to
produce positive societal outcomes if used in isolation from other transitional justice
4

mechanisms. Further, this study finds some, albeit limited, evidence to suggest that truth
commissions, when paired with reparations, do appear to be associated with positive
societal effects in the forms of increased levels of democratization, reduced levels of
communal violence, and increased levels of wealth in post-conflict countries. The
Rwandan case study, moreover, indicates that top-down approaches will likely fail to
accomplish their goals if they do not provide tangible results at the local-level. The key
theme in the survey and interview data is that gacaca, while imperfect, was a countryspecific solution to a country-specific problem using a country-specific transitional
justice mechanism. More importantly, this case study suggests that we must continue to
rethink how transitional justice is being implemented in situations marked by past periods
of violence and instability at the local level. A mixture of bottom-up and top-down
approaches appear to be better situated to meet the specific needs and desires of various
stakeholders that are influential in shaping peace, justice, and reconciliation.
Key words: Transitional Justice, Truth Commissions, Restorative Justice, Retributive
Justice, Gacaca Courts
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

A Tale of Two Post-Conflict Societies
Colombia has the unfortunate distinction of hosting the longest running

insurgency in the post-World War II international system. Decades-old violence between
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army
(ELN), drug traffickers, criminal organizations, and the national government has killed an
estimated 220,000 civilians and displaced six million (Patterson 2016, 4). As a
consequence of this fighting, generations of Colombians have been haunted by
kidnappings, forced displacement, summary executions, and retaliatory attacks from both
government and rebel forces alike. In September 2016, FARC leaders and government
officials agreed to a sweeping peace framework intended to formally bring an end to
violence. This framework was predicated on four main themes: (1) FARC would be
transformed into a political party in Colombia’s multi-party political system; (2) criminal
trials would be held for egregious offenders of human rights abuses; (3) amnesty would
be provided for rebels who turned in their arms; and (4) a truth commission would
investigate allegations of misconduct and abuses perpetrated by both government and
rebel forces. In a surprising turn of events, Colombian voters narrowly rejected the terms
of this peace framework in a national referendum expressing their discontent with the
parameters of the agreement and their fear that the peace process would not end a cycle
of impunity. A revised peace framework, which was subsequently signed in November
16

2016, has since been plagued by problems associated with disarming, demobilizing, and
reintegrating (DDR) roughly 7,000 former rebels. These complications, coupled with a
failure to receive a popular mandate for the revised peace framework, have created
obstacles toward societal reconciliation and the establishment and consolidation of an
enduring and durable peace.
Tunisia, like Colombia, is also a post-conflict country1 in a precarious state.
Although popular uprisings led to the ousting of an entrenched autocrat, the subsequent
transition to democracy has opened a Pandora’s Box of past crimes, abuses, and atrocities
perpetrated against regime opponents and political opposition by state security forces and
former government officials. A central component of the Tunisian political transition is
the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC), which, as a constitutionally-mandated truth
commission, has the power and authority to investigate human rights abuses suffered by
ordinary Tunisians and opposition figures under repressive governments since 1966. This
commission, which formally began its operations in November 2016, has collected
testimony from thousands of individuals who were victims of abuses and, upon
completion, will recommend institutional reforms to ward off future troubles. The choice
of a truth commission to become the bedrock of government efforts to address past
human rights abuses, however, has been controversial since it has limited the ability of
the transitional government to try, sentence, and punish thousands of former regime

1

A post-conflict country is a country that is emerging from a period of political turmoil,
state repression, or civil war. The term “post-conflict” only implies that physically
hostilities and armed violence have ceased; it does not necessarily imply that the
underlying, or root causes, of a conflict have been addressed. The term post-conflict does
suggest a “window of opportunity” for peace as Fischer (2004, 2-3) and Hamre and
Sullivan (2002, 90) suggest.
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officials guilty of committing sweeping, widespread human rights abuses. Further,
political and business elites that benefited from corrupt ties with the former government
mostly remain in positions of power. Both of these facets have hindered Tunisia’s
tenuous political transition and fomented underlying grievances among ordinary
Tunisians who desire justice for crimes committed against loved ones, friends, and
acquaintances.

The post-conflict trajectories of Colombia and Tunisia, at first glance, share very
little in common. Colombia is in the process of ending a decades old civil war and
protracted insurgency, whereas Tunisia is emerging from decades of autocratic,
strongman rule. Colombia and Tunisia, moreover, have adopted different paths to
addressing mass human rights abuses. Colombia has adopted an amnesty program,
implemented provisions to promote DDR, and created an ad hoc human rights criminal
tribunal and truth commission to address insecurity and bring justice to victims and their
families. Tunisia, on the other hand, has largely framed its political transition around a
truth commission modeled after the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(SATRC).2 The goal of this commission is to establish an official, impartial history and
restore a lost balance between victims and perpetrators, many of which remain in office
or hold positions in Tunisia’s state security apparatus. The success of Tunisia’s peace
process, as a result, largely hinges on whether the TDC can effectively dispense
2

This commission was established to investigate widespread human rights abuses that
occurred during South Africa’s apartheid regime between 1960 and 1994. Over the
duration of its operations, it collected testimony from more than 20,000 witnesses, 2,000
of which appeared publicly (Quinn and Freeman 2003, 1121). More than 30 TRCs have
been created since, mainly as a key component of modern day peacebuilding operations,
as illustrated by the Colombian and Tunisian peace process and democratic transition,
respectively.
18

restorative justice3 in such a way that is acceptable to all stakeholders involved in its
political transition. More importantly, its transition hinges on whether victims accept the
outcomes of the TDC and view its operations as satisfactory toward their individual
needs. Colombia’s peace process, on the other hand, hinges on the success of several
mechanisms that blend restorative and retributive justice4 with the intended goal of
delivering a sense of closure to victims and their families and punishing those who were
culpable for abuses committed often decades ago.

Although their post-conflict trajectories appear to have little overlap, efforts by
key stakeholders, government officials, third-party donors, and intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in both
Columbia and Tunisia are similar in many respects. First, key stakeholders in both
countries realize the importance of addressing past human rights abuses in some form or
another as a clear building block for moving forward politically, socially, and
economically. In his 2016 Nobel Peace Lecture, Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos stressed that even though the peace process did not address all societal concerns or
problems associated with the insurgency completely, it provided a path forward for
victims to learn the truth and begin the process of healing.5 In November 2016,
Chairwoman of the TDC, Sihem Ben Sedrine, commented, moreover, that “we need to

3

Restorative justice (i.e., reparative justice) places an emphasis on restoring a lost
balance between victim and perpetrator and rehabilitating and reintegrating perpetrators
back into society (Braithwaite 1999; Olson and Dzur 2004).
4
Retributive justice (i.e., punitive or corrective justice) entails punishing perpetrators of
human rights abuses, often holding them criminally liable for their wrongdoings (Minow
1998, 12).
5
Santos’s Nobel Lecture is available at:
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/santos-lecture_en.html
19

expose these testimonies [of key perpetrators of human rights abuses] for history. The
Tunisian people are tolerant, but they are tolerant after knowing the truth … Tunisia will
no longer accept human rights violations.”6

A second thread that unites the post-conflict trajectories of Colombia and Tunisia
is how both have struggled immensely with the delicate question of how to best address
past abuses in such a way that promotes social reconciliation instead of creating
underlying grievances and animosities that have the potential to reignite conflict. Any
effort to address past abuses holds the potential to rekindle the negative emotions of hate,
anger, and revenge. Although key stakeholders agree that addressing the past is crucial
for moving forward, respective efforts in each country have been a harbinger for painful
memories. These efforts, moreover, have conjured different views toward the competing
values of vengeance and forgiveness.7

A third key thread that unites both of these post-conflict societies is the potential
for the overall peace process to be derailed by factions unwilling to agree to the terms of
their respective transition, the ability of political, economic, and social elites to mobilize
against or try to frame the peace process in their favor, and lingering power dynamics and
entrenched institutions, which make it difficult to completely move forward. These three

6

Quote was obtained from a Reuters news story covering the beginning of testimony at
the TDC. The full story is available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-rightsidUSKBN13C2IF.
7
Martha Minow (1998) coined the term “vengeance and forgiveness” to describe the
dilemma post-conflict countries face when dealing with past (and increasingly
contemporary) human rights abuses. Minow uses the statement to describe how a violent,
reaction to past abuses in the form of “vengeance” will not heal the trauma of mass
violence. She also notes that the “saintliness” of forgiveness is not sufficient on its own
when dealing with injustice and a past legacy of abuse.
20

factors, together, illustrate not only the complications associated with the post-conflict
transitions of Colombia and Tunisia, but the long and tumultuous road any country
emerging from a period of civil war, state repression, or political instability in the
contemporary world faces when attempting to deal or cope with a violent past.

1.2

Purpose Statement
Post-conflict countries are confronted with a host of institutional challenges that

hold the potential to derail peace and reignite renewed violence. Although physical
hostilities may cease and belligerents may agree to basic provisions contained in a peace
agreement or negotiated settlement, they often use the threat of violence to seek better
terms and “spoilers” hold the potential to hijack the peace process for private gain
(Stedman 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Spoilers, as defined by Stephen John
Stedman (1997, 5), are individuals, groups, or segments of society that “believe that
peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and
use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”

Further complicating matters, post-conflict societies are plagued by weak
institutions, poverty, insecurity, the absence of the rule of law, low levels of social
capital, crumbling infrastructure, and weak transitional governments that lack legitimacy
and the ability to exercise authority through nonviolent means (de Greiff and Duthie
2009). In most cases, these societies lack basic judiciaries that can mediate disputes,
proper education and health systems, and economic opportunities for former combatants.
As Donald Horowitz (2008, 1214-1215) comments, these societies are marked by the
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absence of basic mechanisms to prevent intergroup tensions and disparities, which
inevitably rise between groups in the aftermath of multipolar conflicts.

Contributing to these institutional failures, post-conflict countries are also
confronted with the difficult task of addressing past human rights abuses that often stand
in the way of political and social reconciliation. These abuses can range from forcible
displacement to torture, sexual violence, and extrajudicial killings. A failure to address
these past abuses not only may prevent the establishment of a just or inclusive peace as a
growing chorus of jus post bellum theorists suggest (Orend 2002; Walzer 2002; Williams
and Caldwell 2006; Philpott 2012), but also possibly explain why one-fifth to one-third of
all post-conflict societies relapse into armed violence within five years and about half of
all post-conflict countries revert back to armed violence within a decade (Collier et al.
2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 572-581).8

The purpose of this study, then, is to examine how we can devise and implement
durable, effective, and robust transitional justice processes that can allow post-conflict
countries to address their dark pasts. In particular, I wish to shed light on how these
countries can attempt to mitigate past human rights abuses in order to move forward
politically, socially, and economically through the use of a methodologically rigorous
research design. Transitional justice, as a conception of justice associated with the postconflict period, refers to any legal or non-legal mechanism that is adopted in the postconflict stage to address systematic and widespread human rights violations that occurred

8

Walter (2004, 371) estimates that 36 percent of civil wars between 1945 and 1996
experienced renewed warfare, which is slightly higher than the estimate from Collier and
Hoeffler (2004).
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during past, and sometimes contemporary, periods of violence, instability, or armed
hostilities (de Greiff 2009; Teitel 2000; Hayner 2001; Olsen et al. 2010; WiebelhausBrahm 2010; Stewart and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2017).The goal of transitional justice is to
shed light on past abuses but also repair a torn social or societal fabric in order to move
forward. The mechanisms in which to do so vary dramatically in the world today and can
range from criminal tribunals9 and truth commissions10 to amnesty programs,11 lustration
policies (i.e., vetting, exile, or purging processes),12 and reparations.13 In virtually any
post-conflict situation, one or more of these mechanisms is adopted by a transitional
government, a neutral third-party mediator, or an IGO as a means of signifying a
9

Criminal tribunals formally charge perpetrators with human rights violations (e.g.,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, acts of genocide) with the goal of holding them
legally accountable or liable for their past actions. Posner and Vermeule (2004, 766)
comment that “perpetrators are charged with crimes and then provided with lawyers, the
chance to defend themselves, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and other
procedural protections.” Criminal tribunals are usually “ad hoc,” meaning that they exist
for an abbreviated period of time. Criminal tribunals, moreover, are typically perceived
as an extension of the Nuremburg trials and, thus, a Western form of justice.
10
Hayner (1994, 558) defines truth commissions as “bodies set up to investigate a past
history of violations of human rights in a particular country - which can include
violations by the military or other government forces or armed opposition forces.” These
bodies are usually ad-hoc and focus on a specific period of human rights abuses. For
example, Chile’s National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in 1990 (Rettig
Commission) documented more than 3,400 cases of torture, kidnapping, assassinations,
and targeted killings by security forces under the government of Augusto Pinochet as part
of political purges between 1974 and 1977 (Weissbrodt and Fraser 1992).
11
Porter (2015, 82-83) defines amnesty programs as those that grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to former combatants in exchange for disclosing their role in
orchestrating human rights abuses.
12
Lustration policies (i.e., political purges) are intended to formally prevent perpetrators
of state repression or human rights abuses from holding public office or positions in a
country’s security apparatus (Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff 2007). See David (2003) for a
discussion on the implementation and effects of lustration policies in the Czech Republic
and Poland, which had the intended goal of prohibiting former communist regime
members and their sympathizers from holding public office or positions in government.
13
Olsen et al. (2010, 806) define reparations as a “state’s official grant of monetary
payments, property, or other forms of restitution of monetary value to victims, or to
relatives of victims, or past human rights violations.”
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departure, or break, from a past period of state repression or widespread impunity. More
importantly, these transitional justice mechanisms are usually devised in such a way to
provide a sense of closure to victims or their families.

Despite a burgeoning literature on the topic in recent decades, our understanding
of transitional justice as well as the outcomes associated with different transitional justice
mechanisms remains an incomplete enterprise. Some scholars place an emphasis on
utilizing mechanisms that promote accountability for past crimes, such as criminal
tribunals or lustration policies (e.g., Huyse 2003; Sikkink and Walling 2007;
Wigglesworth 2008). Other scholars place an emphasis on adopting mechanisms that are
more victim-centered and “buy off” perpetrators in exchange for immunity from post-war
prosecution, such as reparations, exiles, or amnesties (e.g., Aron 1981; Fearon 2005).
Still others place an emphasis on adopting mechanisms that allow victims to know the
truth about what transpired to their loved ones in the form of truth commissions (Hayner
2001; Kerr and Mobekk 2008; Kashyap 2009; Porter 2015). Further complicating matters
is the fact that these mechanisms vary considerably in their application and
implementation, with some criminal tribunals and truth commissions, for example, being
ad hoc in nature (e.g., the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) and others
existing alongside an established criminal justice system for an extended period (e.g.,
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia) or implemented as a permanent
organ of a newly established government (e.g., National Unity and Reconciliation
Committee for Rwanda).
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This study attempts to build on our understanding of what conditions the success
of transitional justice by focusing primarily on the application and effectiveness of truth
commissions both spatially and across time. In Colombia and Tunisia, truth commissions
are a vital component of the overall peace process and a mechanism to establish an
official, authoritative record of what transpired. These two cases, moreover, highlight a
growing norm in favor of establishing the “truth” in the post-conflict stage. To increase
our understanding of these mechanisms, this research is structured around two key
puzzles. First, do truth commissions exhibit a positive or negative effect on post-conflict
indicators? In particular, do these bodies increase the durability of peace and the
prospects for economic development in post-conflict countries? Do they lead to
improvements in democratization, end a cycle of impunity, and help improve the track
record of human rights protections in the post-conflict countries they operate in? More
importantly, should we expect variation between post-conflict countries that adopted
truth commissions versus those that did not? Second, must truth commissions be coupled
with other transitional justice mechanisms to be effective? In particular, should truth
commissions, as a tool of restorative justice, be coupled with other mechanisms that are
more retributive or punitive in nature to exhibit a positive social effect? In the cases
above, Colombia adopted a truth commission in conjunction with ad hoc criminal
proceedings and amnesty program. Tunisia, on the other hand, has relied exclusively on a
truth commission to promote transitional justice in the post-conflict stage. Will this
variation in design and application lead to different societal outcomes in one post-conflict
situation in comparison to the other?
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1.3

Why Study Truth Commissions?
Since the 1970s, approximately 50 truth commissions and commissions of inquiry

have been established worldwide in countries as disparate as South Africa, El Salvador,
South Korea, East Timor, Haiti, and Liberia.14 Today, truth commissions have been
popularized as an attractive mechanism for transitional justice, one that is capable of
bringing disparate parties together through the establishment of an official, impartial
history of events. Figure 1 illustrates the proliferation of truth commissions in today’s
post-Cold War international system, from a low of four truth commissions between 1970
and 1979 to a high of 25 between 2000 and 2009. A critical juncture in the application of
truth commissions is the South Africa TRC, which was created in 1995 and garnered
mass international attention for its use in uncovering crimes and abuses committed during
South Africa’s apartheid regime. In total, this commission collected testimony from
20,000 individuals, named individual perpetrators, and recommended reparations to
victims of state repression (Gibson 2006). The SATRC is widely viewed as being an
important stepping stone for racial reconciliation and, more importantly, a catalyst for the
consolidation of democracy, improvements in human rights, and impressive domestic
economic growth rates since the mid-1990s (Gibson 2006; Bickford 2007; Gibson 2009).

14

A list of all truth commissions between 1974 and 2010 can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Truth Commissions, 1970-2009
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This proliferation of truth commissions has also been aided by a growing
international norm that families should be guaranteed the basic right of knowing what
transpired, or happened, to their loved ones as part of any peace or politically-motivated
transitional process. This right to know the truth about abuses suffered, the identity of
individual perpetrators, or the fate and whereabouts of loved ones is enshrined in the
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the International Convention for the
Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICCPED), and the United
Nations Convention against Torture (UNCAT). These treaties, however, lack compliance
mechanisms and no specific international convention has been reached on the topic.

Based on cumulative figures in Table 1, the frequency of truth commissions pales
in comparison to the frequency of criminal trials and amnesties in today’s post-Cold War
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international system; however, the percentage increase in the adoption of truth
commissions (as well as reparations and lustrations) has increased dramatically over both
trials and amnesties over this period (see Table 2). Despite only comprising 7 percent of
all transitional justice mechanisms since 1989, there has been a 400 percent increase in
the number of truth commissions between 1989 and 2010 compared to 1970 and 1988.
The frequency of trials has increased marginally (28 percent), while there has been a 0.6
percent decrease in the usage of amnesties over this period. Reparations and lustration
policies have also increased dramatically in today’s post-Cold War international system
(1850 percent and 115 percent respectively), yet their usage is largely isolated to Eastern
European or Latin American countries transitioning away from authoritarian regimes as
part of the Third Wave of Democratization (see Table 3). Truth commissions, on the
other hand, have proliferated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and are recommended in
virtually every post-conflict country today, making them truly an international tool for
transitional justice rather than a Western or Latin American solution to addressing a
legacy of human rights abuses.

Table 1. Frequency of Trials, Amnesties, Truth Commissions, Reparations, &
Lustration Policies, 1989 - 2010
Type
Number
Percentage
Criminal Tribunals
147
24
Amnesties
355
58
Truth commissions
45
7
Reparations
39
6
Lustration Policies
28
5
Total
614
100
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Table 2. Percent Change in Frequency of Trials, Amnesties, Truth Commissions,
Reparations, & Lustration Policies, 1970 - 2010
Type
1970-1988
After 1989
Percent
Change
Trials
115
147
+28
Amnesties
357
355
-0.6
Truth commissions
9
45
+400
Reparations
2
39
+1850
Lustration Policies
13
28
+115

Table 3. Frequency of Trials, Amnesties, Truth Commissions, Reparations, &
Lustration Policies by Region, 1989 - 2010
Type
Asia Africa Latin
North W. Europe E. Europe Oceania
America America
Trials
Amnesties
Truth commissions
Reparations
Lustration Policies

26
130
12
4
2

34
134
15
6
4

23
43
14
10
7

11
0
0
0
0

11
5
2
7
1

41
41
2
11
14

1
2
0
1
0

What’s troubling about this proliferation of truth commissions is the absence of
empirical data to determine whether they actually make a societal difference or not. In
particular, we lack spatial and temporary data needed to determine whether truth
commissions exhibit a positive or negative effect on democracy, human rights, economic
development, and the durability of peace. Even more problematic, truth commissions
vary dramatically in terms of costs and the time that is needed to complete their
investigations. El Salvador’s truth commission in 1993, for example, cost upwards of $2
million and took eight months to wrap up its proceedings (USIP 2017). South Africa’s
TRC, on the other hand, cost upwards of $29 million and required more than two years to
complete investigations into apartheid-related abuses and crimes (Economist 1997).
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The majority of research we do have is largely case-study driven.15 Extant studies,
moreover, tend to choose commissions that represent the opposite sides of the spectrum
when arguing the benefits or pitfalls associated with adopting these bodies. Eric
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010, 129) states “one obvious problem within the literature is that,
in general, it is dominated by a few high-profile truth commission cases such as South
Africa.” This means that proponents of truth commissions largely point to the success of
South Africa’s TRC when making generalizations about the positive effects of truth
commissions. Opponents, on the other hand, only focus on failures, such as Uganda’s
truth commissions in 1974 and 1986 respectively,16 when noting the inherent limitations
and weaknesses associated with these bodies. This reliance on case studies on both sides
creates concerns related to selection bias and selecting on the dependent variable, both of
which increase the potential for erroneous inferences being made in extant studies.

Studies that have attempted to examine their effect geographically or as part of
large-N studies have helped alleviate this small-N nature of the literature; however, these
quantitative-based studies use different and often competing methods, datasets, and

15

A majority of transitional justice research, in general, is qualitative and case-study
driven. This is especially true for research on truth commissions. As a consequence, the
study of truth commissions and transitional justice, overall, continues to lag behind other
key topics in the study of international conflict, such as the causes of interstate and
intrastate wars, territorial disputes, or alliance formation.
16
Idi Amin (i.e., The Butcher) is credited with creating the first truth commission to
investigate crimes committed by his own security and police forces upon taking power.
Yoweri Museveni, leader of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) also created a
truth commission upon taking power in 1986 to illustrate his government’s break with the
Amin and Obote governments, which were associated with notoriously cruel and
inhumane human rights abuses. Both truth commissions are widely argued to be tools
used by successive governments to shore up legitimacy and to pay lip service to calls to
end a cycle of impunity. In both cases, the work of both commissions was hampered by
financial problems and their recommendations largely fell on deaf ears.
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indicators, which further contributes to contradictory results and findings. Further, few
studies have attempted to parse out the societal effects or consequences of truth
commissions in combination with other mechanisms in a rigorous, systematic way. Those
that do so only focus on democracy or human rights protections as critical dependent
variables, or focus on the conditions in which a certain combination of mechanisms is
likely to be adopted over others (e.g., Olsen et al. 2010). Separating cause from effect, on
the other hand, has remained notably elusive in extant studies.

These limitations in existing studies causes conceptual and theoretical debates to
linger without definitive evidence to suggest that these bodies matter or not. In practical
terms, it seems entirely plausible that uncovering the past can promote healing and
societal reconciliation. It also seems entirely plausible that uncovering the truth about
past atrocities can foment debilitating feelings of hate, anger, and revenge. If there is
evidence to conclude that truth commissions “work,” meaning that they have positive
effects on post-conflict indicators then they should be adopted more vigorously in
societies coming to terms with social strife. If they actually exhibit negative outcomes, a
more vibrant and critical discussion must emerge when post-conflict societies plan on
adopting a truth-seeking mechanism as part of their transitional process.
How to promote peace and address a legacy of human rights abuses in war’s last
phase is hardly a new topic or question in the fields of international peacebuilding and
transitional justice. Several influential studies in recent years have yielded important,
empirical insight into what conditions peace and the strategies in which post-conflict
countries can use to promote transitional justice through the use of statistical analyses,
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case study analyses, or historical analyses (e.g., Hayner 2001; Elster 2004; Sikkink and
Walling 2007; Fletcher et al. 2009; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Meernik et al. 2010; Olsen et
al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). To contribute to an already impressive body of
literature, the objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of truth commissions
in combination or in conjunction with other transitional justice mechanisms to build on a
small subset of this literature (e.g., Olsen et al. 2010). In particular, this study isolates the
effects of truth commissions in different combinations and examines the societal
outcomes of these combinations on common societal outcomes, such as democracy and
human rights, as well as additional outcomes in the form of economic development and
the durability of peace. By doing so, the goal is to unite studies that have sought to
explore the effectiveness of truth commissions alone (e.g., Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010) with
those that have examined the effect of transitional justice mechanisms in a broader sense
(e.g., Sikkink and Walling 2007; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Olsen et al. 2010).

In undertaking this project and topic, the intent is to produce a better
understanding of the ways in which we can promote an enduring and durable peace that
is built on the foundations of ending a cycle of impunity, improving human rights, and
promoting societal reconciliation. We desperately need to further our understanding of
transitional justice and, in particular, the role that truth commissions play in this process
as a consequence of the changing nature of contemporary global violence itself. In
contrast to wars fought between countries on accepted battlefields using conventional
weaponry, conflicts today are localized in so-called “zones of war” and involve
extremely personalized violence that is often perpetrated along ethnic or religious lines
(Singer and Wildavsky 1996; Kaldor 2006). Civilian populations are now caught in the
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cross-hairs of this violence and directly targeted as a means to sow fear and exert control
over an increasingly evolved battlefield (Kaldor 2006; de Nevers 2006; Banks 2011;
Kaldor 2013).

This changing nature of global violence means that civilian populations are
increasingly subjected to widespread and repeated human rights abuses. The United
Nations (UN), for example, estimates that 60,000 women were raped at some points, if
not repeatedly, during Sierra Leone’s civil war (1991-2002), that 60,000 women were
raped in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, and that anywhere between 100,000 to 250,000
women were raped over a three-month period during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (UN
2014, 1). Coupled with this sexual violence, millions were displaced either internally or
externally during these conflicts, creating mass humanitarian crises that are still being felt
today in places such as the DR Congo. Not only does this changing nature of global
violence complicate international peacebuilding strategies and laws of warfare governing
interstate conflict, or conflicts between nation-states, it also creates complications for
transitional justice mechanisms that are ill-prepared to deal with human rights abuses
committed on a mass scale (Banks 2011; Richemond-Barak 2011; Zoli 2011).

1.4

Central Research Questions
A burgeoning literature in recent decades has provided important insight into the

effect of transitional justice and other conflict resolution mechanisms in post-conflict
countries. Our understanding of transitional justice, for example, has been strengthened
by those that have identified historical and regional variation in the usage of certain
mechanisms (e.g., Elster 2004, Sikkink and Walling 2007) or even collect information on
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transitional justice on a global scale (e.g., Binningsbø et al. 2005). We have also
benefited immensely from studies examining variation in outcomes across regime-type,
conflict-type, and victory-type (e.g., Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010; Olsen et al. 2010). To
build on an already impressive body of literature, this study is framed around the three
central research questions identified in the purpose statement above:

1. First, are truth commissions independently associated with positive societal
outcomes (e.g., democracy, human rights, economic development, and peace)
in countries emerging from periods of instability, state repression, or armed
violence?
2. Second, must truth commissions be coupled with transitional justice
mechanisms that are retributive in nature (e.g., criminal tribunals, reparations,
lustration policies) in order to exhibit a positive societal effect?
3. Third, and finally, are top-down approaches to transitional justice, such as
truth commissions, increasingly becoming obsolete as a consequence of
shifting conflict trends (e.g., increased frequency of intrastate conflicts over
interstate conflicts, the rise of low-intensity conflicts, etc.) and the changing
nature of global violence?

The first question is hardly new; however, adopting this research question enables
this study to contribute to and build upon extant studies that have sought out the difficult
task of isolating the effect and outcomes of truth commissions either through quantitative,
historical, or case-study research designs. Not surprising, consensus on whether truth
commissions actually “work” is far from homogenous. As described in greater detail in

34

Chapter 2, different camps have formed around the utility of truth commissions and truthseeking processes, with a number of scholars (e.g., Scharf 1997; Boraine 2000; Hayner
2001; Abrams and Hayner 2002) advocating on behalf of establishing the truth in any
post-conflict situation and a growing number of scholars (e.g., Popkin and Roht-Arriaza
1995; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003; Mendeloff 2004; Ingelaere 2009) advocating against
the use of truth commissions and similar ad hoc bodies. Several quantitative studies,
moreover, have found contradictory results when testing the effect of truth commissions
on levels of democracy or human rights protections (e.g., Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010; Olsen
et al. 2010).

The second question is framed for a broader audience -- scholars and practitioners
who are concerned with the effect of transitional justice as a whole. This question builds
on extant studies that have begun the tedious and complicated task of exploring the
individual effects and outcomes of various transitional justice mechanisms and, more
importantly, parsing out the effect that certain mechanisms have in concert with others
(e.g., Olsen et al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). By framing the second question
around the theme of retributive versus restorative effects, this study seeks to build on
extant studies by empirically testing whether this relationship must hold true in postconflict societies today.

The third question is framed for scholars who have questioned the discourse
surrounding the top-down nature, or the “cookie-cutter” approach, of transitional justice.
The conventional wisdom in the transitional justice literature is that there is not a onesize-fits-all solution or approach that can be applied uniformly across continents (e.g.,

35

UN 2010) and even within countries (e.g., Taylor 2015). Borrowing from scholars that
have questioned the dominant discourse of “liberal” peacebuilding in the field of
international peacebuilding (e.g., Paris 1997; Barnet 2006; Newman et al. 2009; Paris
2009; Richmond 2011), there is now a growing view that top-down approaches may be
flawed since they are easily manipulated by elites for personal gain or susceptible to the
detrimental effect of spoilers (Austesserre 2006; Waldorf 2006; Lundy and McGovern
2008; Fletcher 2009; Baines 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; MacDonald 2015;
Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik 2016).

Top-down approaches to transitional justice can be thought of as those that place
an emphasis on social reconciliation, the pursuit of justice, and the establishment of an
official, authoritative record at the national-level. Bottom-up approaches, on the other
hand, can be thought of as being less institutionalized and instead focused on repairing
social relationships and promoting psychological healing among victims at the grassroots
level. The purpose of this last question, then, is to critically assess whether top-down
approaches to transitional justice are increasingly becoming obsolete in the 21st century
due to the changing nature of global violence itself, which has become increasingly
localized. Since a robust debate has emerged between scholars of international
peacebuilding over the utility and effectiveness of top-down peacebuilding strategies in
comparison to bottom-up approaches, this third research question represents an attempt to
bridge parallel critiques in two sets of closely linked literatures.

A mixed-method research design is used to explore and provide empirical
evidence for each of these three research questions (see Chapter 3). The quantitative
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section of this study utilizes a dataset on approximately 1,100 transitional justice
mechanisms between 1970 and 2010 to test the effects of truth commissions, reparations,
amnesties, criminal tribunals, and lustration policies on post-conflict indicators, such as
democracy, human rights, per capita gross domestic product (GDP), and the duration of
peace. These data are used to provide important insight into the first two research
questions. The qualitative section of this study uses Rwanda as a critical case study to
provide insight into the third question. Rwanda, which has engaged in extensive “social
reengineering” projects since the Rwandan genocide, is used since it adopted a hybrid
approach to transitional justice in the form of local, grassroots courts called gacaca and
an internationally-backed, top-down criminal tribunal. Rwanda, as a result, is an excellent
case study for providing insight into how contemporary post-conflict countries have
grappled with the thorny question of how to address past abuses, at what level this should
be done (especially when violence is perpetrated on a mass scale), and what the best
strategy for moving forward after traumatic violence might be.

1.5

Theoretical Framework & Hypotheses
This study begins with the conventional wisdom that adopting more than one

transitional justice mechanism improves the net effect of transitional justice as a whole in
post-conflict countries (UN 2010). This study theorizes that truth commissions, alone, are
unlikely to produce positive societal outcomes despite their growing popularity and
application in virtually every contemporary, post-conflict situation (e.g., Tunisia). This
study bases this view on the belief that the proceedings of truth commissions may not
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deliver a sense of justice or closure to victims or their families. This lack of victimcentered justice, as a result, is not likely to exhibit lasting societal effects.

Truth commissions, without a doubt, offer an invaluable forum to collect the
testimony of thousands of individuals. Further, these bodies hold the potential to promote
psychological and societal healing by uncovering the truth about past abuses and being a
catalyst for repairing intergroup relations, which can lead to improvements in levels of
democracy, human rights, economic development, and the durability of peace. Finally,
truth commissions can play an essential role in the post-conflict stage by dispelling myths
and identifying perpetrators, thus administering a form of “shock therapy” by forcing
transitional societies to confront structural and institutional weaknesses that made past
injustices and violence possible, as was the case with the South African TRC.

With that said, this study argues that truth commissions are unlikely to promote
positive societal transformation by themselves due to their restorative nature. We should
not expect post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions in isolation from other
transitional justice mechanisms to experience measurable increases in levels of
democratization, economic development, human rights protections, or the durability of
peace since their effects are likely time-sensitive and can be muted after their
proceedings, outcomes, and recommendations come to a close. This study advances the
view that these bodies must be coupled with other transitional justice mechanisms to have
a positive effect as a consequence of their lack of a punitive element or ability to punish
perpetrators for past transgressions. If this view is correct, we should not expect the
Tunisian TDC to impose positive societal outcomes since it lacks retributive elements.
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Five hypotheses are framed from this theoretical argument in response to each of
the three research questions above:

H1: In a comparison of post-conflict countries, countries that adopt only a truth
commission are less likely to experience advancements, or improvements, in levels of
democratization in comparison to those that adopt a truth commission in combination
with one or more retributive mechanisms.
The first hypothesis suggests that truth commissions alone are unlikely to become
a catalyst for improvements in democratic institutions or processes. If coupled with
retributive mechanisms, on the other hand, then we should expect truth commissions to
exhibit a positive effect on levels of democracy in post-conflict countries. Democratic
institutions are those that allow for multiple groups to participate in governance, while
democratic processes are those that allow for elected officials to be held accountable by
ordinary citizens at regular intervals and protect basic, individual civil liberties (Dahl
1974; Zakaria 1997; Dahl 1998; Przeworski 2000).

H2: In a comparison of post-conflict countries, those that only adopt a truth
commission are less likely to experience improvements in human rights protections in
comparison to those that adopt a truth commission in combination with one or more
retributive mechanisms.
Similar to H1, this second hypothesis suggests that the effect of truth commissions
on human rights will be negated unless they are coupled with retributive mechanisms. In
other words, we should not expect truth commissions to end a cycle of impunity or lead
to the institutionalization of greater human rights protections over time unless they are
used in conjunction with retributive mechanisms. These latter can range from criminal
trials, reparations, or lustration policies.
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H3: In a comparison of post-conflict countries, those that only adopt a truth
commission are less likely to experience improvements in economic development in
comparison to those that adopt a truth commission in combination with one or more
retributive mechanisms.
The third hypothesis suggests that a positive relationship may exist between truth
commissions and levels of economic development in post-conflict societies as long as
they are coupled with retributive elements. The logic behind this hypothesis is that
restorative and retributive mechanisms are an important harbingers for improving a
climate of economic investment or creating incentives for the transfer of capital and
services into post-conflict countries. More importantly, this study advances the view that
both types of mechanisms are needed to address, mitigate, and ultimately alleviate
patterns of inequality, economic discrimination, and marginalization that largely
contributed to the onset of violence to begin with.

H4: In a comparison of post-conflict countries, those that only adopt a truth
commissions are less likely to remain at peace than those that adopt truth commissions
in combination with one or more retributive mechanisms.
The fourth hypothesis suggests that the durability of peace in post-conflict
countries is tied to a combination of restorative and retributive mechanisms. In this case,
we should not expect truth commissions alone to affect the durability of peace in postconflict countries unless they are coupled with mechanisms that can punish perpetrators
for their past transgressions. Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions in
conjunction with punitive mechanisms, such as trials or lustrations, should be expected to
experience reduced levels of societal violence in comparison to those that do not.

H5: Post-conflict countries that only adopt top-down approaches are less likely to
experience improvements in levels of societal peace, democratization, economic
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development, and human rights in comparison to those that combine top-down
approaches with grassroots level mechanisms.
The sixth, and final, hypothesis addressed in this study suggests that we should
expect countries that adopt both traditional, top-down approaches with hybrid, bottom-up
approaches to experience more positive societal outcomes versus those that only adopt
top-down or bottom-up approaches. This hypothesis is based on the belief that top-down
approaches are necessary, yet increasingly incapable of dispensing justice on a mass scale
and, more importantly, a form of justice that is easily accessible to individuals. The key
component of this hypothesis is that a combination of these mechanisms is required
versus one being a “better” approach than the other.

1.6

Conceptual Definitions
To operationally and conceptually define key variables at the onset to avoid

confusion, several key terms and descriptor variables are defined in this section. Peace,
which is associated as a “post-conflict peace” in this study, is narrowly defined as a
situation in where there is an absence of armed violence between two or more
belligerents, often termed a minimalist or negative conception of peace.17 This conceptual
definition of peace excludes more substantive, or “positive” definitions of peace, which
are associated with social justice marked by the absence of structural violence in the form
of poverty, inequality, or discrimination (Galtung 1965). A negative peace, as a result,
may not necessarily address the underlying sources of conflict, such as social, political, or
cultural injustice. Justice is framed exclusively in a legalistic manner and is defined as a

17

Galtung (1965) terms a “negative peace” as one in where there is merely the absence of
war or physical violence.
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situation in where fairness and equity are administered to victims and perpetrators alike
the post-conflict stage (Elster 2004, 135-139). Reconciliation is defined in interpersonal,
sociopolitical, and institutional terms, with interpersonal reconciliation defined as a
situation in where victims and perpetrators have taken the steps necessary to peacefully
coexist and to move forward with their lives (Philpott 2012: 5-6). Socio-political
reconciliation refers to a situation in where disparate groups in society, which have often
been at odds with one another, are willing to put aside their grievances in favor of
working together as part of a pact. Institutional reconciliation, moreover, occurs when
post-conflict countries creates institutional frameworks, both formal and informal, that
protect the individual rights of citizens and try to rebuild trust and popular acceptance
with the ultimate goal of citizens taking part in the decision-making process by formally
participating in new institutions or by holding government officials accountable. Finally,
a post-conflict society describes any country that is emerging from a period of political
instability, armed conflict, civil war, or state repression and is positioned somewhere
along a continuum between the extremes of war, defined in this study as a conflict that
exceeds 1,000 annual battle-related deaths, and peace. Despite the potential for postconflict societies to be situated anywhere along this continuum, they usually exhibit one
of the following conditions: (1) a cease-fire between two or more parties; (2) a peace
agreement or negotiated settlement usually with third-party monitoring; (3) the absence
of physical hostilities measured by less than 1,000 annual battle-related deaths; or (4) a
disarmament agreement that calls for opposition forces to lay down their weaponry. As
Elisabeth Porter (2015: 3) comments, the term post-conflict is extremely difficult to
conceptualize due to the fact that even when physical hostilities have ended, often a
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culture of violence and impunity persists and underlying tensions between belligerents
endure, which have the potential to become the proximate cause for future conflict.

1.7

Plan of Study
This study is composed of six chapters, with this chapter serving as the

introduction. Chapter 2 is a detailed literature review that is structured around four key
themes. The first part surveys the changing nature of global conflict trends, with a
particular emphasis placed on examining the “new war” thesis. New wars scholars,
notably Mary Kaldor (2006), posit that this changing nature of global violence requires
fundamental shifts in how we view and approach the post-conflict stage. The second part
surveys scholarly debate over the nature and conduct of international peacebuilding
efforts in the 20th century, and whether peacebuilding strategies developed for statecentric conflicts will be effective when dealing with contemporary, modern conflicts best
characterized as internationalized civil wars or mixed conflicts. The third part surveys a
burgeoning literature on transitional justice and studies that have attempted to isolate the
effects of different mechanisms on post-conflict societal indicators, such as democracy or
human rights. The fourth, and final, section surveys critical discussions concerning the
effectiveness of truth commissions and truth-finding processes in post-conflict countries.

The mixed-method research design used to explore and provide empirical answers
to the research questions identified in this chapter is detailed in Chapter 3. Chapter 3
itself is split into five sections. The first section provides the rationale for using a mixedmethod approach. The second describes the original dataset developed for this study, the
quantitative models developed, and the variables employed in these models to test the
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effect of truth commissions and other forms of transitional justice. The third section
describes the case-study design and the fourth section offers a brief synthesis, or
synopsis, of the mixed-method research design.

Chapter 4 presents the statistical tests and their results. The chapter begins by
presenting the results from four models that test the effect of truth commissions on: (1)
levels of democratization; (2) human rights protections; (3) levels of economic growth;
and (4) the durability of peace when holding other transitional justice mechanisms
constant. The second section then presents the results from the four models that test the
effect of truth commissions on these indicators when combined with other mechanisms.
The third section provides a brief, yet clear synthesis of these key findings.

Chapter 5 presents the Rwandan case study. In particular, this chapter critically
assesses survey and interview data collected from gacaca participants to shed insight into
the third research question and fifth hypothesis. These data provide a complicated tale of
post-conflict building in the aftermath of extremely personal and localized violence.
Chapter 6 acts as the concluding chapter in this study by summarizing the key results
found, discussing the implications of these results independently of and in relation to
extant studies on transitional justice, and directing attention to future areas of research
and discovery. This chapter also discusses and acknowledges the limitations associated
with this project as well as the practical applications of the findings.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Introduction
The chapter provides an exhaustive review of the scholarly literature as it relates

to truth commissions and the topic of transitional justice in a broader sense. To do so, key
puzzles and findings raised in extant studies on international conflict, international
peacebuilding, and transitional justice are discussed and dissected. The purpose of
structuring this review in this way is to provide an important foundation for key debates
that linger in the literature and also show how fragmented and decentralized the literature
actually is, which at times creates obstacles toward our understanding of what conditions
peace in war’s last phase and the role that different transitional justice mechanisms,
including truth commissions, play in this complicated and often messy process. A review
of this literature also shows how divided extant studies are in terms of research designs,
research questions, and methodological approaches, which makes comparisons difficult
and creates complications for the establishment of a basic foundation that can provide a
path forward when trying to understand the effect of truth commissions and transitional
justice in the 21st century.

There are four parts to this literature review. The first section surveys the
changing nature of global violence and the “new wars” thesis. The second section
examines the international peacebuilding literature and, in particular, hones in on critical
debates over the goals, effectiveness, and direction of peacebuilding efforts in the 21st
century. In this section, special attention is placed on critiques of “liberal peacebuilding.”
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The third section surveys extant studies on transitional justice and focuses on several key
debates that linger. For example, scholars remain divided on the question of whether it is
better to seek retributive justice, or whether it is better to structure transitional justice
around restorative means. The fourth section specifically focuses on extant studies that
examine the utility and effectiveness of truth commissions as a form of transitional
justice in the 21st century. This chapter concludes with a brief synthesis of these various
discussions. The literature review itself is structured in such a way to “peel” away
different layers to identify gaps and limitations in our knowledge.

2.2

The Changing Nature of Global Violence
Contemporary violence and warfare18 is fundamentally different from the

violence that marked much of the 20th century. Time-series data in Figure 2 illustrate that
interstate wars have virtually ceased to exist in today’s post-Cold War international
system. Andrew Mack (2005, 22-23) was one of the first conflict scholars to estimate that

18

Wars can be categorized based on the nature of the actors and type of violence
involved. Interstate wars involve organized violence between two or more state actors,
whereas intrastate conflicts (i.e., civil wars) involve militarized violence between one or
more state actors and one or more non-state actors within the geographic confines of a
single state (Wallensteen and Sollenburg 2001, 643). As a consequence of most intrastate
conflicts no longer being confined to the territory of one state, Jel Odermatt (2013, 29)
uses the term mixed or internationalized civil wars to describe armed conflicts between
governments and non-state actors such as rebel groups, separatist movements, or
paramilitary groups that take place predominantly within the territory of one state but
spill over into another, with the latter often receiving financial, logistical, or military
assistance from external state actors or donors. The various Islamic groups fighting in
Syria, which are receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, are
an example. Finally, J. Martin Rochester (2012, 146) uses the term extra-state wars to
describe those that involve “unconventional security threats posed by non-state actors,
including transnational terrorist and criminal organizations, which can potentially disrupt
national order and world order through skyjackings, drug trafficking, cyberspace
interference, and other means.”
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intrastate and internationalized intrastate armed conflicts, or civil wars, now comprise
more than 95 percent of contemporary conflicts and wars. Of the 52 conflicts in 2015, for
example, only one was classified as an interstate conflict by the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program. Civil wars, or conflicts within the geographic boundaries of a nation-state
between a government and a non-government actor, have become the primary form of
global violence (Mack 2005; UCDP 2017). Pure civil wars, moreover, are increasingly
being replaced by internationalized, or hybrid civil wars that combine multiple actors and
are fought along the polarizing lines of religion, race, and ethnicity in conjunction with
economic exploitation in the form of natural resource extraction (Collier and Hoeffler
2004). Still further, regional variations now exist in conflict and peace trends, with most
conflicts now located in “zones of war” in parts of Asia, the Middle East, and SubSaharan Africa, and “zones of peace” being in parts of Western Europe, North America,
and Latin America (Singer and Wildavsky 1993; Pinker 2011).

Figure 2: Frequency of Armed Conflict by Type, 1989-2014
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These evolving conflict trends mean that most wars today are fought within, not
between, states and are localized in the poorest and underdeveloped parts of the world.
Although decline of violence theorists (e.g., Pinker 2011; Goldstein 2011) provide
evidence to suggest that all forms of violence are declining worldwide, contemporary
warfare differs dramatically from wars between nation-states or traditional civil wars
decades ago, which were marked by conventional weapons on well-defined battlefields
(Mack 2005; Banks 2011; Pinker 2011; Goldstein 2011). Today’s conflicts are lowintensity in nature, which means that irregular tactics are utilized and formal battles are
rare, which can cause these conflicts to fester for long periods of time. Despite being
labeled as low-intensity, however, the relapse rate for these types of conflicts, if they do
end, has increased dramatically in comparison to conflicts in the first half of the 20th
century (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Walter 2004).

This changing nature of global violence can also be seen by the fact that
contemporary conflicts are increasingly asymmetrical in nature, with non-state actors as
the dominant agents as illustrated by Figure 3. To offset their military disadvantage visà-vis state actors in asymmetric warfare, these actors often utilize guerrilla tactics,
employ irregular, nonconventional weaponry, and deliberately target civilian populations
through unlawful means to create fear.19 Civilian populations, as a consequence, are

19

According to de Nevers (2006, 369), “wars today range from wildly unbalanced
conflicts pitting highly trained and technologically sophisticated armies like that of the
United States against irregular combatants on horseback, to conflicts in which
paramilitaries and criminals intermingle and terrorize local populations to achieve their
own goals.” Under international humanitarian law, belligerents are expected to respect
the principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and the avoidance of
undue suffering. In particular, they are required to clearly distinguish themselves from
civilian populations, avoid using weaponry that inflicts disproportionate suffering, and
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disproportionately affected by modern violence both directly and indirectly. In terms of
the former, Joshua Goldstein (2011, 26) states that “killing and causing the suffering of
civilians can serve military goals such as displacing a hostile population from coveted
land, or punishing a population for supporting insurgents.” In terms of the latter, civilians
often face hardship long afterward in the form of being widowed or losing loves ones,
being forced from their homes, towns, or cities as refugees, or psychological trauma. In a
reversal of civilian to military battle-related deaths in World War I, Charles Kegley and
Shannon Blanton (2010, 509) note that civilian casualities now outnumber military
casualities by a ratio of nine to one.

Figure 3: Frequency of State-Actor Based and Nonstate-Actor Based Conflicts
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avoid conducting military operations in heavily populated civilian areas. For a discussion
on how new wars play havoc with laws of armed conflict, see Banks (2011) and
Rochester (2016).
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To describe these evolving conflict trends, “new wars” theorists (e.g., Kaldor
2004; Hammes 2005; de Nevers 2006; Duffield 2014) argue that modern warfare is
distinct in several ways from conventional warfare between nation-states that shaped the
nature of global violence for much of international relations history, including the 20th
century.20 Mary Kaldor (2006, 2), who coined the term “new wars” to describe the nature
of conflict in today’s post-Cold War international system, posits that modern conflicts
blur “distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized
political groups for political motives), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately
organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain), and large-scale violations
of human rights (violence undertaken by states or political organized groups against
individuals).” Of particular importance to Kaldor (2013, 3) is the changing nature of the
belligerents involved -- ranging from rebel groups and private security contractors to
warlords, jihadists, and children -- their goals, the methods they employ, and how they
finance their war efforts.21 Mark Duffield (2014, 14-15) builds on this terminology by
stating that new wars are defined by local-global connections that work through and
within states.22

20

This “new wars” literature is extensive. We have especially benefited from Hammes
(2005); de Nevers (2006); Kaldor (2006); Lind et al. (2008); Kaldor (2013).
21
“Weak states” can be defined as those that are rife with corruption, fragile government
institutions, and limited rule of law. A key feature of “failed states” is their inability to
provide security and public goods and exercise sovereignty over a territory with defined
borders (Rotberg 2004, 2-21). Most intrastate conflicts are concentrated in states where
transnational terrorist organizations operate freely, including Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq,
Syria, and Yemen.
22
Duffield (2014, 14) argues that “new wars can be understood as a form of nonterritorial network war that works through and around states.”
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Coupled with the breakdown of key distinctions between combatants and
noncombatants in today’s new battlegrounds that are fought in urban jungles, crowded
markets, schools, and public transit systems, most ongoing and reoccurring wars are
sustained through the contracting out of organized violence and financed through the
establishment of war economies (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Banks 2011; Andreas 2014;
Duffield 2014). The illicit trade of small arms, antiquities, precious resources, drugs, and
human trafficking make contemporary warfare “good business.”23 In sum, Kaldor (2007,
185) notes the factors that fuel violence, namely “fear and hatred, a criminalized
economy that profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states,
or the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups,” persist and are often strengthened
long after overt hostilities cease. Duffield (2014, 14) comments that new wars have
“allowed warring parties to forge local-global networks and shadow economies as a
means of asset realisation and self-provisioning.”

For conceptual purposes, it is important to note that economic gain, quasi-private
criminal combatants, plunder, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and guerrilla tactics are hardly
new developments in the history of warfare.24 Further, numerous scholars critique the

23

See the “greed and grievance” thesis advanced by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Also
see Andreas (2014) for a discussion on how smuggling practices and quasi-private
criminal combatants played a critical role in the outbreak, persistence, and termination of
conflict in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995.
24
Stacey (1994, 27-39) provides an excellent discussion on how wars between Christian
belligerents in Europe and between Christian and non-Christian belligerents elsewhere
during the Middle Ages was marked by the indiscriminate killing of combatants and
noncombatants alike (bellum romanum). In the 16th century, large swaths of territory in
Europe were subjected to conflicts marked by indiscriminate killing and plunder,
moreover. Also see Boot (2013) and Kaplan (2015) for a detailed discussion on the
historical evolution of asymmetric warfare as a tool of the “weak” as well as the use of
terrorism as a weapon to create fear among civilian populations throughout human
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very foundations of the news wars thesis by arguing that there is nothing “new” about
contemporary violence (Kalvyas 2001; Berdal 2003; Newman 2004; Darabont 2010; De
Waal 2012). What makes modern conflicts “new” is that they have replaced conventional
warfare between regular armies of nation-states as the primary form of global violence in
today’s post-Cold War international system that remains structured around state
interactions. These conflicts blur distinctions between regular and irregular, internal and
external, and public and private, causing contemporary global violence to represent a
vivid departure from a traditional “Clausewitzian,” or state-centric, view of warfare. The
latter has dominated thinking about the causes of war and how we can promote a durable
and sustainable peace once overt violence and hostilities end.25 As Renée de Nevers
(2006: 378) writes, the key point about new wars is not to debate whether terrorism,
guerrilla warfare, criminality, and greed are new, rather how modern conflicts in a
radically new global setting deviate from the “European model of war involving state
armies of soldiers meeting on a battlefield” that engage in stylized conflict using
acceptable weapons. Even more importantly, contemporary wars are often spawned by
state-failing and denationalization26 processes, which may cause “winning” in a strategic
military sense to no longer be a key objective for belligerents involved.

Although terminology and conceptual definitions are bitterly contested in extant
studies, the former conflicts in the Balkans and Sierra Leone as well as the protracted

history. Boot (2013, 100) goes as far as to argue that conventional warfare is a recent
innovation and the exception rather than the norm when viewed historically.
25
Clausewitz’s conception of war is based on symmetric conflicts between state armies
of roughly equal military strength and comparable organizational structures.
26
Denationalization refers to attempts to break apart a national identity, whether it is
based on a shared heritage, culture, religion, race, or ethnicity.
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conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and
Ukraine today mark the specific contours of new wars. Peter Andreas (2004) finds that
ethnic and religious conflict between Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims was
predominantly orchestrated by paramilitary groups who profited from plunder, hostagetaking, and establishing black markets in weapons and human trafficking, thus adding a
local-global profit-dimension to an already complicated ethnic and religious divide.
Along with perpetrating violence to secure lucrative financial gains, Andreas finds that
these groups purposely recruited criminals into their ranks and utilized ethnic cleansing,
sexual violence, and forced deportation as tactical strategies. de Nevers (2006) finds that
mercenaries figured prominently in Sierra Leone’s internationalized civil war, with
private security contractors hired to train government forces, protect natural resources
that could be utilized to sustain future hostilities, and conduct military operations.27
Ongoing violence in the DRC today is characterized by both government and rebel forces
relying on outside financial, military, and logistical assistance and the trade of precious
resources to fuel war efforts. Not only are decisive battles rare, Séverine Austesserre
(2006: 6-8) finds that civilian populations are purposively targeted through violence or
servitude to create fear and exercise control over territory.

In Afghanistan, de Nevers (2006) argues that even after a multinational coalition
toppled the Taliban and aided in the establishment of a new national government,
warlords remain the principal agents of political authority and violence festers as a
consequence of these warlords having financial incentives to benefit from a lucrative,
27

de Nevers (2006, 380-382) provides an excellent discussion on the role private security
contractors, many of whom were former military personnel from South Africa and the
United Kingdom, played in conducting asymmetric warfare in Sierra Leone’s civil war.
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multibillion dollar opium economy.28 In Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) utilizes foreign mercenaries, funds itself through the sale of priceless
antiquities and petroleum in black markets, and targets different ethnic and religious
groups through illegal slavery, sexual violence, beheadings, and ethnic cleansing. As a
consequence of incentives to continue fighting in order to protect lucrative markets,
thousands of civilians have been displaced while ancient hatreds along religious and
ethnic lines have become the focal point of violence. Finally, Russian-backed separatists
and government-backed militia groups in Eastern Ukraine purposively violate laws of
armed conflict (LOAC) to gain a strategic advantage. Doing so has caused civilian
populations to be disproportionately affected by food-shortages and indiscriminate
violence, while hostilities continue as these groups resist negotiated settlements out of
concerns they may be charged with crimes against humanity once overt hostilities end.

2.3

Why Are These Changing Conflict Trends Important?
Efforts at resolving conflicts on the international stage are complicated by these

changing conflict dynamics. In a UN (2014) report titled “Major Recent Trends in
Violent Conflict,” it is estimated that 90 percent of UN peacekeeping forces are deployed
in scenarios marked by low-intensity conflict, which has contributed to the evolution of
international peacebuilding away from “peacekeeping” to third generation “peace
enforcing” missions (Diehl et al. 1998; Doyle and Sambanis 2007; Sloan 2011). As
Duffield (2014, 16) argues, “new wars have blurred distinctions between people, army,
and government and, at the same time, forged new ways of projecting power through
28

For a discussion on how Afghanistan fits the contours of the new wars thesis, see de
Nevers (2006, 379).
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non-territorial public-private networks and systems.” As a result, it is now increasingly
difficult to address underlying causes of conflict or to create the conditions necessary for
the establishment of orderly, peaceful societies in light of the fragmented nature of
contemporary violence and the disparate actors involved.

Of further importance, civilian populations are subject to extreme and
disproportionate violence perpetrated along religious, ethnic, and racial lines through the
use of irregular tactics, which makes the establishment of peaceful, orderly post-conflict
societies an extremely daunting task. As John Paul Lederach (1996, 18) notes, “deeprooted and long-standing animosities that are reinforced by high levels of violence and
direct experiences of atrocities” often derail peace efforts and those geared toward
promoting reconciliation.29 Coupled with this disproportionate violence, war-shattered
societies in the world today often remain embroiled in a “conflict trap” due to basic needs
like food, water, shelter, and security being unmet and former warlords, paramilitary
commanders, or sympathizers of an oppressive regime being granted positions of power
in transitional governments. These realities on the ground challenge existing strategies to
mitigate and prevent reoccurring violence.30 Similar to the obstacles created by these

29

Lederach’s (1996, 7-10) work on peacebuilding in post-Cold War conflicts is one of
the first to note how the changing nature of global violence complicates efforts at
building peace, even though he does not use the term “new wars.”
30
The international community has traditionally relied on state-centric approaches such
as peacekeeping and diplomacy to mitigate the adverse effects of interstate war. DeShaw
Rae (2009) points out that the three foundational elements of peacekeeping include: (1)
the minimum use of force; (2) consent and deployment based on full agreement of all
parties; and (3) impartiality. Posing a critique to the ability of these traditional approaches
to build peace in the aftermath of civil strife, Lederach (1996, 16) writes, “we persist in
relying on traditional statist diplomacy, despite its inadequacies in responding to the
nature of conflicts today.” Along with peacebuilding, new wars play havoc with
international rules governing warfare that remain tailored to interstate conflicts. For a
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changing conflict trends for LOAC (see Banks 2011; Corn 2011; Rose 2011; Jensen
2011; Richemond-Barak 2011), these trends are also felt in the war’s last phase. As a
result, devising ways of responding to these changing dynamics of global violence as
well as determining how to build peace when hostilities have ended remain topics of
considerable interest and debate.

2.4

What is Peacebuilding?
Peacebuilding31 represents a post-conflict enterprise that includes actions

undertaken after the immediate termination of armed hostilities to mitigate, address, and
ultimately remove underlying causes of conflict. Initially defined by former UN
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992, 5) as “action to identify and support
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into
conflict,” peacebuilding is a robust and holistic approach adopted by the international
community to eliminate various social, economic, political, and security dilemmas that
directly threaten the establishment of a sustainable and durable peace in the post-conflict
stage. As Roland Paris (1997, 55) writes, peacebuilding operations involve a variety of
actors -- ranging from IGOs and INGOs to third-party donors and individual states -- that
are tasked with monitoring cease-fires, disarming belligerents, monitoring and
conducting elections, providing humanitarian assistance, rebuilding and training security
forces, repatriating refugees, rebuilding bridges and infrastructure, demining conflict
zones, and overseeing interim government activities. Although an emphasis is placed on
discussion on how these rules are becoming increasingly obsolete, see Banks (2011, 915) and Rochester (2016).
31
Peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding are used interchangeably in the
literature.
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improving security and humanitarian conditions initially, peacebuilding operations are
structured in such a way to build effective and legitimate state institutions, broaden
political participation, deepen civil society, and create pluralistic institutions that weave
various ethnic and religious groups together into the fabric of society (Doyle and
Sambanis 2000, 779).

These various activities illustrate that peacebuilding is both an ongoing and
sequential process that contains short-term and long-term goals (Lederach 1996; Jeong
2005; Berdal 2009; Philpott 2012). The short-term goals of peacebuilding are to provide
security guarantees and mitigate the detrimental effect of spoilers, whereas the long-term
goals of peacebuilding are to build effective and legitimate state institutions, repair
economic structures, broaden political participation, establish nonviolent dispute
resolution mechanisms, and remove negative emotions of anger, fear, and humiliation
(Stedman 1997). These activities also illustrate that peacebuilding is a preventive tool
with the intended goal of healing deep-seated wounds that inevitably fester even after
overt hostilities end (Cravo 2017, 48). Peacebuilders, in the form of international
peacekeepers and personnel with INGOs, often are tasked then with the difficult goals of
not only preventing renewed violence but also addressing the root causes of the violence
itself. Picking up the pieces after the dust has settled, as a result, has become the chief
source of growth and need for UN over the past two decades (Weiss 2013; de Soto and
del Castillo 2016). As of September 2017, 71 peacebuilding operations have been
authorized since 1948 with 58 of those operations occurring since 1988 (UN 2017).
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Although the main goal of peacebuilding is to prevent future violence,
considerable debate exists among scholars, practitioners, and policymakers over the
goals, objectives, and strategies of peacebuilding. As Rob Jenkins (2013, 19) suggests,
the key contentions refer to the “when, what, how, and who – that is, the period during
which peacebuilding takes place, the type of peace sought, the methods employed to
attain it, and the key actors in the peacebuilding enterprise.” Drawing upon the
distinctions between “positive” and “negative” peace conceived by Johan Galtung
(1965), securing an end to overt hostilities and violence can be considered an
achievement in itself (negative peace). Unfortunately, the threat of violence does not end
when arms are laid down, when belligerents are demobilized, or when peace agreements
are signed. A growing consensus has emerged that building inclusive economic, legal,
social, and political institutions as well as eliminating “structural violence” in the form of
inequality, poverty, and discrimination is often necessary for preventing underlying
sources of conflict from becoming the proximate causes for renewed violence (positive
peace) (Lederach 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Chandler 2004; Jeong 2005;
Porter 2007; Porter 2015).

In spite of this growing awareness that negative peace is fragile, consensus on
how to cultivate positive peace in the aftermath of civil strife remains problematic. Some
scholars contend that reengineering post-conflict societies requires deepening intergroup
harmony, repairing social dynamics, and facilitating dialogue between former
adversaries. Lederach (1996: 84), for example, argues that transforming a “war-system
characterized by deeply divided, hostile, and violent relationships into a peace-system
characterized by just and interdependent relationships with the capacity to find
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nonviolent mechanisms for expressing and handling conflict” is critical for promoting
peace. Elisabeth Porter (2007, 34) further argues that the goal of peacebuilding is to
“build positive relationships, heal wounds, reconcile antagonistic differences, restore
esteem, respect rights, meet basic needs, enhance equality, instill feelings of security,
(and) empower moral agency.” Ho-Won Jeong (2005) suggests that long-term peace can
only be cultivated by facilitating complex interdependencies and dialogue between
opposing societal groups.

Other scholars instead emphasize the need for peacebuilding operations to
promote state-building32 through rebuilding physical infrastructure, facilitating
socioeconomic reforms, and establishing democratic institutions (Doyle and Sambanis
2000; Chandler 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Skarlato et
al. 2013). Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), for example, argue that
peacebuilding operations can meet the needs of their every-changing missions by
restructuring corrupt security forces, weak legal systems, and unresponsive political
institutions. Peacebuilding operations, moreover, are also more likely to be successful
when they are paired with peace agreements (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Seth Kaplan
(2008) posits that state-building activities can generate legitimacy and accountability for
a transitional government, both of which are critical for the nurturing of peace, stability,
and resiliency over an extended period of time as well as bring an end to physical
hostilities in the short-term. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) further argue that
state-building can alleviate government deficiencies, which can reduce the high
32

The terms state-building and nation-building are used interchangeably in the literature.
State-building, in its simplest form, refers to actions undertaken to reform and strengthen
state institutions that are either missing or severely eroded (Caplan 2005).
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opportunity costs of war and increase incentives among warring parties to remain at
peace. Finally, Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth (2008) contend that stable, legitimate,
and effective institutions that are responsive to citizen needs and capable of providing
basic services increases the probability of a war-torn country remaining at peace.

2.5

Are Current Approaches to Peacebuilding Flawed?
Coupled with this disagreement over what peacebuilding operations should look

like, the means of building peace in post-conflict societies are also contested.33 Critics
and proponents hone in on the “liberal” discourse of peacebuilding operations. Based on
a long history of Western thinking about what conditions peace both within and between
states, the liberal peace thesis holds that liberal democracy,34 free-market economies,35
and the institutionalization of the rule of law are critical for building peaceful societies
(Russett and Oneal 2001).36 The logic behind implementing liberal reforms in postconflict societies, as Caroline Hartzell (2014, 378) comments, rests on the belief that
“market democracies and related institutions are thought to help support a durable peace
by fostering restraint, tolerance for others, predictability, justice, a sense of security, and

33

Peacebuilding operations in Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and East Timor are
considered success stories. Peacebuilding operations in the DRC, Somalia, and Cyprus,
on the other hand, are considered failures since they failed to prevent belligerents from
resorting back to the use of armed violence to achieve better terms.
34
Zakaria (1997) defines liberal democracies as those promote free, fair, and competitive
elections, protect basic civil liberties, and are marked by independent media and
judiciaries.
35
Free market ideology, or “market fundamentalism,” is predicated on the belief that
privatization, deregulation, and laissez-faire economics promote development, increased
investment, and prosperity (Stiglitz 2003).
36
In Iraq and Afghanistan, neoliberal principles have been applied extensively with the
hope that democratic and free-market reforms will promote a self-sustaining and
enduring peace for generations to come.
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prosperity, on the one hand, and minimizing the potential for governmental abuse and
arbitrary action on the other hand.”

Proponents defend incorporating liberal principles into peacebuilding operations
in several ways (Rummel 1997; Paris 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Paris 2009; Paris
2010). R.J. Rummel (1997, 85), for example, argues that creating liberal institutions
makes post-conflict countries less prone to civil unrest and other forms of domestic
dysfunction, including “revolutions, bloody coup d’états, political assassinations
antigovernment terrorist bombings, guerilla warfare, insurgencies, civil wars, mutinies,
and rebellions.” Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000, 779-780), moreover,
comment that pluralistic state institutions, the rule of law, and higher levels of economic
development can explain why some post-conflict countries remain at peace while others
relapse back into armed hostilities. Roland Paris (1997, 2009, 2010) staunchly defends
the liberal approach to international peacebuilding by arguing that there is no effective
alternative. Electoral reforms and privatization efforts may fall short; however, Paris
comments (2010, 362) that the “challenge today is not to replace or more “beyond”
liberal peacebuilding but to reform existing approaches within a broadly liberal
framework.” According to proponents, then, the post-conflict stage represents a critical
window, or juncture, to implement key political, social, and economic reforms that can
cure post-conflict countries by bringing disparate actors and former belligerents into the
fold and creating incentives for warring parties to peaceful coexist through creating
positive-sum institutions. Echoing Francis Fukuyama (1992), who defiantly claimed the
“end of history,” champions of this liberal discourse suggest that structuring
peacebuilding operations around the implementation of elections, the building of state
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institutions, and the opening of markets is the only way to repair war-torn societies.37
This logic of the liberal approach to peacebuilding is depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The Liberal Peacebuilding Approach

Rule of Law

Peace

Liberal Democracy

Free-Market Reforms

Critics, on the other hand, posit that contemporary peacebuilding operations are
ill-prepared to deal with their ever-expanding missions and liberal peacebuilding
strategies, sometimes labeled liberal interventionism or liberal internationalism, are
structured around incompatible and often conflicting goals (Barnet 2006; Cooper 2007;
Chandler 2008; Pugh et al. 2008; Richmond 2011). Instant liberalization, or quickly
promoting neoliberal principles in post-conflict societies through democratization as well
as marketization, may actually may be doing more harm than good. This is largely a
consequence of unintended socioeconomic and political disparities in the short-term,
which raise the specter of renewed violence due to growing tensions between winners

37

Fukuyama (1992) posited that the end of the Cold War represented a triumph for
liberalism and constitutional democracy over its ideological counterparts – fascism and
communism – in the 21st century.
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and losers in markets and political processes.38 Michael Barnett (2006, 89), for example,
suggests that liberal reforms are detrimental since they lack the “necessary institutional
framework or civil culture to absorb the potential pressures associated with political and
market competition.” Kirsten Howarth (2014) suggests that liberal democratic and
economic reforms produce unequal outcomes, which creates a cycle of interpersonal
violence and crime in post-conflict societies. In response to Paris’ critical defense of
liberal peacebuilding, Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh (2011) argue that
promoting free markets and strengthening instruments of state coercion through “capacity
building” leave little room for improvements in democracy and human rights.

The claims of these critics are backed by recent empirical research, which shows a
negative relationship between elections and the durability of peace or neoliberal
economic reforms and peace. In a recent study on post-conflict elections, Thomas Flores
and Infran Nooruddin (2012, 558) find that those held within the first year after armed
hostilities end actually increase the probability of renewed violence when holding other
predictor variables, such as type of victory or geographic region constant. Despite the
normative appeal of replacing bullets with ballots, they posit that this is largely a
consequence of former enemies using their newfound power to punish their opponents.
Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Molly Bauer (2010) also find evidence to suggest that
neoliberal reforms enacted immediately following the cessation of violence exacerbate
38

Barnet (2006: 89) argues that liberal peacebuilding strategies are actually sowing the
seeds for renewed violence since post-conflict societies “do not have the necessary
institutional framework or civil culture to absorb the potential pressures associated with
political and market competition.” Paris (1997: 56) notes that “paradoxically, the very
process of political and economic liberalization has generated destabilizing side effects in
war-shattered states, hindering the consolidation of peace and in some cases even
sparking renewed violence.”
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tensions between winners and losers in markets, which increases the likelihood of
fighting reigniting. Roger Mac Ginty (2011, 7-8) in a provocative critique of
reengineering societies through establishing electoral democracies finds that in four postconflict settings (Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Kosovo, and Mozambique) turnout
rates in parliamentary elections drop significantly after a peace accord is signed or as
elections become more entrenched.39

Other critics question the top-down nature of mediation in peacebuilding
operations (Belloni 2001; Austesserre 2009; Pugh 2009; Labonte 2012; Mac Ginty and
Richemond 2013). To these critics, top-down mediation tends to fortify the privileged
status of predatory elites that largely contributed to the onset of violence. Michael Pugh
(2009), for example, suggests that top-down peacebuilding strategies lock, or freeze,
conflicts in place by ignoring local concerns, marginalizing local power-brokers, and
making civilian populations more vulnerable to social divisions and intergroup tensions.
Melissa Labonte (2012, 90) finds that top-down political reforms in Sierra Leone enabled
political elites at the national-level to regain control over decision-making processes at
the expense of local councils. Austesserre (2009, 249) also finds that peacebuilding
operations in the DRC have failed as a consequence of political and economic reforms
failing to resolve local grievances over land, resources, and administrative power that
have traditionally been a source of violent conflict throughout modern Congolese history.
Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond (2013) support more localized peacebuilding
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Mac Ginty finds that turnout rates decreased in Kosovo in 1998 from approximately 71
percent to 37 percent in 2006, from 90 percent in El Salvador in 1997 to 54 percent in
2009, from 50 percent in Kosovo in 2004 to 45 percent in 2007, and from 88 percent in
Mozambique in 1994 to 36 percent in 2004.
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strategies due to realities on the group, in where local actors are often the first source, and
final, source of peacebuilding efforts and since infighting behind major players or actors
in most international peacebuilding operations lead to a loss of confidence in a particular
mission’s public image or legitimacy.

To improve the track record of peacebuilding, even if it remains a liberal
endeavor, Mac Ginty (2011) proposes “hybrid peacebuilding,” which entails the use of
liberal peacebuilding mechanisms but in conjunction with input of local actors or agents
that are capable of providing incentives to partake and participate in peacebuilding
activities. Barnett (2006) proposes a “republican peacebuilding,” which places an
emphasis on deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation to build legitimacy for the
peacebuilding process and address the underlying concerns of all belligerents involved
instead of relying on instant liberalization. Labonte (2012) and Austesserre (2009)
propose yet another model, which is predicated on the utilization of INGOs and other
third-party actors at the local level to increase the legitimacy of peacebuilding operations
and incorporate local concerns that are often neglected at the national-level, yet become
the proximate causes for future conflict. Finally, Jonathan Goodhand (2006)40 as well as
Carrie Manning and Monica Malbrough (2010)41 are advocates for approaches that take
into account regional differences and variations in peace processes worldwide, with a
particular emphasis placed on incorporating regional donors or region-specific actors that
have country-specific experience, knowledge of domestic political actors and institutions,
40

Goodhand (2006) is a proponent of “regional peacebuilding,” largely through regional
organizations, rather than the cookie-cutter approach that has been used to describe
liberal peacebuilding.
41
Manning and Malbrough (2010, 143-169) cite the success of third-party, regional
actors in Mozambique as evidence for the success of regional-specific approaches.
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and a shared commitment to successful outcomes in comparison to UN-directed
operations.

2.6

Transitional Justice as Peacebuilding in the 21st Century
A subset of this peacebuilding literature stresses the importance of addressing past

human rights abuses and demands of justice by victims against those they regard as
perpetrators as a way of maintaining peace (Minow 1998; Tutu 1999; Teitel 2000; Teitel
2003; Posner and Vermeule 2004; Philpott 2012; Porter 2015). As an academic topic,
scholars are increasingly concerned how post-conflict societies come to terms with
violence, oppression, and massive human rights abuses committed during periods of state
repression, political instability, or armed conflict. A key area of analysis is how
transitional societies employ different transitional justice42 mechanisms-- ranging from
criminal tribunals and political purges to amnesty, reparations, and truth commissions -to address past wrongs, hold those who are guilty of perpetrating atrocities accountable,
and prevent the repetition of abuses in the future (Elster 2004). The roots of modern
transitional justice can be traced to international efforts to develop international criminal
law in response to the near extermination of European Jews at the hands of the Nazis as
well as war crimes perpetrated by the Japanese during the Second World War in the

42

Teitel (2000, 11) defines transitional justice as a conception of justice associated with
periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront wrongdoings
committed during periods of upheaval. Olson, Payne, and Reiter (2010, 805) expand this
definition of transitional justice by noting how it encompasses an “array of processes
designed to address systematic or widespread human rights violations committed during
periods of state repression or armed conflict.”
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Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals respectively.43 Although the roots of
transitional justice can be traced to these two international criminal tribunals, transitional
justice as a conception of post-conflict justice truly emerged during the 1980s as various
political transitions in Latin America attempted to deal with past human rights abuses
and, more importantly, thousands of “disappeared” under the oppressive reign of military
governments in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil (Arthur 2009). This view of transitional
justice as a critical component of international peacebuilding efforts was finally realized
in the aftermath of the Cold War, which effectively gave a “green light” for the
international community to pursue ambitious transitional justice projects in response to
mass violence in places such as Bosnia and Rwanda. Once considered merely instruments
to promote victor’s justice, transitional justice mechanisms began to be viewed as
appropriate strategies for post-conflict countries to deal with legacies of past abuses
(Subotic 2009, 166).

Over time, scholars have shifted their focus to studying how and when different
transitional justice mechanisms are employed and what factors impede or provide the
foundations for the success of these mechanisms. For example, should a post-conflict
society utilize trials to punish perpetrators, or should they offer amnesty to those who are
willing to lay down their arms, confess their crimes, demobilize, and seek reconciliation
in their former communities? Does offering amnesty, moreover, satisfy victims’ demands
for justice, or does it create new grievances?
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For a discussion on how the field of transitional justice has evolved, see Posner and
Vermeule (2004) and Fischer (2011).
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The basic premise behind transitional justice is that peace can only be cultivated
by addressing painful memories and past suffering. As Porter (2015, 10) writes, “the
objectives of transitional justice are twofold: to deal with the past in confronting the
legacies of human rights abuses and human suffering, ensuring accountability for past
injustices while maintaining peace, the rule of law, and democratic processes; and also, to
move into the future, including fostering reconciliation.” Although transitional justice can
be viewed as retrospective due to an emphasis being placed on punishing wrongdoers or
compensating victims, the prospective, or forward-looking dimension, of transitional
justice offered by Porter is important since it promotes the idea that confronting the past
is an essential ingredient for moving forward.44 Minow (1998, 2) similarly comments that
post-conflict societies “have to struggle over how much to acknowledge, whether to
punish, and how to recover.”
In today’s post-Cold War landscape, transitional justice mechanisms have
increasingly become embedded in peacebuilding operations. This proliferation is largely
a consequence of shifting international attitudes that perpetrators must be held
responsible for their actions in war and noncombatants must be afforded basic protections
from the violence that is perpetrated. This proliferation has also been aided by a growing
body of scholarship that stresses the need for a “just” peace to be established to prevent a
cycle of renewed violence (Walzer 1992; Rawls 1999; Orend 2002; Bass 2004; Walzer
2004; Williams and Caldwell 2006; Stahn 2007; Williams 2014). Despite being
underdeveloped in the Just War tradition, a cornerstone of jus post bellum (“justice after
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For a discussion on how transitional justice is criticized as being backward thinking,
see Posner and Vermeule (2004, 766) and Porter (2015, 10-12).
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war”) is the assumption that restoring basic human rights protections and addressing a
legacy of past human rights abuses is necessary and sufficient for an enduring and
durable peace to take root. Similar to a revolution in ideas concerning international
peacebuilding, scholars also began to view transitional justice along transformative lines,
meaning that transitional justice, like peacebuilding, is both a short-term and long-term
process that links the past to the future (Lambourne 2009).

As Michael Walzer (1992) notes, considerations about ending a war justly are of
equal importance to considerations as to whether a war was started for just reasons (jus
ad bellum) or whether that war was fought justly (jus in bello). John Rawls (1999, 98)
also discusses postwar obligations and contends that “the enemy’s people are not to be
held as slaves or serfs after surrender, or denied in due time their full liberties.” Building
on the work of Walzer and Rawls, which remain the most influential on the topic, Robert
Williams and Dan Caldwell (2006, 309) argue a “just peace exists when the human rights
of those involved in the war, on both sides, are more secure than they were before the
war.” Brian Orend (2002, 55) further comments that a just peace is one in where “human
rights to life and liberty and community entitlements to territory and sovereignty” are
established. Finally, Carsten Stahn (2007, 936) argues that “a fair and just peace
settlement will ideally endeavor to achieve a higher level of human rights protection,
accountability, and good governance than in the period before the resort to armed force.”

2.7

Vengeance or Forgiveness?
Transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict societies assume two broad

forms: retributive justice and restorative justice. When pursuing retributive justice,
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perpetrators of human rights abuses are held accountable through criminal prosecution
and punishment through courts of law and ad hoc war crimes tribunals (trials), through
ineligibility for public office (lustration), or through being forced to repay victims,
usually through monetary compensation.45 The rationale behind retributive justice is that
some abuses are so heinous that perpetrators must be punished due to the extent of the
harm inflicted by their actions. If not, past injustices will remain unaddressed and a cycle
of impunity will continue, increasing the prospects for armed violence reigniting. As
Minow (1998, 12) writes, retributive justice “reflects a belief that wrongdoers deserve
blame and punishment in direct proportion to the harm inflicted,” in the hope that doing
so will deter abuses in the future and establish a society that upholds the virtue of human
rights and the rule of law. A central assumption of retributive justice, then, is the idea that
those responsible for organizing, orchestrating, or actually carrying out acts of mass
violence should not “get away with” their crimes and only a legal response -- one that is
capable of handing down punishments for these crimes -- is capable of creating the
conditions necessary for peace, societal stability, and reconciliation (Stover and
Weinstein 2004; Fletcher 2005).
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As a form of retributive justice, Posner and Vermeule (2004, 766) note that in criminal
trials “perpetrators (are) charged with crimes and then provided with lawyers, the chance
to defend themselves, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and other procedural
protections.” In their most basic form, lustration policies (i.e., political purges) are
intended to formally prevent perpetrators of state oppression or human rights abuses from
holding public office or positions in a country’s security apparatus. For a discussion on
the role of lustration policies in transitional justice literature, see Mayer-Rieckh and De
Greiff (2007). Also see David (2003) for a discussion on the role of lustration policies in
the Czech Republic and Poland to impose legal disabilities on former communist regime
members and their sympathizers. Olsen, Payne, and Reiter (2010, 806) define reparations
as a “state’s official grant of monetary payments, property, or other forms of restitution of
monetary value to victims, or to relatives of victims, of past human rights violations.”
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Restorative justice, on the other hand, takes the form of amnesties, pardons,
public memory projects, and truth commissions.46 In contrast to retributive justice, the
goal of restorative justice is to heal and reintegrate victims and perpetrators into society.
As John Braithwaite (1999) notes, “restorative justice is about restoring victims, restoring
offenders, and restoring communities.” Susan Olson and Albert Dzur (2004, 139) further
offer that restorative justice is victim-centric and decenters the focus on offenders to
broader institutional weaknesses and social disparities that made violence possible. The
underlying goal is to right a balance between groups bitterly divided along the polarizing
lines of ethnicity, class, religion, or race to advance reconciliation and, more importantly,
to allow individuals an opportunity to recover from past trauma.

In the transitional justice literature, widespread debate exists between the values
of “vengeance” and “forgiveness” and which is more compatible with the lofty goals of
peace, justice, and reconciliation in post-conflict societies (Minow 1998). These
competing visions of what justice entails, as a result, has created a healthy debate
concerning what type of mechanism should be used and under what contexts. To some
scholars, retributive justice contributes to reconciliation more so than restorative justice
mechanisms (Huyse 2003; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Wigglesworth 2008). Luc Huyse
(2003: 98), for example, posits that retributive justice can help post-conflict societies
move forward by preventing perpetrators of abuses from returning to power and ending a
46

Porter (2015, 82-83) notes that amnesties, as a form of restorative justice, often grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to former combatants in exchange for disclosing
their role in orchestrating human rights abuses or human suffering. Already defined
above, Hayner’s (1994, 558) definition of truth commissions is widely accepted: truth
commissions are “bodies set up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights
in a particular country – which can include violations by the military or other government
forces or armed opposition forces.”
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cycle of impunity. Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling (2007) broadly assess the
impact of retributive justice mechanisms in Latin America and conclude that these
mechanisms have contributed to democratic consolidation and increased human rights
protections. Gillian Wigglesworth (2008) further argues that retributive justice
mechanisms foster reconciliation by making it difficult for heads of state and other
important political and military leaders to avoid facing legal consequences for their
actions, which allows post-conflict societies to prevent a repetition of abuses. Hunjoon
Kim and Kathryn Sikkink (2010) argue that trials do indeed promote positive societal
outcomes, especially positive human rights outcomes, since they promote accountability
that socially ostracize violations and the potential for a future repetition of abuses.
Somewhat refuting the findings of Sikkink and Walling (2007) and the overall arguments
advanced by scholars that favor trials as a form of retributive justice, James Meernik,
Angela Nichols, and Kimi King (2010) find little evidence to suggest that trials make
much of a positive or negative difference when examining the effect of domestic and
international prosecutions in post-conflict countries between 1982 and 2007.

On the other hand, other scholars contend that restorative justice mechanisms
represent a more viable long-term option for promoting reconciliation since they can
repair broken relationships and promote societal healing (Hayner 1994; Goldstone 1995;
Nino 1996; Minow 1998; Kritz 1999; Tutu 1999; Rotberg and Thompson 2000; Hamber
2001; Mamdani 2001; Amstutz 2005; Roman and Choi Yuk-ping 2005; Kerr and
Mobekk 2007; Clark 2008; Kashyap 2009; Porter 2015). Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk
(2007, 4), for example, contend that restorative justice mechanisms ensure that past
wrongs will never happen again by strengthening the rule of law, which delivers justice
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and lessens a desire for vengeance. Rina Kashyap (2009, 453) contends that restorative
justice “identifies the opportunity to tell the story of what happened, as a primary need of
the victim,” which gives victims a sense of justice and allows them the opportunity to
forgive. Porter (2015, 14) further notes that for harms that can reasonably be addressed
through restorative justice, “accountability for wrongdoing is recognized, but the target of
justice lies in achieving a right relation between the victim and perpetrator – that is, some
degree of reconciliation.” Finally, Janine Clark (2008) finds that restorative justice
processes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have initiated and furthered
reconciliation more so than retributive processes. Examining the effectiveness of
reparations in the Czech Republic, Roman David and Susanne Choi Yuk-ping (2005) also
find that reparations to victims of human rights violations can provide sociopolitical
redress, whereas retributive justice mechanisms rarely deliver reconciliation. To these
scholars, retributive justice holds the potential to destabilize fragile post-conflict societies
by provoking hostile attitudes and new grievances.

2.8

Is Transitional Justice Flawed?
Coupled with this disagreement over the appropriate nature of transitional justice

processes, other scholars question whether transitional justice mechanisms are compatible
with peace and reconciliation to begin with. Some scholars hail the pacifying effect of
transitional justice mechanisms and their ability to alleviate volatile emotions and
advance healing (Goldstone 1996; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Olsen et al. 2010;
Nettelfield 2010; Porter 2015). Richard Goldstone (1996), for example, argues that
transitional justice mechanisms compliment peace by strengthening judicial systems and
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the rule of law. Lara Nettelfield (2010) further finds that transitional justice mechanisms,
notably ad hoc tribunals, have contributed to democratization and peaceful transitions in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Other scholars instead argue that transitional justice mechanisms undermine the
peace they are intended to create and are frequently manipulated for personal and
political gain (Kiss 2006; Minkkinen 2007; Leebaw 2008; Lundy and McGovern 2008).
Csilla Kiss (2006, 927), for example, finds that transitional justice mechanisms employed
in Hungary failed as a consequence of them diverting “attention from ongoing difficulties
in the country, especially social issues deriving from inherited economic problems … as
well as from financial and economic management committed in the course of
privatization and social reform.” Bronwyn Leebaw (2008) argues that transitional justice
processes are susceptible to revenge or victor’s justice, which creates the question of
“whose” justice is being served. Panu Minkkinen (2007) also points out that transitional
justice mechanisms fail to address resentment, which causes underlying feelings of anger,
hate, and animosity to fester well beyond the immediate termination of violence.

Along with this critique that transitional justice may actually undermine the peace
it is intended to build, some scholars, applying criticisms levied against liberal
peacebuilding, question the dominant, legalistic discourse of transitional justice. Rama
Mani (2002) argues the legalistic nature of transitional justice and its emphasis on
redressing direct human rights abuses often leaves structural injustices in place that
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contributed to the conflict to begin with.47 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern (2008),
moreover, raise concerns over the top-down nature of transitional justice processes,
which they argue are not inclusive and participatory in nature. Using the Ardoyne
Commemoration Project (ACP) in Northern Ireland as a case study, Lundy and
McGovern (2008, 284-291) trace how community-inspired, truth-telling strategies
incorporated participation of various stakeholders and created a “victim-centered”
agenda, which contributed to wider goals of nation-building, social reconciliation, and
conflict de-escalation. Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein (2004, 29-48) also shed
light on the shortcomings of top-down approaches by suggesting that publics within
countries of top-down approaches often perceive that these efforts constitute an external
solution or are externally imposed without local input, which undermines the legitimacy
of state-level trials, truth commissions, or amnesty programs that often accompany DDR
processes. Andrea Kupfer Schneider (2009, 298) comments that this lack of local input
into the truth commission in El Salvador was ultimately a harbinger for its ineffectiveness
considering that it “consisted entirely of international commissioners and staff members,
purposely excluding Salvadoran natives because of the civil war.” Paul Gready and
Simon Robins (2014) also build on this argument by noting that a key limitation
associated with transitional justice processes is that they are dominated by a few
stakeholders externally as well as internally. Externally, these processes are controlled by
key IGOs and INGOs, such as the UN or Human Rights Watch (HRW), while internally,
only a small number of citizens, in most cases, participate as witnesses, defendants, or
47

Mani (2002), in particular, argues that focusing only on direct abuses committed by
allowing victims to identify perpetrators in trials or truth commissions negates the ability
of mechanisms to address underlying grievances, animosities, or tensions that hold the
potential to rekindle future violence and acts of human rights abuses.
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through the giving of testimony (Gready and Robins 2014, 343). Jack Snyder and Leslie
Vinjamuri (2003) also critique the top-down, legalistic nature of transitional justice
processes by noting that they often come to embody the inter-group tensions that were
meant to remedy. In their study of the ICTY, for example, Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003,
21) find that the ICTY reinforced ethnic cleavages, evident by the fact that “many Serbs
complained that the tribunal unfairly targets Serbs, while many Croats have argued that
their group has been unfairly singled out.” Further, the authors (2003, 22) use survey data
to argue that the ICTY marginalized Bosnia’s domestic court system by imposing
international standards that were not well understood or accepted, thus undermining
efforts at delivering justice and reconciliation. Kieren McEvoy (2008, 17), thus, calls for
a “thicker” understanding of transitional justice, one that acknowledges how its legalistic
discourse causes it to be “something rooted firmly in the formal mechanisms and
institutions of international criminal justice rather than in the communities most affected
by the conflict.”

A final critique of the political-legal, top-down discourse surrounding transitional
justice comes from Erin Baines (2010) who suggests that trying to administer formal
transitional justice through existing state institutions actually exacerbates conflict and
injustices by ignoring processes independent of the state that are better situated to
promote social healing and reconciliation at the micro-level. In particular, Baines (2010:
411) argues that the “process of social reconstruction often takes place at the micro level,
amongst the war-affected themselves and firmly outside the formal institutions [utilized
as part of transitional justice processes today].” In her study of conflict resolution and
reconciliation processes in Northern Uganda, Baines (2010: 417-428) finds that moral
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and spiritual based processes in Acholi-land were better situated to promote spiritual and
therapeutic healing as well as social reconstruction. More importantly, Baines (2010:
412) finds that these processes provided a sense of closure to people who fell into
ambiguous victim-perpetrator statuses that included “bystanders, collaborators,
informants, forced perpetrators, forced combatants, victims-turned-perpetrators, and
perpetrators-turned-victims.” What separates Baines (2010) from Mani (2002), Lundy
and McGovern (2008), Fletcher and Weinstein (2004), and Gready and Robins (2014) is
her criticism of the emerging idea that the limitations of top-down approaches can be
rectified by simply adopting bottom-up approaches in conjunction with universal
mechanisms. Although Baines (2010, 412-414) agrees that top-down mechanisms are
likely to create frictions in local contexts by negating or undoing processes of
reconciliation already under way, Baines also acknowledges that “traditional,” grassroots
approaches can be susceptible to the same pressures and limitations as well in the form of
elite capture, spoilers, or failing to deliver a sense of justice to victims or their families.

The common unifier across these critiques is that the legalistic and top-down
framing of transitional justice is problematic. In some cases, these mechanisms are not
participatory, they are viewed as being distant and externally imposed, or they are
perceived as being a tool to simply make it appear as if a transitional government has
made a sharp departure from a past period of violence, instability, oppression, or conflict.
Further, as Dan Bar-On (2007), Neil Kritz (2009), and Martina Fischer (2011) suggest,
post-conflict justice and reconciliation efforts are extremely diverse enterprises that
require both top-down and bottom-up strategies that purposively target various actors,
stakeholders, and, more importantly, civil society groups in a post-conflict country in
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order to be effective. The key debate that rages between these critics, then, is how we can
design processes and universal mechanisms that must be implemented at the nationallevel while acknowledging that healing is a victim-centered enterprise that must be
targeted at various levels of society (Lundy and McGovern 2008; Schneider 2009; Baines
2010). More importantly, how can we utilize top-down approaches in such a way to
prevent them from undoing efforts to repair relationships between victims and
perpetrators at the micro-level?

2.9

Do Truth Commissions Work?
As a form of restorative justice that places an emphasis on strengthening the rule

of law, while also promoting psychological and societal healing, truth commissions have
proliferated in recent decades, evident by their increasing application in a variety of
societies haunted by human rights abuses in Latin America, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan
Africa. This is largely a consequence of the fact that transitional societies are marked by
criminality and widespread instability, which makes retributive forms of justice, such as
criminal trials, hard to pursue on a massive scale. Further, South Africa’s truth
commission marked a turning point in global awareness that uncovering the truth,
listening, and forgiveness can address past injustices and promote reconciliation at the
same time. As Leebaw (2008, 102) comments, “truth commissions are no longer seen as
a second rate alternative, but rather an important complement to prosecution of
systematic atrocity.” In most cases, truth commissions eventually blend restorative justice
with retributive justice by combining psychological healing and the “truth” with the rule
of law later in the transitional process.
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In the literature, it is argued that clear-cut conditions must be met for truth
commissions to be effective.48 Commissions must have strong public support, include
representatives of various sectors of society, and operate in impartial, transparent, and
non-political ways. Commissions must also have adequate financial and material
resources to collect testimony, perform investigations, and conduct public hearings. On
the other hand, commissions will be toothless and impotent if they lack legitimacy and
transparency among ordinary citizens, have inadequate resources, and draw their
members only from elites or specific segments of society. Above all, commissions fail if
they are used as a form of victor’s justice or as tools to whitewash past injustices.

Despite this agreement over the factors that are thought to condition the
effectiveness of truth commissions, existing studies remain far from homogenous over
whether truth commissions promote positive societal transformation. On one hand,
proponents argue that truth commissions can become a catalyst for reconciliation by
repairing intergroup relationships, advancing human rights protections, fostering
transparency and accountability, and strengthening democratic processes (Scharf 1997;
Minow 1998; Boraine 2000; Lutz and Sikkink 2001; Hamber 2001; Kim and Sikkink
2010; Olsen et al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010; Porter 2015). Truth commissions are
particularly appealing to proponents in situations marked by transitions away from
authoritarianism, in where these bodies can become an essential component of efforts to
uncover crimes committed by state security forces, establish the “truth” about the nature
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See Gibson (2009: 125) and Hayner (1994: 558) for a more detailed discussion on
metrics that have been used to examine the success and effectiveness of truth
commissions.
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and scope of past surveillance programs, or uncover the whereabouts of those who had
been “silenced” (Lundy and McGovern 2008, 270).

Proponents of truth commissions advance the following three claims: (1) truthseeking builds justice; (2) truth-telling can become a catalyst for societal healing and
reconciliation; and (3) truth-finding promotes a culture of respect for human rights
(Herman 1994; Scharf 1997; Hayner 1994; Ash 1997; Minow 1998; Hayner 2001;
Abrams and Hayner 2002). In terms of the first claim, exposing past atrocities, assigning
blame to perpetrators, and allowing victims to come forth and share their past injustices is
viewed as an essential ingredient in the peacebuilding process. As Richard Goldstone
(1996, 491) has argued, “…the public and official exposure of the truth is itself a form of
justice.” Closely related to the first claim, truth-telling is perceived as being therapeutic.
As Judith Herman (1994: 1) notes, “…remembering and telling the truth about terrible
events are prerequisites for both the restoration of the social order and for the healing of
individual victims.” Michael Scharf (1997, 379) similarly writes that “…national
reconciliation and individual rehabilitation are facilitated by acknowledging the suffering
of victims and their families, helping to resolve uncertain cases, and allowing victims to
tell their story, thus serving a therapeutic purpose for an entire country.” Minow (2000,
244) also posits that “coming to know that one’s suffering is not solely a private
experience, best forgotten, but instead an indictment of a social cataclysm, can permit
individuals to move beyond trauma, hopelessness, numbness, and preoccupation with
loss and injury.” Finally, truth-finding can allow post-conflict societies to develop an
impartial, historical record of past abuses that are often kept secret. This is posited to be
advantageous as a consequence of truth-finding educating a society about its past,
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teaching a culture of respect for human rights protections, and preventing future human
rights abuses. As Priscilla Hayner (1994, 607-609) comments, truth-finding “allows a
society to learn from its past in order to prevent a repetition of such violence in the
future.” Jeremy Sarkin (1999: 800) further argues that truth-finding can “ensure the
avoidance of such human rights violations in the future and will also further the
development of a human rights culture.” Of equal importance is the fact that truth
commissions can correct “mythmaking” and the detrimental effects of revisionism in the
future (Posen 1993; Snyder 2000; Kaufman 2001). Using complex datasets, Tricia Olsen,
Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter (2010) and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) find that truth
commissions are not associated with improvements in human rights protections in postconflict countries that adopt them. Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) further finds that truth
commissions have no effect on levels of democratization. Kim and Sikkink (2010), using
an alternative data, instead find that truth commissions, when coupled with trials,
strengthen human rights protections. When examining combinations of mechanisms
further, Olsen, Payne, and Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) later concede that the effect of truth
commissions is enhanced when they are coupled with tribunals and amnesty provisions.

Despite these claims, a growing chorus of skeptics view truth-building as a
potentially destabilizing force in already delicate and fragile post-conflict situations, and
argue that truth commissions often fail more than they succeed (Huntington 1991; Popkin
and Roht-Arriaza 1995; Brody 2001; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003; Mendeloff 2004;
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Gibson 2009).49 Refuting the first claim above, Reed Brody (2001) comments that justice
is better served through criminal courts, which now have greater authority and legitimacy
in prosecuting perpetrators of human rights abuses. Margaret Popkin and Naomi RohtArriaza (1995, 114), moreover, argue that truth commissions in Chile, El Salvador, and
Guatemala did not end a cycle of impunity since they were a poor substitute for
appropriate punitive action. Arguing against the second claim, Michael Ignatieff (1996)
questions whose “truth” is being told since there are different degrees of truth, which can
range from “forensic truth” to “partial truth” and “hearsay.”

Even more problematic, several scholars suggest that victims may exaggerate
their claims to exact revenge or even use the truth-building process for personal gain. In
Rwanda, for example, Bert Ingelaere (2009) finds that truth-building processes have
failed to administer justice as a consequence of victims using formal processes to seize
land from alleged perpetrators as well as its Tutsi minority using them to exact revenge of
certain segments of its Hutu majority. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri (2003) further
comment that truth commissions have the potential to rekindle anger, hatred, and
resentment between victims and perpetrators rather than becoming a catalyst for social
reconciliation. Building on the work of Sikkink and Walling, David Mendeloff (2004:
366) also notes that there is little evidence to suggest that truth commissions have
deepened intergroup harmony or promoted a culture of respect for human rights in Latin
America or South Africa. Although truth commissions have been vital components of the
peace process in these countries, Mendeloff (2004) notes that tensions persist along the
49

Gibson (2009, 124) embodies this view when noting that “many commissions appear to
have had little, if any, impact on societal transformations” even when expectations are
minimal.
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polarizing lines of ethnicity, race, and religion. Finally, some scholars have argued that
forgetting about the past, or promoting “collective amnesia,” is better suited for
promoting healing and stability in transitional societies (Huntington 1991).

Along with these critiques, other scholars criticize how truth commissions have
been utilized as a transitional justice mechanism. Glenda Mezarobba (2010) documents
how Brazil’s truth commission between 1995 and 2007 did little to establish an
authoritative record of what transpired during years of oppressive, military governments.
Instead of being an independent, investigative mechanism, this body merely became a
forum to process claims made by victims. Other scholars posit that truth commissions are
susceptible to political manipulation by political elites. Examining the use of truth
commissions in Serbia and Croatia, Brian Grodsky (2009) argues that truth commissions
in each country respectively have been greatly undermined by political, economic, and
social elites who established them in a haphazard fashion to counter international
pressure for criminal prosecutions. Using the failure of the Haitian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission as a case study, Joanna Quinn (2009) also comments how
truth commissions can be plagued by a lack of political will, which can contribute to
shortages in funding and time constraints.

2.10 Summary
This chapter focuses on four key debates in the literature as it relates to the
operation of truth commissions as a form of transitional justice in post-conflict societies.
The first section examined the changing nature of global violence and the new wars
thesis. Contemporary global conflicts are no longer dominated or marked by state-actors
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using accepted weaponry on well-defined battlegrounds. Instead, contemporary conflicts
are increasingly intermittent and protracted in nature and marked by a diffuse number of
state and non-state actors that may, in some cases, have incentives to see violence persist
rather than come to an end through a peace agreement or negotiated settlement.

The second section surveyed extant studies on the nature and goals of
international peacebuilding. While peacebuilding operations started with clear goals and
objectives immediately following World War II, the evolution of international
peacebuilding from keeping the peace to peace enforcing and peace building has
complicated international efforts to prevent post-conflict countries from relapsing back
into armed violence and instability. Today, international peacekeeping operations are
structured around diverse and sometimes unrealistic goals, ranging from holding
elections and rebuilding basic state institutions to fostering reconciliation between former
belligerents and their supporters. Some scholars, moreover, question the liberal approach
to international peacebuilding, which places a focus on shoring up democratic institutions
and processes, incentivizing free market exchanges, and promoting the rule of law. To
critics, this instant liberalization is actually causing more harm than good.

The third section surveyed transitional justice as both a growing norm and
literature. Scholars of transitional justice argue that post-conflict countries must address
past human rights abuses in some form or another in order to more forward politically,
socially, and economically. If not, these societies will forever be plagued by a legacy of
past abuses, atrocities, and violations that have the potential to become underlying
sources of conflict in the future. With that said, scholars of transitional justice remain
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divided over whether it is better to punish perpetrators for past abuses, or whether it is
better to promote strategies that are more restorative in nature in order to reintegrate
former perpetrators back into their communities. Scholars operating from one perspective
over another, moreover, remain divided over best practices, or the mechanisms that
should be adopted in post-conflict countries. Some scholars who favor retributive justice
argue that criminal tribunals represent the best way forward, whereas others place an
emphasis on lustrations or reparations as the appropriate mechanisms to punish
perpetrators.

The fourth and final section examines the main topic in this study -- do truth
commissions actually work? Even among scholars who are proponents of restorative
justice, these bodies are highly controversial. Some scholars point to the operations and
proceedings of high-profile cases, such as South Africa’s TRC, to press the claim that
truth commissions are a vital component of the peacebuilding and transitional justice
processes. Other scholars point to the deficiencies associated with numerous examples of
failed truth commissions, such as those in Uganda, to press the opposite claim.
Regardless of these debates, we have benefited tremendously from alternative viewpoints
on the effectiveness of truth commissions as a transitional justice mechanism. We have
also benefited tremendously from those who have attempted to isolate the conditions in
which truth commissions are more likely to exhibit a positive effect. With that said, we
continue to lack the empirical evidence that is cross-national and time series in nature to
judge or prove whether these bodies actually make a difference or not.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN
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Methods, Models, and Procedures

3.1

Introduction
This chapter describes, in detail, the mixed-method research design used to test

and provide answers to each of the three research questions identified in Chapter One.
The first part of this chapter discusses the merits associated with using mixed-, or multimethod, approaches in social science research. The second section frames the quantitative
aspect of the study, with a particular emphasis placed on discussing the data, models, and
statistical tests utilized to test each of the five hypotheses developed in Chapter 1. To do
so, this section describes how each of the dependent, independent, and control variables
are measured, provides descriptive statistics for these variables, and constructs the eight
models developed to assess the impact of truth commissions and different combinations
of transitional justice mechanisms on levels of democratization, human rights protections,
economic development, and the durability of peace in post-conflict countries. The
original dataset, which contains information on transitional justice mechanisms and postconflict indicators between 1970 and 2010, is described in detail in this section as well.
The third section explains the qualitative aspect of this study, with a particular emphasis
placed on describing the rationale for picking Rwanda as a case study as the surveys and
interviews that were developed to measure popular views and beliefs toward the gacaca
courts. This section, in particular, discusses how the surveys were manipulated to test for
automatic responses, which is critical when measuring attitudes in non-democratic
countries, and reports the descriptive data for the respondents. This section also discusses
how general principles of case study research designs are met to produce robust and
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replicable data (Geddes 1990; Lieberson 1991; King et al. 1994; Yin 2009). A brief
synthesis and overview of the key components of the quantitative and qualitative methods
is offered at the end of this chapter as an easy reference for the overall research design
adopted in this study.

3.2

Rationale for Mixed-Method Approaches
Multi-method and mixed-method approaches have grown in popularity and

application in Political Science research over the past two decades. The former is usually
characterized by a researcher adopting multiple techniques within a specific research
frame, whether it is qualitative or quantitative in nature (Collier and Elman 2008).
Mixed-method approaches, on the other hand, combine quantitative and qualitative
research techniques, strategies, or analyses into a single research design and often involve
multiple types of data collection (both numerical and qualitative) (Creswell 2003, 209).
More importantly, this type of research design enables generalizations obtained from
large-N studies to be complemented with thick description from small-N case studies or
vice versa.

This methodological strategy has become increasingly attractive in social science
research since it offers researchers the ability to examine complex research questions
from diverse perspectives, which creates various avenues to test competing hypotheses or
theories. As Robert Yin (2009, 63) comments, mixed-method approaches that triangulate
data sources “permit investigators to address more complicated research questions and
collect a richer and stronger array of evidence that can be accomplished by any single
method alone.” John Creswell (2003, 4) concludes that mixed-method approaches are the
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wave of the future and to “include only quantitative and qualitative methods falls short of
the major approaches being used today in the social and human sciences.”

The merits of mixed-method approaches, as a methodological strategy, rest in
their ability to allow researchers to address limitations and complications associated with
conducting a purely quantitative or qualitative study, which helps explain why these
approaches have proliferated (King et al. 1994; Creswell 2003; Maxwell 2005; Yin
2009). A common critique of quantitative-driven research designs is that they force
researchers to frame research questions around those that can be tested through the use of
statistical or numerical data. Critics of quantitative research designs also raise concerns
over the growing complexity and sophistication of statistical methods in social science
research, causing some to question whether quantitative research designs are actually
producing useful and relevant knowledge regarding political phenomena. A common
critique of qualitative studies, on the other hand, is that they are plagued by issues related
to reliability, validity, and replication. For example, can one researcher replicate and
produce the same results collected by another researcher across time and across different
geographic or cultural settings? Critics also raise concerns over the small-N nature of
qualitative studies, which may cause researchers to make erroneous inferences about a
larger population of cases based on a small subsample of cases. Finally, some critics
question the external validity of qualitative research designs and, in particular, those that
utilize case studies to test competing hypotheses or theories. Barbara Geddes (1990), for
example, has improved our understanding of comparative case study analysis by
highlighting how seminal studies are possibly rooted in erroneous conclusions or
assumptions as a consequence of a researcher picking cases or observations that already
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prove or disprove a particular value of a dependent variable (i.e., selecting on the
dependent variable).

The merits of mixed-method approaches, then, rest in their ability to mix different
types of data or nest one method within another to provide additional insight into
different research questions and hypotheses (Jick 1979; Creswell 2003). Statistical
studies often lack “thick description,”50 while qualitative studies -- ranging from case
study research and interview-based research to participant observation or survey-based
research designs -- often lack generalizability or replicability. Qualitative-driven studies,
moreover, often suffer from the lack of empirical, testable data researchers can use to
clearly test the effects of different theories and variables. By combining quantitative and
qualitative techniques, this allows researchers to make inferences about a large number of
cases in a population through quantitative analyses, and then explore outliers or
anomalies through case studies or other qualitative techniques. It is important to note,
however, that mixed-method approaches create extensive challenges for researchers. As
John Creswell (2003, 210) comments, combining different methodological approaches
often involves “extensive data collection, the time-intensive nature of analyzing both text
and numeric data, and the requirement for the researcher to be familiar with both
quantitative and qualitative forms of research.”

50

Geertz (1973) comments that thick description entails not just describing a research
phenomenon in interest, but also establishing sufficient detail and background context to
determine whether the conclusions reached in one particular case are potentially
transferable to other cases, settings, or situations. Thick description, then, goes beyond
just providing a superficial account of a particular phenomenon of interest with the goal
of complex analysis of the particularities of a case.
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Out of the various mixed-method approaches available,51 this study adopts a
concurrent transformative design strategy to gain a better understanding of what impact
truth commissions have in post-conflict countries (see Figure 5 below). This method
involves collecting and analyzing quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously
(Creswell 2003, 214). The hallmark features of this approach is the development of a
theoretical framework, or perspective, in the initial stages of a study, which then guides
the research questions, hypotheses, and data analysis that is performed. The goal, or
objective, of this type of inquiry is to use theory to frame a research design and then use
both quantitative and qualitative research strategies to provide empirical answers to the
research questions being posed through this framework. Concurrent approaches are
different from sequential strategies in the fact that the former places on emphasis on
collecting and analyzing data simultaneously, while the latter places an emphasis on
collecting and analyzing one type of data first and the other second (i.e., it places an
emphasis on one type of method over the other).

Figure 5: Concurrent Transformative Research Design
Theory

51

Other mixed-method research design types include: (1) sequential explanatory design
models; (2) sequential exploratory design models; (3) sequential transformative design
models; (4) concurrent triangulation design models; and (5) concurrent nested design
models (Creswell 2003).
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Quantitative + Qualitative Data
Collection

Concurrent Analysis of Data &
Findings

By adopting a mixed-method approach, the aim of this study is to provide a more
comprehensive examination of what conditions the effectiveness of truth commissions as
a form of transitional justice in the past as well as to provide insight into how to improve
their performance in 21st century conflicts. The study, however, does not intend to
establish clear cause-effect relationships between truth commissions and any of the
dependent variables examined. Instead, the objective is to examine the societal effect of
truth commissions from various perspectives and utilize multiple techniques to survey
whether there is evidence to suggest that truth commissions are tied to positive societal
outcomes or not. Further, the quantitative models used in this study incorporate various
time intervals with the intent of mimicking difference-in-difference (DiD) models in both
quantitative and qualitative research designs, which are increasingly becoming an
attractive strategy for determining whether complex linkages exist when holding multiple
variables constant. The inability to differentiate between truth commissions actually
causing an outcome or merely being associated with an outcome remains an open source
of debate and a critical limitation in extant studies. By combining quantitative models
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with a case study, the goal of this study is provide additional, empirical insight into what
conditions peace, justice, and reconciliation in war’s last phase.

3.3 Quantitative Research Design: Statistical Data, Variables, & Model
Specification
Brief Summary of Research Questions & Hypotheses

The quantitative aspect of this study uses data on transitional justice mechanisms
and various societal indicators in post-conflict countries between 1970 and 2010 to assess
the impact of truth commissions and their performance in relation to other transitional
justice mechanisms. More importantly, the data were collected in such a way to provide
empirical insight into each of the three main research questions that guide the nature of
inquiry in this study and to test each of the five hypotheses derived from the main
theoretical argument in Chapter 1. These research questions and the five hypotheses
derived from them are summarized in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Review of Research Questions & Hypotheses

Summary of Research Questions
RQ1

Do truth commissions produce positive societal outcomes in the form
of democratization, economic development, human rights protections,
and the durability of peace?

RQ2

Must truth commissions be coupled with transitional justice
mechanisms that are retributive in nature (e.g., criminal tribunals,
lustrations, reparations) in order to be effective?

RQ3

Are top-down approaches to transitional justice, such as truth
commissions, increasingly becoming obsolete?
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Summary of Study Hypotheses, Key Variables, & Purported Direction of
Relationships
H1

Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less
likely to experience advancements, or improvements, in levels of
democratization in comparison to those that adopt truth commissions
in combination with one or more retributive mechanisms.
Dependent Variable
Democracy

H2

H4

Independent Variable
Truth commission

Direction
Negative

Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less
likely to experience improvements in economic development in
comparison to those that adopt truth commissions in combination with
one or more retributive mechanisms.
Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Direction
Economic
Truth commission
Negative
development
Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less
likely to remain at peace in comparison to those that adopt truth
commissions in combination with one or more retributive
mechanisms.
Dependent Variable
Durability of peace

H5

Direction
Negative

Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less
likely to experience improvements in human rights protections in
comparison to those that adopt truth commissions in combination with
one or more retributive mechanisms.
Dependent Variable
Human Rights

H3

Independent Variable
Truth commission

Independent Variable
Truth commission

Direction
Negative

Post-conflict countries that combine top-down approaches with
grassroots level mechanisms are more likely to experience
improvements in levels of societal peace, democratization, economic
development, and human rights in comparison to those that only adopt
top-down mechanisms.
Dependent Variables
Democracy, economic
development, human
rights protections,
durability of peace

Independent Variable
Top-Down
Mechanism +
Grassroots (i.e.,
Local or Bottom-Up)
Mechanism

Direction
Positive
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Transitional Justice Dataset

The dataset created for this study contains information on 1,110 transitional
justice mechanisms in 141 countries between 1970 and 2010. The unit of analysis is a
specific transitional justice mechanism during this period.52 As a consequence of using
specific transitional justice mechanisms as the unit of analysis, multiple mechanisms can
exist in a given year for a specific country. For example, a truth commission and two
amnesty programs are coded for Algeria in 2006. Five amnesty programs, moreover, are
coded for Afghanistan in 1979. Start and end dates are included for each transitional
justice mechanism included in the dataset, which allows for the creation of time-specific
variables in the data.

Five transitional justice mechanisms are included in the dataset: (1) truth
commissions; (2) reparations; (3) lustration policies; (4) criminal tribunals; and (5)
amnesties. Of the 1,100 mechanisms included, 54 are truth commissions (5%), 41 are
reparations (4%), 41 are lustrations (4%), 262 are criminal tribunals (24%), and the
remaining 712 are cases involving amnesties (64%). As illustrated in Figure 6 below,
transitional justice mechanisms peak between 1990 and 1999, with 343 mechanisms in

52

Information on specific transitional justice mechanisms was compiled from the
Transitional Justice Data Base Project (available at: http://www.tjdbproject.com/). This
project maintains the dataset used by Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter for
their groundbreaking work on transitional justice mechanisms. The only data that was
copied from this dataset was information on transitional justice mechanisms between
1970 and 2010. Data on political, economic, and social indicators for each mechanism
were individually coded by the author.
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operation during this time period in comparison to 255 between 1970 and 1979, 276
between 1980 and 1989, and 237 between 2000 and 2010.

Figure 6: Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 1970-2010
400

Number

300

200

100

0

1970-1979

1980-1989

1990-1999

2000-2010

In the universe of transitional justice, it is important to note that more than just
these five mechanisms exist; however, these are the most commonly used and adopted
transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict societies historically, which warrants
attention on their application and outcomes. This is not to say, though, that these are the
only transitional justice mechanisms that post-conflict societies have an ability to choose
from. Public memorial projects, institutional reforms, and the restructuring of educational
systems or educational material in primary schools, for example, represent transitional
justice mechanisms in of themselves that have drawn increased scrutiny in recent years

95

(Bassiouni and Rothenberg 2008). Reliable and accurate data on the usage of
mechanisms outside of these five main mechanisms is problematic to obtain and code.

Each observation in the dataset has country-year specific information as well as a
unique Correlates of War (CoW) identification marker. In addition, information on the
target of a particular mechanism and whether a mechanism itself is domestic,
international, or hybrid (type) is included for each observation. For example, mechanisms
that are coded “1” for target are those that were aimed at state actors, while mechanisms
coded “2” are those that target non-state actors. Domestic mechanisms, moreover, are
those that were directed within a country against domestic agents. International
mechanisms are those that were created either by an IGO or transitioning government as
part of a multi-government brokered peace agreement or those that target individuals
from multiple countries of origin. The codebook for the dataset, which contains detailed
information on how specific variables are coded, is available in Appendix B.53

In the dataset, coverage of transitional justice mechanisms begins with 1970 since
this marks the beginning of the Third Wave of Democratization (Huntington 1993). This
‘Third Wave’ was characterized by transitions to democracy in Western Europe
beginning with Greece (1974), Portugal (1974), and Spain (1975) and those that would
later occur in Latin American and Eastern European countries during the 1980s and early
1990s. In all of these geographic regions, political transitions followed the collapse of
oppressive and often brutal military, despotic, or communist regimes that forcefully

53

The appendix contains information on mechanism coding for each of the variables
included in the dataset. The appendix itself is structured in such a way to provide a clear,
yet comprehensive overview of the data itself.
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denied basic human rights and civil liberties to their citizenry over an extended period of
time. Even though Paige Arthur (2009) traces the roots of transitional justice to political
transitions beginning in the 1980s, this study expands this boundary to transitions that
occurred in the 1970s.

Variables

Several dependent, independent, and control variables are utilized in this study.
Most of these variables are measured in ways similar to extant studies to promote
methodological consistency. For example, scholars assessing the impact of different
transitional justice mechanisms on human rights protections often utilize indices available
from either the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) dataset or the Political Terror Scale (PTS)
produced from yearly reports compiled by Amnesty International and the US State
Department. To further promote methodological consistency, this study measures
democracy, economic development, human rights protections, and the durability of peace
in almost identical terms using the same databases (e.g., World Bank Project and the
Polity IV database) as past quantitative studies (e.g., Kim and Sikkink 2010; Olsen el al.
2010; Meernick et al. 2010; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). The decision to do so was
informed by the belief that measuring these variables in alternative ways would create
further methodological divisions in an already nascent, messy, and convoluted literature
marked by studies that find evidence to suggest that truth commissions (or amnesties or
trials) promote human rights and others that argue the opposite. By using the same
measures as those used in past studies, this provides an important baseline for
comparison. Using similar measures also represents a path forward for future researchers
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interested in the societal effects of truth commissions as well as other transitional justice
mechanisms.

Dependent Variables

Four dependent variables are used in this study: (1) democracy; (2) human rights
protections; (3) economic development; and (4) the durability of peace. Each of these
variables are described, in detail, below and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5
(see pp. 18-19). For each dependent variable, measures are available for the year prior
(pre), the year of (event), the year after (post), five years after (five-year), and ten years
after (ten year) for each transitional justice mechanism. For example, democracy scores
for Morocco, which adopted an amnesty program in 1980, are available for 1979, 1980,
1981, 1985, and 1990. The goal of structuring the dataset in this way is to mimic DiD
analyses that incorporate a temporal analysis of the data to not only track the immediate
societal effects associated with a particular mechanism, but also their societal outcomes
on various indicators over a much longer time period. The first time interval is used as an
additional strategy to determine whether different mechanisms matter or not in the
countries they are adopted and to determine whether the effect of these mechanisms is
increasing or decreasing in intensity. If the coefficient, for example, is negative the year
prior and remains negative over the other four time periods for a particular mechanism,
this might indicate a relationship that is tenuous at best. If the coefficient is negative and
then becomes positive after a particular mechanism is adopted, this might suggest this
mechanism is having some type of effect.

Dependent Variable 1: Democracy
98

Democracy54 is measured through Polity IV scores available from the Polity
Project database. Polity IV scores are country-specific and combine democracy and
authoritarian scores on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 indicating
a purely authoritarian or autocratic government, -5 to +5 indicating an “anocracy,”55 and
+6 to +10 indicating an electoral democracy. To allow for additional statistical tests (e.g.,
ordered logit), additional variables that consolidated these scores into three categories
were included in the dataset. Countries with a Polity IV score between -10 and -6, for
example, were coded “1,” countries with a Polity IV score between -5 and +5 were coded
“2,” and countries with a Polity IV score between +6 and +10 were coded “3” for each of
the three new variables. Collapsing these scores into these three additional variables
provided an avenue to test whether results varied between different statistical techniques.

54

Democracy is a notoriously difficult concept to define, let alone measure. In this study,
democracy is associated with the concept of “liberal democracy,” which is defined as a
system of government that is marked by a free press, ensures free, fair, and competitive
elections, provides mechanisms or avenues to hold political leaders accountable, and
provides for basic political rights and civil liberties (e.g., equal access to voting, freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion) (Dahl 1956).
55
The Polity IV Project defines anocracies as regimes that are somewhere between
autocracies (political power is completely concentrated in the hands of a few) and
democracies (political power is held by governing elites who are accountable to citizens
through elections, interest groups, civil society, etc.). Anocracies, as a result, combine
features of both regime types together. Following the definition of liberal democracy
above, anocracies can be best thought of as “illiberal democracies.” According to Zakaria
(1997, 22) illiberal democracies are marked by governments that come to power through
elections, which may be free and fair, but once in power, ignore constitutional limits on
executive power, deprive citizens of basic political rights and civil liberties, intimidate
opposition, and exercise control over mass media. Levitsky and Way (2010) have
recently used the term “competitive authoritarianism” to describe hybrid regimes that fall
somewhere between democratic and authoritarian regimes.
99

The median value56 for the raw Polity IV scores at each time interval in Table 5 (4, -3, -3, 0, and 3 respectively) indicates that most of the observations in the dataset are
anocracies. Further, the pre, event, and post democracy scores (-4, -3, and -3) are lower
than the five-year and ten-year measures (0 and 3) even though all five measures had
similar standard deviations (6.9, 6.5, 6.9, 6.9, and 6.8 respectively). This high standard
deviation for all five time intervals indicates high variation in Polity IV scores. These
higher polity scores also seem to highlight shifting trends in regime types and a move
away from authoritarianism to democracy over the period covered in the dataset.

Polity IV scores were utilized over other measures, such as those available from
Freedom House,57 for two design reasons. First, Polity IV scores measure democracy
based on six component measures in three broad areas: (1) the existence of institutional
constraints on executive power; (2) the existence of institutional and procedural elements
that allow citizens to express preferences and hold leaders accountable; and (3) the
guarantee of civil liberties. Second, Polity IV scores are the most widely used measures
of democracy in extant studies. Long time-series data exists for Polity IV scores (18002015), which has caused this index to become the academic standard for measures of
democratization, particularly in studies in International Relations.

56

The median value is reported since the data are skewed (i.e., a large number of
countries (~50) with a perfect democracy score of 10 are pulling the data (and the mean)
to the right).
57
Freedom House ranks countries, annually, on a democracy index based on civil liberties
and political rights. In both categories, scores range from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free).
The annual Freedom in the House Report presents these scores and offers a cumulative,
or aggregate, score for individual countries on 25 different measures. The annual report
also classifies countries as “free,” “partly free,” and “not free” based on these measures.
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Polity IV scores are not perfect, however. Polity scores are missing for certain
countries or for certain periods in the dataset. For example, there are no data for Bosnia
and data are missing for both Afghanistan (1979-1988, 2001-2010) and Lebanon (19902004) due to the presence of ongoing conflicts in each country. Polity scores also exhibit
dramatic shifts. For example, Hungary had a combined Polity score of -7 in 1987,
following by a score of 10 in 1990. Haiti, moreover, had a score of -7 in 1993, which was
then followed by a score of 7 in 1995, and score of 2 in 2000. South Africa also yielded a
perfect score of 10 even during apartheid, which indicates that Polity IV scores may not
accurately measure commonly perceived views of liberal democracy. Regardless of these
conceptual and measurement problems, polity scores are strongly correlated with other
measures of democracy (e.g., Vanhanen Index of Democratization, Cheibub and
Gandhi’s Classification Regime Index).

Dependent Variable 2: Human Rights

Human rights protections in the dataset are measured through the Physical
Integrity Rights Index (PHYSINT) available from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset. This
index measures government protection of human rights through indices that rank
countries based on the incidence of torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment,
and disappearance. The PHYSINT index ranges from 0 to 8, with 0 indicating the
absence of government respect for human rights in these four areas and 8 indicating full
government respect for human rights. Physical Integrity scores for all five time intervals
had similar standard deviations (2.3, 2.3, 2.3, 2.2, and 2.1 respectively) as illustrated in
Table 5, which indicates minimal variation in human rights scores across countries
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included in the dataset. It is important to note, however, that PHYSINT scores are
missing for a sizeable number of observations for all five time intervals in the dataset
(368, 322, 299, 215, and 257 respectively).

This index is an increasingly attractive measure of human rights since it examines
the performance of particular governments in these four areas and provides a cumulative
score based on their collective performance in each of these four areas. Similar to Polity
IV scores, moreover, PHYSINT scores are commonly used to measure human rights
protections in extant studies. With that said, there are limitations associated with this
index as well. First, Physical Integrity scores are only available after 1981, which
accounts for the large frequency of missing values in the dataset.58 Second, PHYSINT
scores are often unavailable during active periods of conflict or armed hostilities, which
means that data are missing for active conflicts in the dataset, such as for the DRC (1995present), Bosnia (1995-1999), Iraq (2003-present), and Somalia (1993-present). These
missing data are clearly problematic; however, Physical Integrity scores are utilized over
other measures, such as PTS data available from Amnesty International, since these two
limitations affect alternative measures as well. PTS data, for example, is only available
after 1976.

Dependent Variable 3: Economic Development

Economic development is measured through annual gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita data (constant $US) available through the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators Database. GDP per capita is a measure of all economic activity
58

All observations between 1970 and 1980 were coded as missing.
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by an individual country’s citizens and corporations both within and outside of its borders
divided by its total population. This per capita measure is important because it provides
economic data on the average household in a particular country. Out of the several
economic indicators available to economists and academics alike, data on GDP per capita
has become the favored approach, or standard, for measuring differences or variation in
economic development and facilitating comparisons or investigating differences between
two or more countries’ economies over other economic indicators, such as gross national
product data (GNP) (i.e., gross national income (GNI)). To promote comparisons, data on
GDP per capita is measured through constant $US. Similar to the other three dependent
variables, data on GDP per capita is available one year prior, the year of, one year after,
five years after, and ten years after for each transitional justice mechanism included in the
dataset.

The GDP per capita for countries in the dataset varies between different time
intervals. Pre, event, and post GDP per capita is much lower than ($714, $736, and $807)
than the GDP per capita five-years and ten-years after for each observation ($955, and
$1,044 respectively). The data also illustrate that most countries in the dataset fall into the
low-income or lower-middle income economies (LDCs) categories59 utilized by the
World Bank when classifying and evaluating the performance of economies around the
world.

59

The World Bank develops for economic categories: (1) low-income economies; (2)
lower-middle income economies; (3) upper-middle-income economies; and (4) highincome economies. Using the World Bank Atlas method (which is a conversion factor),
LDCs are those with a GNP per capita of $1,005 or less in 2016. The World Bank LDCs
are highly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia.
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Dependent Variable 4: Durability of Peace

The last dependent variable, peace, is coded as a dummy variable indicating
whether active conflict occurred in a country for a specific year. An observation is coded
“1” if armed conflict or violence occurred in a given year or “0” if armed conflict or
violence did not occur within a calendar year. The threshold adopted in this study is the
25-annual battle-related deaths utilized by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).
The UCDP adopts a much narrower threshold for violence in comparison to other
databases that measure and code incidences of armed violence and hostilities worldwide.
The UCDP provides country-year specific information on armed conflicts by using a 25
annual battle-related deaths as a benchmark for whether armed violence exists in a
country or not. This threshold was used over others, such as the CoW, since it is more
likely to catch low-intensity conflicts that may slip through other conflict trackers.

As shown in Table 5, 36 percent of cases experienced armed conflict in the year
prior. 37 percent and 33 percent of cases experienced armed conflict in the event year and
post year intervals respectively. For the five-year and ten-year intervals, 32 percent and
28 percent of cases respectively experienced armed conflict.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Democracy, Human Rights, &
Economic Development
Variable
(N)
Polity IV Pre
(1053)
Polity IV
Event
(1073)
Polity IV

Mean

Median

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Missing

-1

-4

6.8

-10

10

57

-1

-3

6.5

-10

10

37

0

-3

6.9

-10

10

36
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Post
(1074)
Polity IV 5
(1010)
Polity IV
Ten
(888)
GDP per
capita Pre
(997)
GDP per
capita Event
(1014)
GDP per
capita Post
(1016)
GDP per
capita 5
(966)
GDP per
capita 10
(835)
PHYSINT
Score Pre
(742)
PHYSINT
Score Event
(788)
PHYSINT
Score Post
(811)
PHYSINT
Score 5
(895)
PHYSINT
Score 10
(853)
Conflict Pre
(1092)
Conflict
Event
(1101)
Conflict Post
(1100)
Conflict 5
(1055)
Conflict 10
(921)

1

0

6.9

-10

10

100

1

3

6.8

-10

10

222

2547.7

714

5473.8

70.9

41921.8

113

2646.9

736.4

5729.8

72.9

44307.9

96

2857.7

807

6259.4

65.5

52531

94

3490.2

954.8

7081.7

125.1

48401.4

144

3740.6

1043.6

6950.2

66

53324.4

275

4

4

2.3

0

8

368

4

4

2.3

0

8

322

4

4

2.3

0

8

299

4

4

2.2

0

8

215

4

4

2.1

0

8

257

0.36

0

0.5

0

1

18

0.37

0

0.5

0

1

9

0.33

0

0.5

0

1

10

0.32

0

0.5

0

1

55

0.28

0

0.4

0

1

189
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Note: Raw Polity IV scores are depicted above. GDP per capita is in thousands of dollars
(constant $US).

Independent Variables

All five transitional justice mechanisms included in the dataset are utilized as
independent variables. Each variable is coded as a dummy variable, with “1” indicating
the existence of a particular transitional justice mechanism and “0” indicating the absence
of this indicator. Observations that qualify as truth commissions are those that are marked
by an independent, temporary body officially sanctioned by a state actor or IGO to
investigate past human rights abuses. Observations that are coded as criminal trials or
tribunals are those that are marked by criminal proceedings created to hold perpetrators
of human rights abuses accountable for their actions. To qualify as a lustration policy or
political vetting mechanism, an observation must include some type of provision that
legally prohibits active or former government officials or those directly tied to a
government from holding political office for some time period based on past violations of
human rights abuses. Observations that are coded as reparations are those that include the
transfer of monetary payments, property, or other forms of restitution to victims or their
families for past human rights abuses. Finally, observations coded as amnesties are those
that involve an official, state-sanctioned policy that declares eligible individuals will not
be prosecuted or held criminally liable for their role in orchestrating or perpetrating past
human rights abuses as long as they meet certain conditions.

Dummy variables are created for different combinations of mechanisms. In
particular, a set of four variables combining truth commissions with other mechanisms
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were created. For example, a dummy measuring whether a country adopted a truth
commission in combination with an amnesty program was included. Another is dummy
measuring whether a country adopted a truth commission in combination with a criminal
tribunal was also created. Overall variables indicating the presence of a restorative
mechanism, a retributive mechanism, and a combination of at least one restorative and
one retributive mechanism was also included. In all of these cases, a variable is coded “1”
if a particular combination exists and “0” if such a combination does not exist.

Control Variables

The four dependent variables described above are used additionally as controls in
each of the eight models below. Conceptually, it makes sense to control for each of these
variables to determine whether they are correlated. For example, studies on
democratization suggest that transitional societies that are wealthy are more likely to
become successful democracies than those that are poor (Lipset 1959; Bilson 1982;
Bollen 1993; Olson 1993; Londregan and Poole 1994; Leblang 1996). Several studies
have also advanced links to suggest that democracies are more likely to protect basic
human rights over non-democracies (Poe and Tate 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli
1996; Poe et al. 1999; Keith 2002; de Mesquita et al. 2003). The data also seem to
provide evidence that such links exist, as suggested by the reported collinear figures in
Table 6 below.60 Although these figures do not suggest that any of these variables are

60

Pre measures for each variable are only reported in this table. These figures do not
change much when taking into account different time intervals. Democracy and human
rights scores and democracy and GDP per capita ten years after, for example, are not
highly collinear (correlation coefficient r = 0.30 & 0.38 respectively).
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strongly correlated with one another,61 there does appear to be weak and moderate
relationships between several of the variables. For example, a moderate negative
relationship exists between human rights and conflict, while a moderate positive
relationship exists between democracy and per capita GDP.

Table 6: Correlation between Democracy, Human Rights, GDP per
capita, & Conflict Pre Measures
Variable 1

Variable 2

Correlation

Democracy

Human Rights

0.30

Democracy

GDP per capita

0.42

Democracy

Conflict

-0.01

Human Rights

GDP per capita

0.32

Human Rights

Conflict

-0.57

GDP per capita

Human Rights

0.32

GDP per capita

Conflict

-0.07

In addition to all four dependent variables being included as controls, several
other additional control variables are included. Region is included since extant studies
have highlighted regional differences in the frequency, adoption, and success of different
transitional justice mechanisms (e.g., Sikkink and Walling 2007; Olsen et al. 2010;
Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010). In the dataset, 35% and 38% of the total amnesties included

61

A correlation coefficient between 0.30 (+/-) and 0.50 (+/-) generally indicates a weak
linear relationship between two variables. A value between 0.50 (+/-) and 0.70 (+/-)
indicates a moderate relationship. Any value above 0.70 suggests a strong linear
relationship exists between two variables.
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are concentrated in Asia and Africa respectively. Lustration policies, moreover, tend to
be concentrated in Eastern Europe (34%), while trials are heavily concentrated in Africa
(38%). Reparations, on the other hand, are evenly spread across the regions62 included in
the dataset. The target of particular mechanisms is also included for purposes of
determining whether the success of mechanisms vary based on whether they are directed
against state actors or non-state actors. By including these additional controls in the
dataset, the goal is to parse out the effect of truth commissions as well as other
transitional justice mechanisms as much as possible.

Model Specification

Eight different statistical models are tested. The first model uses a logit analysis to
measure the impact of truth commissions as well as other transitional justice mechanisms
on the durability of peace. The second, third, and fourth models test the impact of truth
commissions as well as other transitional justice mechanisms on democracy, human
rights, and economic development through ordinary-least squares (OLS) analyses that
incorporate five different time-intervals. The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth models use
the same dependent variables and statistical analyses as the first four models; however,
these test different combinations of transitional justice mechanisms. In particular, four
combinations are tested to determine whether truth commissions are more effective in
they are paired with one mechanism over another. Similar to each of the first four
models, the dependent variable is manipulated at different time intervals to mimic a DiD
model in these models.
62

Seven regions are coded: (1) Asia; (2) Africa; (3) Latin America; (4) North America;
(5) Western Europe; (6) Eastern Europe; (7) Oceania.
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Model One: Peace Outcomes for Specific Mechanisms

The first model is depicted in Figure 7. The dependent variable is the durability
of peace, which is measured by the absence of 25 annual battle-deaths. This variable is a
dummy variable, with “1” equaling the presence of at least 25 annual battle-deaths in a
given country for a given conflict; “0,” on the other hand, equals the absence of armed
hostilities measured by more than 25 annual battle-related deaths. The key independent,
or predictor, variables are truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations, and
reparations. All five of these variables are binary, with “1” indicating the presence of a
mechanism and “0” representing the absence of this mechanism for a country-specific
observation. Geographic region, per capita GDP, regime type, CIRI scores, and the target
of a mechanism (state, non-state, or both) are included as controls.

The aim of this model is to determine whether truth commissions reduce the
propensity of belligerents to resort back to the use of armed violence or hostilities to
settle lingering grievances or underlying tensions. A logit model is utilized to test for the
durability of peace at five different intervals (pre-event year, event years, post-event year,
five-years after event year, and ten-years after event year) due to the binary nature of the
dependent variable. To ensure the best model fitness, probit models were also run for
each of the five models.

Figure 7: Multivariate Model of Peace Outcomes
Truth
commission, trial,
amnesty,
lustration,
reparations
(IVs)

Peace
(DV)
Measure: > 25 Annual
Battle-Deaths
Time intervals: Year 110
prior, event year, year
after, five years, ten years

Region, GDP per capita,
Regime Type, Human Rights
Score, Target of Mechanism,
(CVs)

Model Two: Democracy Outcomes for Specific Mechanisms

The second model, depicted in Figure 8, is structured in such a way to test the
democratic outcomes associated with truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations,
and reparations. The five intervals used in Model 1 are also utilized in this model. An
OLS model of the following form is developed:

YiDemocracy = B0 + B1TC + B2Trials + B3Amnesty + B4Reparation +
B5Lustration+ B6Cj + Ei t
The coefficient YiDemocracy is an estimate of the effect on democracy and
represents the raw (-10-10) and recoded polity scores (1-3) for an observation included in
the dataset. The coefficient B0 represents the constant (or intercept), B1TC represents the
dummy truth commission variable, B2Trials represents a dummy trial variable,
B3Amnesty represents a dummy amnesty variable, B4Reparation represents a dummy
reparations variable, B5Lustration represents a dummy lustration variable, B6Cj
represents the added control variables, and Ei t represents the error term for each unit at
each time period. To ensure the best model fitness and also to evaluate whether results
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differ based on a particular statistical test, an OLS model and an ordered logit model
(using the recoded DV) are used to investigate whether variation exists in the results.

Figure 8: Multivariate Model of Democracy Outcomes
Democracy
(DV)

Truth
commission, trial,
amnesty,
lustration,
reparations
(IVs)

Measure: Polity scores
Time intervals: Year prior
(-1), event year (0), year
after (1), five years (5), ten
years (10)

Region, GDP per capita,
Active Conflict, Human
Rights Score, Target of
Mechanism,
(CVs)

Model Three: Human Rights Outcomes for Specific Mechanisms

The third model is depicted in Figure 9. This model is structured in such a way to
evaluate the human rights outcomes of truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations,
and reparations over five time intervals. An OLS model of the following form is tested:

YiHumanRights = B0 + B1TC + B2Trials + B3Amnesty + B4Reparation +
B5Lustration+ B6Cj + Ei t
In the model, the coefficient YiHumanRights gives an estimate of the human rights
effect and measured through Physical Integrity scores. The coefficient B0 represents the
constant (or intercept), B1TC represents the dummy truth commission variable, B2Trials
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represents a dummy trial variable, B3Amnesty represents a dummy amnesty variable,
B4Reparation represents a dummy reparations variable, B5Lustration represents a dummy
lustration variable, B6Cj represents the added control variables, and Ei t represents the
error term for each unit at each time period. An OLS model is utilized since the DV
ranges from 0 to 8.

Figure 9: Multivariate Model of Human Rights Outcomes
Human Rights
(DV)

Truth
commission, trial,
amnesty,
lustration,
reparations
(IVs)

Measure: Physical
Integrity Index
Time intervals: Year prior
(-1), event year (0), year
after (1), five years (5), ten
years (10)

Region, GDP per capita,
Active Conflict, Regime Type,
Target of Mechanism
(CVs)

Model Four: Economic Outcomes for Specific Mechanisms

The forth model is depicted in Figure 10. This model tests the economic
outcomes associated with truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations, and
reparations over five time intervals. An OLS model of the following form is tested:

YiGDP per capita= B0 + B1TC + B2Trials + B3Amnesty + B4Reparation +
B5Lustration+ B6Cj + Ei t
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YiGDP represents GDP per capita (constant $US), B0 represents the constant (or
intercept), B1TC represents the dummy truth commission variable, B2Trials represents a
dummy trial variable, B3Amnesty represents a dummy amnesty variable, B4Reparation
represents a dummy reparations variable, B5Lustration represents a dummy lustration
variable, B6Cj represents the added control variables, and Ei t represents the error term for
each unit at each time period. An OLS model is selected due to the continuous nature of
the dependent variable.

Figure 10: Multivariate Model of Economic Outcomes
Economic Development
(DV)

Truth
commission, trial,
amnesty,
lustration,
reparations
(IVs)

Measure: GDP per capita
Time intervals: Year prior
(-1), event year (0), year
after (1), five years (5), ten
years (10)

Region, Human Rights Scores,
Active Conflict, Regime Type,
Target of Mechanism
(CVs)

Model Five: Peace Outcomes for Combinations of Transitional Justice Mechanisms

The fifth model, in Figure 11 below, mirrors Model 1 to estimate the pacifying
effects of transitional justice mechanisms. The only difference is that this model uses
combinations of truth commissions with other transitional justice mechanisms as the
predictor variables. These new predictors are binary in nature, with “1” indicating the
presence of both mechanisms. Similar to Model One, a logit model is utilized to test the
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impact of these different combinations over five different time intervals. Probit models
were also run alongside these models to test for variation in the results.

Figure 11: Multivariate Combination Model of Peace Outcomes
Peace
(DV)

Truth
Commission &
Trial, Truth
Commission &
Lustration, Truth
Commission &
Amnesty, Truth
Commission and
Reparations
(IVs)

Measure: > 25 Annual
Battle-Deaths
Time intervals: Year
prior, event year, year
after, five years, ten years

Region, GDP per capita,
Regime Type, Human Rights
Score, Target of Mechanism,
(CVs)

Model Six: Democracy Outcomes for Combinations of Transitional Justice Mechanisms

The sixth model, as depicted in Figure 12, mirrors Model Two to estimate the
democratic effects and outcomes of truth commissions in conjunction with other
transitional justice mechanisms. Similar to Model Five, specific combinations of truth
commissions and other mechanisms are utilized as the predictor variables. The same
vector of control variables and time intervals are used as all of the other models. The
same OLS model used in Model 2 to estimate the democratic outcomes of each
transitional justice mechanism separately is used in this model to test the effects of
different combinations of truth commission mechanisms on democratic outcomes.

Figure 12: Multivariate Combination Model of Democracy Outcomes
115

Democracy
(DV)

Truth
Commission &
Trial, Truth
Commission &
Lustration, Truth
Commission &
Amnesty, Truth
Commission and
Reparations
(IVs)

Measure: Polity scores
Time intervals: Year prior
(-1), event year (0), year
after (1), five years (5), ten
years (10)

Region, GDP per capita,
Active Conflict, Human
Rights Score, Target of
Mechanism,
(CVs)

Model Seven: Human Rights Outcomes for Combinations of Transitional Justice
Mechanisms

The seventh model, depicted in Figure 13 mirrors the third model; however, it is
manipulated to estimate the human rights effects of truth commissions in conjunction
with other mechanisms. The dependent variable remains the same as in Model Three and
the same vector of control variables and time intervals are included. An OLS model,
moreover, is used to estimate the human rights effects of these four combinations. This
model is identical to the model used in Model Three; however, instead of treating each
transitional justice as a key independent variable individually, the different combinations
of mechanisms are included as the predictor variables in this model.

Figure 13: Multivariate Combination Model of Human Rights
Outcomes
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Human Rights
(DV)

Truth
commission &
Trial, Truth
Commission &
Lustration, Truth
Commission &
Amnesty, Truth
Commission and
Reparations
(IVs)

Measure: Physical
Integrity Index
Time intervals: Year prior
(-1), event year (0), year
after (1), five years (5), ten
years (10)

Region, Human Rights Scores,
Active Conflict, Regime Type,
Target of Mechanism, Level of
Mechanism
(CVs)

Model Eight: Economic Outcomes for Combinations of Transitional Justice Mechanisms
The eighth, and final, model depicted in Figure 14 estimates the economic effects
associated with truth commissions in conjunction with other transitional justice
mechanisms. The dependent variable is the same as Model Four. The same combinations
of predictor variables are used as well as the same vector of control variables and time
intervals. An OLS model, moreover, is used to estimate these economic effects. This
model is identical to the model used in Model Four; however, instead of treating each
transitional justice as a key independent variable individually, the different combinations
of mechanisms are included as the predictor variables in this model.

Figure 14: Multivariate Combination Model of Economic Outcomes
Truth
commission &
Trial, Truth
Commission &
Lustration, Truth
Commission &
Amnesty, Truth

Economic Development
(DV)
Measure: GDP per capita117
Time intervals: Year prior
(-1), event year (0), year
after (1), five years (5), ten

Region, Human Rights Scores,
Active Conflict, Regime Type,
Target of Mechanism, Level of
Mechanism
(CVs)

3.4

Case Study Research Design
To explore the critical question of whether top-down approaches to transitional

justice are becoming increasingly obsolete in the 21st century, Rwanda’s gacaca courts
are utilized as a case study to explore the intersections and obstacles to peacebuilding and
transitional justice. These courts represent a hybrid, bottom-up approach to transitional
justice that was utilized in conjunction with traditional, top-down approaches in the form
of an international criminal court that was created by the UN following the events that
unfolded during the Rwandan genocide. These courts can also be considered hybrid in
nature since they dispensed both retributive and restorative justice by punishing those
guilty of committed crimes during the genocide and by promoting reconciliation for those
who came forward and confessed their crimes. The genocide, coupled with a broader
civil war between 1990 and 1994, led to the forcible displacement of roughly half of
Rwandan’s population and killed approximately 10 percent of Rwanda’s total population
(Moghalu 2005, 17). Thousands of women were also subjected to sexual violence with 70
percent of survivors being infected with HIV (Amnesty International 2004, 3).
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Although a hybrid-approach was adopted, the gacaca courts became the face of
transitional justice in a battered and war-torn society marked by extreme violence
perpetrated at the local level. According to Coel Kirkby (2006, 100), the goals of gacaca
were to: (1) establish the truth about crimes that were committed during the genocide; (2)
speed up the prosecutions of accused perpetrators who had languished in jail without
formally being charged; and (3) end a cycle of impunity and promote reconciliation and
unity among Rwandans. Despite their success in trying large numbers of perpetrators,
these courts quickly became a source of contention and controversy. Jeremy Sarkin
(2001, 161) comments that the limited jurisdiction of the courts caused them to only
focus on crimes committed by Hutu and not those committed outside of the genocide by
Tutsi. Bert Ingelaere (2009) comments that these courts inhibited reconciliation and
prospects for national unity since they were used by the Rwandan government as a tool
for political manipulation.

Survey & Interview Design

The gacaca courts represent a unique case study to explore the intersections
between peace, justice, and reconciliation and, more importantly, to evaluate the impact
and effectiveness of bottom-up approaches to transitional justice compared to top-down
approaches and vice versa. To test public perceptions of the gacaca process and the
overall transitional justice process in post-genocide Rwanda, this study administered a
survey to 27 gacaca court participants between June and July 2016. Of the 27 that
participated, 12 agreed to participate in a longer, semi-structured interview that examined
key themes, questions, and values in a more in-depth, but informal manner. Two versions
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of the survey were administered to manipulate wording in order to test whether
Rwandans have been conditioned to think or perceive of gacaca in certain ways. The
rationale for using two versions was to determine whether different wording affected
participant responses and to also safeguard against participants mistaking the meaning or
application of certain words in particular questions. Each semi-structured interview
followed the same prompt and focused on three critical themes: (1) whether gacaca
promoted justice; (2) whether gacaca contributed to reconciliation both nationally and at
the village-level; and (3) whether alternative mechanisms, other than gacaca, were more
capable of dispensing justice, uncovering the truth, and allowing individuals to move
forward. The study protocol is available in Appendix D. Both versions of the survey are
available in Appendices F and G respectively. Finally, the interview prompt is available
in Appendix E.

66 percent of the surveys and approximately two-thirds of the study interviews
were conducted in Ruhengeri (18 surveys, 8 interviews); the remaining 40 percent of the
surveys and one third of the interviews were conducted in Kigali (9 surveys, 4
interviews). Ruhengeri was a focal point early on in the civil war between the RPF and
the Rwandan government and RPF forces used this border area as a staging area to
conduct attacks in Rwandan territory from Uganda. In the waning days of the genocide,
this was also one of the main routes the Interahamwe used when fleeing to the DRC. Due
to its status as a staging point for RPF-led incursions as well as the “exit point” for the
Interahamwe as they fled Rwanda, unthinkable acts of violence and cruelty were
committed against civilians. The proximity of Ruhengeri to the DRC and Ugandan
borders also makes it susceptible to inter-ethnic tensions with Tutsi families now
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occupying homes and land once occupied by Hutu before the civil war and genocide.
Kigali, on the other hand, was the site of countless atrocities committed at the beginning
of the genocide. As noted above, Interahamwe and government soldiers manned
roadblocks and checkpoints in the capital during the early stages of the genocide, which
effectively trapped and limited the movement of Tutsi and moderate Hutu opposed to the
killings. Like Ruhengeri, streets throughout Kigali were the site of horrendous murders
and other human rights violations by both Interahamwe and other militias allied with the
Hutu Power movement as well as RPF soldiers.

In total, a sample of 60 individuals was initially identified during the planning
stages of the research to participate in both the survey and interview. These 60
individuals were randomly selected among a list of 95 gacaca participants identified by
two gacaca court judges. These judges were identified through contacts established
during the initial research design stage through American nongovernmental organizations
working in the country. One judge presided over cases in Ruhengeri, while the other
judge presided over cases in Kigali. Those targeted to participate in the survey and
interviews were Rwandans that either were involved in gacaca proceedings as plaintiffs,
defendants, and witnesses or those who were regular attendees to weekly meetings.
Approximately 18.5 percent of the respondents were participants in gacaca cases, another
18.5 percent were witnesses in gacaca cases, and the remaining 63 percent were those
that attended gacaca proceedings on a regular basis.

Of the 60 individuals initially identified, only 27 were able to participate during
the time frame identified above (45 percent response rate) and of these 27, only 12 agreed
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to take part in a longer, more substantive interview (44 percent response rate). These
response rates were negatively affected by the inability of the author to receive ethics
approval from the Rwandan National Ethics Committee as well as a research permit from
the Rwandan Ministry of Education, which prevented the ability to administer surveys
and interviews to government officials and those officially tied to the gacaca proceedings
through a direct, government link. Approximately half of those that did not participate
were omitted for this reason. The other half were omitted since they either refused to
participate when contacted at a later point or due to logistical reasons preventing the
author from administering the survey or interview (if they agreed to take part in this
aspect of the study) in person. For non-disclosure reasons, all participants are not directly
identified and several measures have been taken to shield their identity. The interview
methods table can be found in Appendix H.
The survey and study interview included questions that asked respondents’
sociodemographic characteristics. The survey and study interview did not ask a
respondents’ ethnicity (whether they were Tutsi or Hutu) since doing so is prohibited by
law in Rwanda. This basic demographic information is found in Table 7 below. The
median age of the survey respondents was 35 years old, which is significantly higher than
the national median age of 19 years old.63 Males were over-represented in the sample,
with 16, or 59 percent of respondents being men. This is higher than the national ratio in
where men comprise roughly 51 percent of the population. Approximately three out of
four respondents had a primary school education, which is similar to demographic data

63

All demographic data used for comparison was compiled from databases administered
by the World Bank.
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contained in existing studies (Thompson 2002; Rettig 2008; Pozen et al. 2014). Further,
those working in the education (5) and nonprofit or nongovernmental sectors (9) were
over-sampled, which is a consequence of the fact that one of the gacaca judges is the
founder of a nongovernmental organization group, while the other was a principal of an
elementary school that receives assistance from an American-based INGO in the form of
a cow project.

Table 7: Demographic Information of Gacaca Survey Respondents
Survey Demographic Information

N

%

Male
Female

16
11

59
41

18-25
26-33
34-41
42-49
50-57
58-65
65+

1
5
11
4
3
2
1

4
18.5
41
15
11
7
4

Education
Primary
Secondary
Post-Secondary

20
3
4

74
11
15

Occupation
Nongovernmental
Education
Tourism
Transportation
Agriculture
Other

9
5
5
4
3
1

33
19
19
15
11
4

Residence
Ruhengeri
Kigali

18
9

66
33

Sex

Age
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Type
Gacaca Participant
5
(Judge, accuser, defendant)
Gacaca Witness
5
Gacaca Attendee
17
Note: Numbers may not add up perfectly due to rounding.

18.5
18.5
63

Study eligibility required participants to be at least 18 years of age and understand
and agree to an informed consent form. The average time for a respondent to complete
either form of the survey was approximately 10 minutes. The average length of each
interview was approximately 45 minutes. If a participant had trouble understanding a
particular question or a topic on the survey or during the interview, further clarification
was provided. All of the surveys were administered in paper-form, which required the
participant to fill out the survey by hand. The surveys were administered in this fashion to
shield a participant’s responses64 and to ensure proper coding at a later time. All surveys
were destroyed approximately a month after the study was conducted. For some
interviews, a translator was used if language barriers proved too difficult to overcome.
For some respondents, their proficiency in English was limited and they preferred,
instead, to conduct the interview in French.

Measures

Attitudes and perceptions toward gacaca were measured in the survey through a
three-point response option ranging from “agree” to “disagree,” with the additional

64

The author perceived that written survey forms would shield individual responses to
questions on the survey. The use of a paper-form was also a necessity considering that the
author did not receive a government-issued research permit.
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response of “I don’t know.” This response option was utilized rather than a traditional
five-point response option for purposes of simplicity and efficiency. The questions were
structured in such a way to measure a vast constellation of attitudes toward gacaca. The
questions were also structured in such a way to measure attitudes and beliefs toward
gacaca processes, procedures, and outcomes. For example, the question “did gacaca
promote national unity” was utilized to measure attitudes and perceptions toward
outcomes and processes associated with gacaca. The questions, “there was a large
amount of false testimony or accusations,” “people told lies,” and “people felt
threatened” were intended to measures attitudes toward procedural elements associated
with gacaca. Finally, for purposes of comparison, questions were sometimes framed in
the same way as past studies that have attempted to measure attitudes and beliefs toward
gacaca (Thompson et al, 2002; Rettig 2008; Pozen et al. 2014). For example, the
statement “people told lies” was adopted from the study of Max Rettig (2008) and Pozen,
Neugebaurey, and Ntaganira (2014). The purpose in doing so was to add a time-series
component when evaluating attitudes and perceptions toward gacaca.

Some questions (e.g., gacaca allowed perpetrators to be reintegrated back into
their community) were also similarly structured to those that are used in the Rwanda
Reconciliation Barometer (RRB), which is administered by the National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda (NURC). This government agency has been
measuring attitudes at different stages of the gacaca process. A survey was administered
by the NURC to approximately 5,000 Rwandans in 2006, 2010, and 2016. The purpose of
framing these questions similar to the RRB was to determine whether Rwandans have
been conditioned to think in certain ways. If their responses are largely similar to those
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questions found in the NURC survey, yet differ on those questions either developed from
past studies or those that are unique in this study, this should cause us to be careful when
making generalizations or inferences about the effect of the gacaca courts. In past
studies, Rwandans are commented to be notorious for telling researchers “want they
want” (Thompson et al. 2002; Rettig 2008; Pozen et al. 2014).

Building on these surveys, the semi-structured interview questions were
structured in such a way to measure whether Rwandans perceive that gacaca was better
suited to dispense justice on a mass scale in comparison to other commonly used
transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict countries. The study interview questions
provided participants with a greater opportunity to elaborate on their own feelings and
attitudes toward the gacaca process, procedures, and policies. In the end, the study
interview built on the surveys in incalculable ways. The study interview, in particular,
was extremely useful in collecting data on whether gacaca worked and whether gacaca
was the best mechanism available to not only dispense justice on a mass scale, but also
uncover the truth and contribute to ethnic reconciliation and the overall healing process in
post-genocide Rwanda.

3.5

Summary
Multi-method research designs are extremely powerful in social science research

since they allow researchers to explore research questions from various viewpoints and
methodological perspectives. In this study, a concurrent transformative research approach
is utilized to explore the critical questions of whether truth commissions work, whether
coupling truth commissions with retributive mechanisms enhances their effect and
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outcomes, and whether top-down approaches to transitional justice, such as truth
commissions, are becoming obsolete due to the changing nature of global violence. The
quantitative section of this study utilizes a dataset constructed on transitional justice
mechanisms, ranging from truth commissions to amnesty programs, between 1970 and
2010. Eight models are developed to test whether truth commissions exhibit positive or
negative effects on levels of democratization, economic development, human rights
protections, and the durability of peace in post-conflict countries during this period both
individually and in conjunction with other transitional justice mechanisms. More
importantly, these models test the impact of truth commissions as well as other
transitional justice mechanisms at different intervals to control for time and the effect of
different combinations of mechanisms. The Large-N nature of this inquiry provides
valuable insight into topic since effects of truth commissions, other transitional justice
mechanisms, and other salient factors can be controlled and manipulated to draw
inferences and generalizations about a large universe of cases. In addition, the different
time intervals included in the models allow for before and after comparisons.

The qualitative section of this study provides useful thick description for these
Large-N analyses. More importantly, Rwanda’s gacaca courts provide a valuable avenue
for exploring what conditions peace, justice, and reconciliation in the aftermath of
extremely personal and localized violence, which often marks the contours of
contemporary global conflicts. The survey questions are structured in such a way to
provide valuable insight into popular perceptions toward different levels of transitional
justice in post-genocide Rwanda. The interviews, moreover, provide valuable
opportunities to explore the limited nature of the survey response questions in a more in127

depth manner. With the course of the study now outlined, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
implement the research design.

CHAPTER 4: STATISTICAL RESULTS & FINDINGS
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Modeling Effects & Outcomes of Truth Commissions & Alternative
Transitional Justice Mechanisms
4.1

Introduction
This chapter presents the statistical findings from the eight models described in

Chapter 3. This chapter is divided into seven component parts. The first section presents
the peace estimates for the first model, which use a dummy variable that captures annual
battle-related deaths to test the impact of truth commissions, trials, amnesties, lustrations,
and reparations on levels of communal violence. The second, third, and forth sections
present the OLS estimates for the democracy, human rights, and economic development
models, which use Polity IV scores, Physical Integrity indices, and per capita GDP as
measures to evaluate the societal effects of these mechanisms. The fifth section provides
a synthesis of the results obtained in the first four models. The sixth section presents the
peace estimates for the models that estimate the societal effects of truth commissions in
different combinations with other transitional justice mechanisms. The seventh, eighth,
and ninth sections then present the OLS estimates for the democracy, human rights, and
economic development models for these different combinations respectively. The chapter
concludes with an overall synthesis of the findings reached in all eight models. A more
substantive discussion on the implications associated with these models is included in
Chapter 6, which synthesizes these findings in conjunction with the case study findings
and overall implications of the dissertation itself. The diagnostics for all of the models
are available in Appendix C. The findings in this chapter provide some evidence that
truth commissions, when paired with reparations, begin to exhibit positive societal
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effects; however, the effects of truth commissions both individually and in combination
with other mechanisms appears to be limited based on the eight models reported.

4.2

Estimating Peace Outcomes for Individual Transitional Justice

Mechanisms
The statistical results for Model 1, which uses five different time intervals to
estimate the peace effects of truth commissions, trials, amnesties, reparations, and
lustrations appear in Table 8. The key take-away from the results is that truth
commissions have no measurable, or statistically significant effect, on the durability of
peace in four of the intervals included when controlling for all other variables in the
models. On peace estimates 10 years after adoption, truth commissions do appear to
exhibit a positive, statistically significant effect. This positive relationship, though,
suggests that the presence of a truth commission is actually detrimental for the durability
of peace since these bodies increase the probability of violence reigniting within a tenyear period. The odds ratios depicted in Table 9 suggest that the odds of conflict
reigniting increases by 4.6 percent in countries that adopt truth commissions versus
countries that do not within a ten-year period, when holding other variables constant.
These results, together, seem to support Hypothesis 4, which states that truth
commissions, by themselves, are unlikely to promote positive societal outcomes by
increasing the durability of peace in post-conflict countries and reducing the probability
of renewed violence or armed hostilities.
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Table 8: Logit Estimates for Peace Outcomes
Variable
Conflict1
Truth Commission
0.82
(0.79)
Trials
0.84
(0.68)
Lustrations
1.00
(0.78)
Amnesties
1.19*
(0.66)
PHYSINT
-0.79***
(0.07)
Polity IV
0.05**
(0.02)
GDP
-0.20*
(0.11)
Asia
-0.37
(1.52)
Africa
-0.63
(1.52)
Latin America
-1.13
(1.52)
N. America
2.93*
(1.66)
W. Europe
-0.03
(1.64)
E. Europe
-0.49
(1.55)
State Target
-0.37
(0.38)
Non-State Target
-0.30
(0.31)
Constant
3.19*
(1.81)
N
688
Pseudo R2
0.33
Log Likelihood
-303.14

Conflict2
0.41
(0.68)
1.11*
(0.64)
2.16***
(0.79)
1.41*
(0.61)
-0.85***
(0.07)
0.49**
(0.02)
-0.27**
(0.11)
-0.94
(1.19)
-1.50
(1.19)
-1.49
(1.20)
2.87**
(1.35)
-1.08
(1.43)
-1.82
(1.23)
-0.39
(0.34)
-0.35
(0.29)
4.33***
(1.59)
732
0.39
-291.82

Conflict3
0.10
(0.96)
1.26
(0.89)
0.57
(1.09)
1.01
(0.88)
-0.98***
(0.08)
0.37*
(0.21)
0.002
(0.12)
-0.05
(0.81)
-0.32
(0.82)
-0.95
(0.83)
2.58**
(1.05)
0.55
(1.02)
-1.24
(0.91)
0.04
(0.38)
-0.17
(0.33)
1.86
(0.39)
749
0.42
-272.43

Conflict4
0.42
(0.93)
0.71
(0.79)
0.84
(0.96)
0.95
(0.77)
-0.84***
(0.06)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.32***
(0.11)
0.70
(0.59)
0.22
(0.59)
0.32
(0.57)
5.79***
(0.91)
2.67
(0.73)
----0.33
(0.42)
0.12
(0.37)
2.70*
(1.39)
813
0.35
-326.94

Conflict5
13.04***
(0.66)
13.37***
(0.48)
13.01***
(0.72)
13.91***
(0.45)
-0.87***
(0.07)
-0.002
(0.01)
-0.11
(0.11)
0.88*
(0.48)
0.86*
(0.50)
-0.13
(0.51)
4.81***
(0.96)
2.14***
(0.61)
----0.47
(0.42)
0.21
(0.32)
-11.83***
(1.22)
799
0.36
-301.39

Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable measuring annual battle-related deaths,
with “1” indicating the presence of ongoing hostilities (>25 annual battle deaths) and “0”
indicating the absence of physical hostilities (<25 annual battle deaths). The labels 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” “five-years
after,” and “ten-years after” being adopted. Logit coefficients are reported with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of
heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded from the model above since
they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. The results did not vary based on whether
amnesties or reparations were included in the models. Oceania and mechanisms targeting
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both state and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with
other categories of region and mechanism target. Eastern Europe is omitted in Conflict
Models 4 and 5 since it is highly collinear. N is the number of observations included in each
model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The results from all five time intervals in Model 1 also provide mixed findings for

the other transitional justice mechanisms included as key predictor variables. Trials,
amnesties, and lustrations exhibit a positive, statistically significant effect on annual
battle-deaths in both the first year and ten year mark, meaning that these mechanisms,
too, are associated with an uptick in violence within the first year and within ten years of
being adopted. The odds ratios in Table 9 indicate that countries that adopted trials
witnessed an increase in communal violence by 203 percent in the first year of being
adopted. Countries that adopted lustrations, moreover, witnessed an increase in
communal violence by 769 percent in the first year, while countries that adopted
amnesties witnessed an increase in physical hostilities by 312 percent in the first year of
being adopted. Needless to say, these models do not provide meaningful evidence to
suggest that transitional justice mechanisms, individually, play a positive role in reducing
violence in post-conflict societies.

The results from Model 1 are much more benign for the variables included as
controls. A negative, statistically significant relationship exists between human rights and
economic development on the durability of peace. Across all five time intervals models,
Physical Integrity scores are consistently significant at the 99 percent level, and the odds
ratios in Table 9 suggest that a one unit increase in Physical Integrity scores is associated
with a -54 percent, -57 percent, -63 percent, -57 percent, and -58 percent decrease in the
incidence of armed violence for each time interval respectively. Further, the logit models
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suggest a negative relationship exists between GDP per capita and annual battle-related
deaths, with a $1,000 (constant $US) increase in GDP per capita being associated with a
decrease in the incidence of armed hostilities by -24 the year of a mechanism being
adopted and -27.5 percent five years after being adopted.

Levels of democratization and geographic region, however, appear to have a
contradictory effect on the durability of peace. Polity IV scores exhibit a statistically
significant, positive effect on annual battle-related deaths in the first year and the
following year of a mechanism being adopted, meaning that post-conflict countries that
score higher on the Polity IV range are actually associated with an uptick of violence in
the short-term. Across all five time-intervals, the results also indicate that mechanisms
utilized in North America increase the likelihood of violence reigniting across all five
time intervals.

Table 9: Odds Ratios for Peace Models
Variable
Truth Commission
One-year prior
Year of
One-year after
Five-years after
10-years after
Trials
One-year prior
Year of
One-year after
Five-years after
10-years after
Lustrations
One-year prior
Year of
One-year after
Five-years after
10-years after

P-Value

Odds Ratios (%)

0.29
0.60
0.92
0.65
0.00

130
51
10
52
4.6e+07

0.21
0.09
0.16
0.37
0.00

132
203
254
104
6.4e+07

0.19
0.01
0.59
0.38
0.00

173
769
77
132
4.5e+07
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Amnesties
One-year prior
Year of
One-year after
Five-years after
10-years after
PHYSINT
One-year prior
Year of
One-year after
Five-years after
10-years after
Polity IV
One-year prior
Year of
One-year after
Five-years after
10-years after
GDP
One-year prior
Year of
One-year after
Five-years after
10-years after

0.07
0.02
0.25
0.22
0.00

231
312
174
158
1.1e+08

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

-54
-57
-63
-57
-58

0.02
0.02
0.08
0.41
0.87

5
5
3.7
1.6
-0.2

0.07
0.02
0.98
0.01
0.29

-18
-24
0.3
-27.5
-10.8

4.3 Estimating Democracy Outcomes for Individual Transitional Justice
Mechanisms
The multivariate regression results65 for all five time-intervals for Model 2 appear
in Table 10. Similar to the results in each of the durability of peace models above, truth
commissions do not exhibit much of a meaningful effect on levels of democratization

65

The results did not change dramatically between the OLS and ordered logit models,
which were run separately to determine whether one model was a better fit for the data
considering the nature of the dependent variable. Reparations were excluded from the
dataset since they were perfectly correlated with amnesties. Including reparations, instead
of amnesties, does affect the OLS coefficients and statistical significance of some
indicators, including truth commissions. The author, however, concludes that these
differing results show that truth commissions do not have much of a meaningful impact
on levels of democratization in post-conflict countries.
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alone. Although a positive, statistically significant relationship exists between truth
commissions and democracy at the five-year mark, no statistically significant relationship
exists for any of the other time intervals. The results for the five-year model do suggest
that truth commissions increase Polity IV scores by 1.86 within five-years when holding
all other variables constant. The inability to reject the null for the other time intervals
suggests that we should be cautious when stating that truth commissions have a positive
effect on levels of democracy in post-conflict countries. The lack of statistically
significant results for the ten-year mark seems to indicate that the effects of truth
commissions are isolated to the first few years of a political transition rather than to longterm outcomes. Similar to the results for Model 1, the results from Model 2 do not
provide much evidence to reject Hypothesis 1, which states that truth commissions,
alone, are unlikely to yield positive democratic developments in post-conflict countries
that adopt them versus those that do not.

Table 10 tells a much more complicated story for other transitional justice
mechanisms. Trials, lustrations, and amnesties all have a negative, statistically significant
effect on democracy and seem to impede the growth of democratic institutions or
processes in the countries that adopt them. In countries that adopted lustration policies,
for example, Polity IV scores decreased by 2.29 in the year of being adopted and 1.72 in
the following year when holding all other variables constant. In countries that adopted
amnesty provisions, Polity IV scores decreased by 1.5 in the first year and 1.41 in the
following year when holding all other variables constant. Finally, countries that adopted
trials or criminal tribunals to try offenders of human rights abuses witnessed a decrease in
Polity IV scores by 1.36 in the first year, 1.51 in the following year, and 1.32 five years
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after adopted when holding all other variables constant. These large and stable
coefficients across these time intervals seem to indicate that these mechanisms delay or
even postpone democratic processes and institutions in countries that adopt them versus
countries that do not.

Similar to the results for each of the controls in Model 1 above, Table 10 also
spells out a positive story for several of these controls in Model 2 as well. In particular,
the results show a positive, statistically significant relationship exists between democracy
and per capita GDP, Physical Integrity scores, and the absence of armed violence.
Increasing per capita GDP by $1,000 ($US constant) increases Polity IV scores by 0.91 in
the first year, 0.88 the following year, 0.99 within five years, and 1.51 within ten years.
Increasing Physical Integrity scores by 1 increases Polity IV scores by 0.46, 0.46, and
0.45 in the first year, the following year, and within five years. Finally, the absence of
armed hostilities increases Polity IV scores by 1.47 in the first year and 1.21 the
following year.

These results also show that regional effects and the target of a mechanism matter
for democracy-building efforts in post-conflict countries. In particular, mechanisms that
are targeted at non-state actors only decrease Polity IV scores by 2.29, 1.99 and 1.98 in
the first year, the following year, and five years after being adopted. Mechanisms that are
geographically concentrated in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe also decrease the
development of democratic processes and institutions across all five time intervals, while
those located in North America and Western Europe are more likely to witness short-term
advancements in the consolidation of democratic institutions and processes. A
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mechanism adopted in Western Europe, for example, increases Polity IV scores by 2.05
five years after being adopted when holding all other variables constant.

Table 10: OLS Estimates for Democracy Outcomes
Variable
Truth Commission
Trials
Lustrations
Amnesties
GDP
PHYSINT
>25 Annual BD
Asia
Africa
Latin America
N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe
State Target
Non-State Target
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE

Polity1
0.19
(1.07)
-1.42*
(0.81)
-2.64**
(1.23)
-1.95**
(0.83)
0.91***
(0.24)
0.44***
(0.13)
1.41***
(0.50)
-4.87***
(0.71)
-6.86***
(0.66)
-1.47**
(0.68)
1.73*
(0.90)
1.34*
(0.75)
-1.62**
(0.73)
0.93
(0.69)
-1.85***
(0.59)
-1.45
(2.07)
688
0.44
5.19

Polity2
1.06
(0.88)
-1.36*
(0.72)
-2.29*
(1.19)
1.50**
(0.75)
0.91***
(0.22)
0.46***
(0.12)
1.47***
(0.52)
-4.31***
(0.85)
-6.14***
(0.81)
-0.64
(0.42)
2.10**
(1.02)
1.61*
(0.90)
-0.34
(0.82)
0.26
(0.63)
-2.29***
(0.58)
-1.60
(2.11)
732
0.44
5.08

Polity3
0.73
(0.81)
-1.51**
(0.64)
-1.72*
(0.93)
-1.41**
(0.66)
0.88***
(0.22)
0.46***
(0.13)
1.21**
(0.52)
-4.38***
(0.69)
-6.44***
(0.64)
-0.47
(0.61)
1.81*
(0.92)
1.22
(0.75)
-0.06
(0.63)
0.21
(0.62)
-1.99***
(0.56)
-1.13
(0.55)
749
0.45
5.03

Polity4
1.86**
(0.95)
-1.32*
(0.79)
-0.90
(1.01)
-0.48
(0.79)
0.99***
(0.19)
0.45***
(0.12)
0.54
(0.49)
-4.13***
(0.76)
-5.29***
(0.68)
0.69
(0.70)
2.24*
(1.15)
2.05**
(0.89)
1.48**
(0.73)
-0.55
(0.61)
-1.98***
(0.54)
-2.84
(1.82)
816
0.46
4.97

Polity5
3.11
(4.01)
0.12
(4.23)
0.62
(5.38)
0.93
(4.31)
1.51***
(0.29)
-0.19
(0.22)
-0.09
(0.82)
-6.49***
(1.20)
-6.31***
(1.01)
-1.28
(1.01)
0.52
(1.79)
0.38
(1.28)
-14.87***
(4.91)
2.99
(2.27)
-0.99
(1.67)
-5.89
(5.21)
801
0.15
12.06

Note: The dependent variable are Polity IV scores, which range from -10 to +10. The labels
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,”
“five-years after,” and “ten-years after” being adopted. OLS coefficients are reported with
robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of
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heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded from the model above since
they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. The results did not vary dramatically depending
on whether amnesties or reparations were included in the models. Oceania and mechanisms
targeting both state and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are highly
collinear with other categories of region and mechanism target. N is the number of
transitional justice mechanisms examined for each model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.4 Estimating Human Rights Outcomes for Individual Transitional
Justice Mechanisms
The multivariate regression results for all five time-intervals in Model 3 are
depicted in Table 11. Much like the results in Model 1 and Model 2, which estimate the
effects of truth commissions on the durability of peace and levels of democratization, the
results in Model 3 appear to suggest that truth commissions are inconsequential when
promoting human rights protections in post-conflict countries. In particular, truth
commissions are statistically significant in any of the five time intervals when using
Physical Integrity scores as the dependent variable. These results, more so than Model 1
and Model 2, provide a straightforward answer to Hypothesis 2, which suggests that
truth commissions, alone, are not associated with improvements in human rights
protections in post-conflict countries that adopt them in comparison to those that do not.

When examining the impact of other transitional justice mechanisms, the results
in Table 11 indicate that amnesties actually have a negative effect on human rights
protections, with post-conflict countries that adopt amnesties witnessing a decrease in
Physical Integrity scores by 0.54 in the first year and 0.55 in the following year when
holding all other variables constant. Ironically, the regression results also indicate that
trials have a negative effect on human rights protections in the short-term, with post-
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conflict countries that adopt them witnessing a decrease in Physical Integrity scores by
0.46 in the first year when holding all other variables constant.

Table 11 portrays a similar story for the same vector of control variables included
in all five models. GDP per capita, the absence of armed conflict, and democracy are
positively associated with human rights outcomes in post-conflict countries. Increasing
GDP per capita by $1,000 ($US constant) increases Physical Integrity scores by 0.18 and
0.17 in the first year and within five years. An increase in Polity IV scores by one is
associated with an increase of Physical Integrity scores by 0.05 in the first year, the year
after, and within five years. The presence of physical hostilities, moreover, reduces
Physical Integrity scores by 2.23, 2.48, 2.59, 2.31, and 2.32 in each of the five time
intervals included in the model when holding all other variables constant. These results
provide clear evidence to suggest that per capita GDP, Polity IV scores, Physical
Integrity scores, and the absence of armed violence are positively associated with one
another. In other words, an increase in one will likely lead to an increase in another, even
when using different time intervals or models.

Finally, geographic variations appear again in the results, with mechanisms
adopted in Asia and Latin America being negatively associated with human rights
outcomes. In particular, mechanisms adopted in Asia are associated with a decrease in
Physical Integrity scores by 1.99, 0.94, 1.27, and 1.06 in the first year, the following year,
within five years, and within ten years. Mechanisms adopted in Latin America are
associated with a decrease in Physical Integrity scores by 1.65, 0.77, 0.82, and 0.54
during these same time intervals when holding all other variables constant.
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Table 11: OLS Estimates for Human Rights Outcomes
Variable
Truth Commission
Trials
Lustrations
Amnesties
GDP
Polity IV
>25 Annual BD
Asia
Africa
Latin America
N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe
State Target
Non-State Target
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE

HR1
0.21
(0.40)
-0.13
(0.30)
0.13
(0.29)
-0.15
(0.29)
0.22***
(0.07)
0.04***
(0.01)
-2.23***
(0.13)
-1.66***
(0.58)
-0.60
(0.59)
-1.53***
(0.58)
0.65
(0.65)
-0.19
(0.61)
-0.10
(0.59)
0.41*
(0.24)
0.25
(0.20)
3.79***
(0.85)
688
0.48
1.63

HR2
-0.42
(0.32)
-0.46*
(0.27)
0.001
(0.37)
-0.54**
(0.26)
0.06
(0.07)
0.05***
(0.01)
-2.48***
(0.14)
-1.99***
(0.49)
1.30***
(0.50)
-1.65***
(0.49)
0.55
(0.57)
-0.36
(0.56)
-0.65
(0.49)
0.26
(0.21)
0.25
(0.18)
5.83***
(0.73)
732
0.49
1.64

HR3
-0.18
(0.33)
-0.16
(0.26)
-0.59
(0.41)
-0.55**
(0.25)
0.18***
(0.06)
0.05***
(0.01)
-2.59***
(0.13)
-0.94***
(0.27)
0.05
(0.29)
-0.77***
(0.28)
0.63*
(0.28)
0.53
(0.36)
0.49*
(0.29)
0.45**
(0.22)
0.49**
(0.19)
3.74***
(0.62)
749
0.53
1.58

HR4
0.19
(0.31)
0.04
(0.26)
-0.37
(0.40)
-0.11
(0.06)
-0.004
(0.06)
0.04***
(0.01)
-2.31***
(0.13)
-1.27***
(0.32)
-0.58*
(0.31)
-0.82***
(0.31)
1.74***
(0.47)
0.98**
(0.42)
0.33
(0.33)
0.48**
(0.21)
0.32
(0.19)
5.02***
(0.58)
816
0.47
1.57

HR5
-0.27
(0.36)
-0.17
(0.29)
-0.37
(0.38)
-0.09
(0.29)
0.17***
(0.06)
-0.003
(0.003)
-2.32***
(0.13)
-1.06***
(0.14)
-0.29**
(0.13)
-0.54***
(0.15)
1.35***
(0.41)
0.68***
(0.26)
0.70***
(0.21)
0.47**
(0.21)
0.09
(0.17)
3.87***
(0.53)
801
0.44
1.57

Note: The dependent variable is Physical Integrity scores, which range from 0 (no human
rights) to 8 (perfect human rights). The labels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “oneyear prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” “five-years after,” and “ten-years after” being
adopted. OLS coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust
standard errors were used due to the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term.
Reparations are excluded from the model above since they are perfectly correlated with
amnesties. These results do not differ when including reparations over amnesties and vice
versa. Oceania and mechanisms targeting both state and non-state actor category were also
omitted since they are highly collinear with other categories of region and mechanism target.
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N is the number of transitional justice mechanisms examined for each model; *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.5 Estimating Economic Outcomes for Individual Transitional Justice
Mechanisms
Table 12 presents the OLS regression results66 for all five time-intervals for
Model 4. In each time interval, a statistically significant relationship exists between truth
commissions and per capita GDP ($US constant). The negative coefficient, however,
suggests that truth commissions are actually associated with decreased economic
outcomes. In particular, for countries that adopt truth commissions, we can expect their
per capita GDP to decrease by 43 percent within the first year, 52 percent within five
years, and 48 percent within 10 years. These results provide conflicting evidence for
Hypothesis 3, which states that truth commissions, alone, are unlikely to produce
economic outcomes in post-conflict countries. On one hand, the estimates suggest a
relationship exists; on the other hand, this relationship is not positive in nature.

Along with truth commissions, all five of the other transitional justice
mechanisms individually exhibit a negative, statistically significant relationship on per
capita GDP in post-conflict countries. For a country adopting a criminal tribunal, we can
expect per capita GDP to decrease by 66 percent after the first year, 77 percent within 5
years, and 73 percent within 10 years. For countries adopting lustration policies, we can

66

Like all of the models above, reparations are excluded because they are perfectly
collinear with amnesties. Similar to the democracy models, including reparations over
amnesties or amnesties over reparations does contribute to changes in statistically
significant results in the models; however, including reparations instead of amnesties in
Model 4 actually changes the directional effect of truth commissions from negative to
positive.
141

expect a decrease in per capita GDP by 66 percent, 77 percent, and 73 percent for these
same periods. Finally, for countries adopting amnesty programs, we can expect per capita
GDP to decrease by 69 percent, 81 percent, and 82 percent when using the same time
periods as trials and lustrations when holding all other variables constant.

In contrast to the negative, statistically significant relationship between all of the
transitional justice mechanisms included in the dataset and per capita GDP, Physical
Integrity scores and Polity IV scores have a positive effect, while the presence of active,
armed hostilities has a negative effect on per capita GDP. A one unit increase in Physical
Integrity scores increases per capita GDP by 6 percent within one year and 7 percent
within ten years. A one unit increase in Polity IV scores, moreover, leads to a 3 percent, 4
percent, and 1 percent increase in per capita GDP within one year, five years, and ten
years when holding all other variables constant. The presence of armed hostilities, on the
other hand, reduces per capita GDP by 23 percent in the first year and 29 percent after
five years. Regional differences also exist in the model, with countries located in North
America being associated with an increase in per capita GDP by 392 percent and 352
percent over a five-year and ten-year period, for example, and countries located in
Western Europe being associated with an increase in per capita GDP by 271 and 229
percent respectively when using the same time intervals.

Table 12: OLS Estimates for Economic Outcomes
Variable
Truth Commission
Trials
Lustrations

GDP1
-0.44**
(0.22)
-0.59***
(0.18)
-0.79***
(0.21)

GDP2
-0.46**
(0.22)
-0.62***
(0.18)
-0.75***
(0.22)

GDP3
-0.43*
(0.23)
-0.66***
(0.18)
-0.67***
(0.21)

GDP4
-0.52**
(0.25)
-0.77***
(0.21)
-0.85***
(0.23)

GDP5
-0.48*
(0.26)
-0.73***
(0.18)
-0.92***
(0.21)
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Amnesties
PHYSINT
Polity IV
>25 Annual BD
Asia
Africa
Latin America
N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe
State Target
Non-State Target
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE

-0.61***
(0.19)
0.07***
(0.02)
0.03***
(0.01)
-0.15
(0.09)
-0.19
(0.61)
-1.06*
(0.60)
0.06
(0.60)
2.74***
(0.61)
1.79***
(0.61)
0.14
(0.61)
0.15
(0.13)
0.16
(0.11)
7.54
(0.65)
688
0.55
0.91

-0.65***
(0.18)
0.19
(0.02)
0.03***
(0.01)
-0.23**
(0.09)
-0.14
(0.66)
-0.99
(0.65)
0.10
(0.65)
2.98***
(0.66)
1.94***
(0.66)
0.18
(0.66)
0.26**
(0.12)
0.23**
(0.11)
7.66***
(0.71)
732
0.55
0.92

-0.69***
(0.19)
0.06***
(0.02)
0.03***
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.10)
-0.13
(0.65)
-1.00
(0.64)
0.08
(0.64)
2.78***
(0.66)
1.88***
(0.65)
0.06
(0.65)
0.17
(0.13)
0.17
(0.11)
7.55***
(0.69)
749
0.53
0.94

-0.81***
(0.21)
-0.001
(0.02)
0.04***
(0.01)
-0.29***
(0.09)
0.84***
(0.15)
-0.18
(0.12)
0.86***
(0.12)
3.92***
(0.21)
2.71***
(0.16)
1.05***
(0.16)
0.23*
(0.13)
0.13
(0.11)
7.17***
(0.27)
816
0.54
0.95

-0.82***
(0.17)
0.07***
(0.02)
0.01***
(0.002)
-0.08
(0.10)
0.58***
(0.17)
-0.55***
(0.14)
0.77***
(0.14)
3.52***
(0.18)
2.29***
(0.18)
1.28***
(0.18)
-0.02
(0.14)
-0.09
(0.11)
7.39***
(0.25)
801
0.52
0.98

Note: The dependent variable is per capita GDP, in natural log form, measured in thousands
of $US. The labels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,”
“one-year after,” “five-years after,” and “ten-years after” being adopted. OLS coefficients are
reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to
the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded from the model
above since they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. Oceania and mechanisms targeting
both state and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with
other categories of region and mechanism target. N is the number of transitional justice
mechanisms examined for each model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.6

What Are The Implications of These Models?
Each of the four models estimating the effects of individual mechanisms on key

post-conflict societal indicators do not tell a promising story about the effect of
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transitional justice over the period of analysis. For immediate purposes in this research,
truth commissions do not appear to exhibit a meaningful effect, if any effect at all, on
levels of peace, democratization, and human rights protections in post-conflict countries
that adopt them. Even more troubling, truth commissions appear to have a strong,
negative effect on economic outcomes in post-conflict countries that adopt them in
comparison to those that do not. All four models, as a result, seem to vindicate each of
the four main hypotheses in this study.

This should cause policymakers to pause when considering the application of
these bodies in virtually every post-conflict country today, especially in those that remain
economically underdeveloped, such as those are embroiled in repetitive violence and
“conflict traps” in geographic regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. If
anything, it appears peace, democracy, human rights, and economic outcomes are
intimately tied to each other. All four models provide statistically significant results that
suggest positive relationships between economic development and levels of
democratization, between levels of democratization and the extent to which human rights
protections are guaranteed, and the extent to which human rights guarantees exist and
levels of economic development in a given post-conflict country.

The estimates in each model also suggest that the effect of transitional justice, as a
whole, is a much more complicated that commonly depicted in the literature. Trials are
not a one-size-fits-all solution to post-conflict justice. There is evidence to suggest that
amnesties reduce democratic, economic, and human rights outcomes. The models also
suggest that lustrations are tied to declining economic prospects and human rights
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protections. The effects of these mechanisms, including truth commissions, in isolation
from one another is dubious at best. This picture, however, begins to evolve when truth
commissions are paired with different mechanisms.

4.7 The Effect of Different Truth Commission Combinations on PostConflict Peace, Democracy, Human Rights, and Economic Outcomes
The effect of truth commissions becomes more pronounced when these bodies are
paired with other transitional justice mechanisms. Table 13 depicts the results for Model
5. In this model, truth commissions are paired with trials, amnesties, lustrations, and
reparations. These pairs are then used as the main predictor variables to determine
whether peace outcomes vary between different sets of truth commission combinations.
Picking up the effects in Model 1, three combinations (truth commissions with trials,
amnesties, and lustrations) increase the probability that violence will reignite within ten
years. Coupling a truth commission with reparations, however, actually decreases the
probability of violence reigniting over this period. Further, pairing a truth commission
with reparations reduces the probability of violence reigniting within the first year of
being adopted and year 10.

The effects of Physical Integrity scores, Polity IV scores, and per capita GDP
remain largely the same as those presented in Model 1. Table 13 illustrates that that an
increase in Physical Integrity scores is associated with a reduction in physical violence
and armed hostilities the following year, within five years, and within ten years. The
direction of the coefficient for the first year, however, is now positive and different from
Model 1. Like Model 1, per capita GDP is associated with a decreased probability of
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violence reigniting within the first year and five years. Democracy scores continue to
exhibit a positive effect or, in this case, increase the probability of violence reigniting in
the first and following year of a mechanism being adopted.

Table 13: Logit Estimates for Peace Outcomes by Truth Commission
Combinations
Variable
Truth Commission
+ Trial
Truth Commission
+ Amnesty
Truth Commission
+ Lustration
Truth Commission
+ Reparations
PHYSINT
Polity IV
GDP
Asia
Africa
Latin America
N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe
State Target
Non-State Target
Constant
N
Pseudo R2
Log Likelihood

Conflict1
0.10
(0.36)
0.45
(0.36)
0.26
(0.44)
-0.74
(0.49)
-0.79***
(0.07)
0.05**
(0.02)
-0.20*
(0.11)
-0.37
(1.52)
-0.63
(1.52)
-1.13
(1.52)
2.93*
(1.65)
-0.03
(1.64)
-0.49
(1.55)
-0.27
(0.38)
-0.30
(0.31)
3.94**
(1.71)
688
0.33
-303.14

Conflict2
-0.32
(0.35)
-0.01
(0.33)
0.74*
(0.44)
-1.42***
(0.47)
0.05***
(0.21)
0.05**
(0.21)
-0.27**
(0.11)
-0.94
(1.19)
-1.50
(1.19)
-1.49
(1.19)
2.87**
(1.35)
-1.08
(1.43)
-1.83
(1.23)
-0.39
(0.34)
-0.35
(0.29)
5.75***
(1.46)
732
0.39
-291.82

Conflict3
0.35
(0.44)
0.09
(0.45)
-0.34
(0.57)
-0.92
(0.65)
-0.98***
(0.08)
0.04*
(0.02)
0.003
(0.12)
-0.05
(0.81)
-0.32
(0.82)
-0.95
(0.83)
2.58**
(1.02)
0.55
(1.01)
-1.24
(0.91)
0.04
(0.39)
-0.16
(0.33)
2.78**
(1.24)
749
0.42
-272.43

Conflict4
0.02
(0.40)
0.25
(0.39)
0.15
(0.52)
-0.69
(0.57)
-0.84***
(0.06)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.32***
(0.11)
0.70
(0.59)
0.22
(0.59)
0.32
(0.57)
5.79***
(0.92)
2.67***
(0.92)
--0.33
(0.42)
0.18
(0.37)
3.39***
(1.15)
813
0.35
-326.94

Conflict5
4.28***
(0.34)
4.83***
(0.33)
3.93***
(0.48)
-9.08***
(0.37)
-0.87***
(0.07)
-0.002
(0.01)
-0.11
(0.11)
0.88*
(0.48)
0.86*
(0.49)
-0.13
(0.51)
4.82***
(0.96)
2.14***
(0.61)
--0.47
(0.42)
0.21
(0.32)
-2.74**
(1.13)
799
0.36
301.39
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Note: The dependent variable is a dummy variable measuring annual battle-related deaths,
with “1” indicating the presence of ongoing hostilities (>25 annual battle-deaths) and “0”
indicating the absence of physical hostilities (<25 annual battle-deaths). The labels 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” “five-years
after,” and “ten-years after” being adopted. Logit coefficients are reported with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of
heteroscedasticity in the error term. Oceania and mechanisms targeting both state and nonstate actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with other categories of
region and mechanism target. Eastern Europe is omitted in Conflict Models 4 and 5 since it is
highly collinear. N is the number of transitional justice mechanisms examined for each
model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 14 depicts the results for Model 6, which estimates the effects of these
different truth commission combinations on Polity IV scores. Truth commissions, when
paired with amnesties and reparations, have a positive, statistically significant effect on
Polity IV scores. Countries that adopt a truth commission in conjunction with an amnesty
program increase Polity IV scores by 1.04 within five-years when holding all other
variables constant. Polity IV scores increased by 2.07, 1.79, and 1.52 when countries
adopted both a truth commission and reparations within the first year, the following year,
and within five years when holding all other variables constant. With that said, the preyear coefficient (2.07) is similar to the coefficients for the other time intervals, which
does not demonstrate a causal effect. These coefficients also seem to suggest that
democracies are more likely to adopt truth commissions and reparations to begin with,
not that truth commissions, when paired with reparations, increase levels of
democratization. The other two truth commission pairs (those including trials and
lustrations) do not exhibit a meaningful effect on levels of democracy in post-conflict
countries.

Much like the democracy effects in Model 2, the outcomes associated with
different control variables does not change much in Model 6. Physical Integrity scores,
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per capita GDP, and the absence of armed hostilities all exhibit a positive, statistically
significant effect on Polity IV scores.67 Combinations located in Asia, Africa, and Eastern
Europe continue to have lower Polity IV scores than those located in North America and
Western Europe. Finally, mechanisms that target non-state actors continue to exhibit a
strong, negative effect on democracy in post-conflict countries, reducing Polity IV scores
by 2.29, 1.99, and 1.98 in the first year, the following year, and within five years when
holding all other variables constant.

Table 14: OLS Estimates for Democracy Outcomes by Truth
Commission Combinations
Variable
Truth Commission
+ Trial
Truth Commission
+ Amnesty
Truth Commission
+ Lustration
Truth Commission
+ Reparations
GDP
PHYSINT
>25 Annual BD
Asia
Africa
Latin America
N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe

Polity1
0.65
(0.56)
0.12
(0.59)
-0.57
(0.78)
2.07***
(0.67)
0.91***
(0.24)
0.44***
(0.13)
1.41***
(0.50)
-4.87***
(0.71)
-6.86***
(0.66)
-1.47***
(0.68)
1.73*
(0.90)
1.34*
(0.75)
-1.63**

Polity2
0.71
(0.52)
0.56
(0.56)
-0.22
(0.75)
2.07***
(0.59)
0.91***
(0.22)
0.46***
(0.12)
1.47***
(0.52)
-4.31***
(0.85)
-6.14***
(0.81)
-0.64
(0.79)
2.10**
(1.02)
1.61*
(0.90)
-0.34

Polity3
0.27
(0.44)
0.38
(0.07)
0.07
(0.59)
1.79***
(0.51)
0.88***
(0.22)
0.46***
(0.13)
1.21**
(0.52)
-4.38***
(0.69)
-6.44***
(0.64)
-0.47
(0.64)
1.81**
(0.92)
1.22
(0.75)
-0.06

Polity4
0.20
(0.47)
1.04**
(0.49)
0.62
(0.60)
1.52**
(0.59)
0.99***
(0.19)
0.45***
(0.12)
0.54
(0.49)
-4.13***
(0.76)
-5.29***
(0.68)
0.69
(0.70)
2.24*
(1.15)
2.06**
(0.89)
1.48**

Polity5
0.60
(1.81)
1.41
(2.02)
1.09
(2.79)
0.48
(3.10)
1.51***
(0.29)
-0.19
(0.22)
-0.09
(0.82)
-6.49***
(1.20)
-6.31***
(1.01)
-1.28
(1.02)
0.52
(1.79)
0.38
(1.28)
-14.87***

67

The coefficients are the same for the controls in Model 6 as those reported in Model 2
in Table 10.
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State Target
Non-State Target
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE

(0.73)
0.93
(0.69)
-1.85***
(0.59)
-3.52*
(1.92)
688
0.44
5.19

(0.82)
0.26
(0.63)
-2.29***
(0.58)
-3.67*
(1.97)
732
0.44
5.08

(0.63)
0.21
(0.62)
-1.99***
(0.56)
-2.92
(1.77)
749
0.45
5.03

(0.73)
-0.55
(0.61)
-1.98***
(0.54)
-4.36***
(1.61)
816
0.46
4.97

(4.91)
2.99
(2.27)
-0.99
(1.67)
-6.37**
(3.32)
801
0.15
12.07

Note: The dependent variable is Polity IV scores, which range from -10 to +10. The labels 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,”
“five-years after,” and “ten-years after” respectively. OLS coefficients are reported with
robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of
heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded from the model above since
they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. Oceania and mechanisms targeting both state
and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with other
categories of region and mechanism target. N is the number of transitional justice
mechanisms examined for each model; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 15 presents the results for Model 7, which estimates the human rights
effects of different truth commission combinations. Much like the results from Model 3
in Table 11, truth commissions, even when paired with different transitional justice
mechanisms, do not appear to have much of a meaningful effect on human rights
protections in post-conflict countries that adopt them. Truth commissions, when paired
with reparations, do exhibit a minor, statistically significant effect on human rights
outcomes, with the presence of this specific combination being associated with a 0.37
increase in Physical Integrity scores the following year. When paired with amnesties,
however, this specific combination exhibits a minor, negative effect on human rights with
this specific combination being associated with a 0.35 reduction in Physical Integrity
scores in the first year.
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The results do not change for the same vector of control variables used from
Model 3.68 Polity IV scores, per capita GDP, and the absence of 25 annual battle-related
deaths exhibit a positive, statistically significant effect on Physical Integrity scores.
Human rights outcomes continue to vary by region as well, with combinations of
mechanisms adopted in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have a negative, statistically
significant effect on Physical Integrity scores.

Table 15: OLS Estimates for Human Rights Outcomes by Truth
Commission Combinations
Variable
Truth Commission
+ Trial
Truth Commission
+ Amnesty
Truth Commission
+ Lustration
Truth Commission
+ Reparations
GDP
Polity IV
>25 Annual BD
Asia
Africa
Latin America
N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe
State Target

Polity1
-0.01
(0.19)
-0.03
(0.20)
0.25
(0.24)
0.12
(0.24)
0.22***
(0.07)
0.04***
(0.01)
-2.23***
(0.13)
-1.66***
(0.58)
-0.60
(0.59)
-1.53***
(0.58)
0.65
(0.65)
-0.19
(0.61)
-0.10
(0.59)
0.41*

Polity2
-0.27
(0.18)
-0.35*
(0.18)
0.19
(0.24)
0.19
(0.21)
0.06
(0.07)
0.05***
(0.01)
-2.49***
(0.14)
-1.99***
(0.49)
-1.30***
(0.50)
-1.65***
(0.49)
0.55
(0.57)
-0.36
(0.56)
-0.65
(0.49)
0.26

Polity3
0.21
(0.18)
-0.18
(0.19)
-0.21
(0.26)
0.37*
(0.21)
0.18***
(0.06)
0.05***
(0.01)
-2.59***
(0.13)
-0.94***
(0.27)
0.05
(0.29)
-0.77***
(0.28)
0.63*
(0.53)
0.53
(0.36)
0.49
(0.29)
0.45**

Polity4
0.25
(0.17)
0.09
(0.17)
-0.18
(0.25)
0.21
(0.21)
-0.001
(0.06)
0.05***
(0.01)
-2.31***
(0.13)
-1.27***
(0.32)
-0.58*
(0.31)
-0.82***
(0.31)
1.74***
(0.47)
0.98**
(0.42)
0.33
(0.33)
0.48**

Polity5
-0.05
(0.17)
0.03
(0.17)
-0.25
(0.22)
0.12
(0.22)
0.17***
(0.06)
-0.003
(0.003)
-2.32***
(0.13)
-1.06***
(0.14)
-0.29**
(0.13)
-0.54***
(0.15)
1.35***
(0.41)
0.68***
(0.26)
0.70***
(0.21)
0.47**
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The coefficients for these variables in Model 7 do not change from Model 3 in Table
11.
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Non-State Target
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE

(0.24)
0.25
(0.20)
3.68***
(0.81)
688
0.48
1.63

(0.21)
0.25
(0.18)
5.64***
(0.70)
732
0.49
1.64

(0.22)
0.49**
(0.19)
3.36***
(0.59)
749
0.53
1.58

(0.21)
0.32
(0.19)
4.82***
(0.19)
816
0.47
1.57

(0.21)
0.09
(0.17)
3.75***
(0.44)
801
0.44
1.57

Note: The dependent variable is Physical Integrity scores, which range from 0 (no human
rights) to 8 (perfect human rights). The labels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “oneyear prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,” “five-years after,” and “ten-years after”
respectively. Z-scores from each respective logit model are reported with robust standard
errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used due to the presence of
heteroscedasticity in the error term. Oceania and mechanisms targeting both state and nonstate actor category were also omitted since they are highly collinear with other categories of
region and mechanism target. Eastern Europe is omitted in Conflict Models 4 and 5 since it is
highly collinear. N is the number of transitional justice mechanisms examined for each
model. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Model 8, representing the final model tested in this study, is depicted in Table
16.69 Building on Model 4, this model tests the effects of different combinations of truth
commissions on economic outcomes in post-conflict countries. The results in Model 8,
unlike the other combination models and their predecessors, do vary considerably from
Model 4. When combining a truth commission with lustration policies, this creates a
negative, statistically significant effect on per capita GDP. Post-conflict countries that
adopted this specific combination experienced a 23 percent, 21 percent, and 26 percent
reduction in per capita GDP in the first year, within five years, and within ten years.
When combining a truth commission with reparations, on the other hand, this creates a
positive, statistically significant effect on per capita GDP. In particular, post-conflict
countries that adopted this combination experienced a 52 percent, 53 percent, 64 percent,

69

The coefficients for each of the control variables remain the same in Model 8
compared to Model 4.
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and 66 percent increase in per capita GDP in the first year, the following year, within five
years, and within ten years.

Table 16: OLS Estimates for Economic Outcomes by Truth
Commission Combinations
Variable
Truth Commission
+ Trial
Truth Commission
+ Amnesty
Truth Commission
+ Lustration
Truth Commission
+ Reparations
PHYSINT
Polity IV
>25 Annual BD
Asia
Africa
Latin America
N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe
State Target
Non-State Target
Constant
N
R2
Root MSE

GDP1
-0.08
(0.09)
-0.09
(0.10)
-0.27**
(0.12)
0.52***
(0.14)
0.07***
(0.02)
0.03***
(0.01)
-0.15
(0.09)
-0.19
(0.61)
-1.06*
(0.60)
0.06
(0.60)
2.74***
(0.61)
1.79***
(0.61)
0.14
(0.61)
0.15
(0.13)
0.16
(0.11)
7.03***
(0.62)
688
0.55
0.91

GDP2
-0.09
(0.09)
-0.13
(0.13)
-0.23*
(0.13)
0.52***
(0.13)
0.19
(0.02)
0.03***
(0.01)
-0.23**
(0.09)
-0.14
(0.66)
-0.99
(0.65)
0.10
(0.65)
2.98***
(0.66)
1.94***
(0.66)
0.18
(0.66)
0.26**
(0.12)
0.23**
(0.11)
7.14***
(0.68)
732
0.55
0.92

GDP3
-0.13
(0.10)
-0.16
(0.10)
-0.14
(0.13)
0.53***
(0.14)
0.06***
(0.02)
0.03***
(0.01)
-0.05
(0.10)
-0.13
(0.64)
-1.00
(0.64)
0.08
(0.64)
2.77***
(0.66)
1.88***
(0.65)
0.06
(0.65)
0.17
(0.13)
0.17
(0.12)
7.03***
(0.66)
749
0.53
0.94

GDP4
-0.14
(0.10)
-0.17
(0.11)
-0.21*
(0.13)
0.64***
(0.15)
-0.001
(0.02)
0.04***
(0.01)
-0.29***
(0.09)
0.84***
(0.15)
-0.18
(0.12)
0.86***
(0.12)
3.92***
(0.21)
2.71***
(0.16)
1.05***
(0.16)
0.23*
(0.13)
0.14
(0.11)
6.53***
(0.20)
816
0.54
0.95

GDP5
-0.06
(0.11)
-0.15
(0.11)
-0.26**
(0.13)
0.66***
(0.14)
0.07***
(0.02)
0.01***
(0.003)
-0.08
(0.10)
0.58***
(0.17)
-0.55***
(0.14)
0.77***
(0.14)
3.52***
(0.29)
2.29***
(0.18)
1.28***
(0.18)
-0.02
(0.14)
-0.09
(0.11)
6.72***
(0.21)
801
0.52
0.98

Note: The dependent variable is per capita GDP, measured in thousands of $US. The labels 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5 refer to the time intervals “one-year prior,” “the year of,” “one-year after,”
“five-years after,” and “ten-years after” respectively. Z-scores from each respective logit
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model are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors were
used due to the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term. Reparations are excluded
from the model above since they are perfectly correlated with amnesties. Oceania and
mechanisms targeting both state and non-state actor category were also omitted since they are
highly collinear with other categories of region and mechanism target. N is the number of
transitional justice mechanisms examined for each model. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

4.8

Summary
The results in this chapter tell a complicated story for the effect of truth

commissions in post-conflict countries. The first four models, which test the effect of
these bodies in isolation from other transitional justice mechanisms, do not provide much
evidence to suggest that democracy, human rights, economic development, or the
durability of peace are influenced by these bodies. If anything, the direction of the
coefficients in Model Four suggest that these bodies might adversely affect economic
processes and development both in the short-term and in the long-term. The first four
models, together, appear to provide partial support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. The
models indicate that we should not expect truth commissions, individually, to create
positive societal outcomes and that post-conflict countries that adopt them are no more or
less likely to experience improvements in political, economic, or social outcomes in
comparison to those that do not adopt these bodies.

This complicated story is similar for other transitional justice mechanisms
included in the models. Trials and amnesties actually exhibit a negative effect on
democratic outcomes, whereas all of the alternative mechanisms exhibit a negative effect
on the durability of peace. When estimating the effect on human rights, amnesties also
exhibit a negative effect, primarily in the short-term, while all of the alternative
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mechanisms exhibit a negative effect when estimating economic outcomes in postconflict countries. It seems, as a whole, that these mechanisms, in isolation from one
another, are actually doing more harm than good.

The four models that manipulate political, economic, and social outcomes for
different combinations of truth commissions and alternative mechanisms provide a more
positive outlook on the effect of transitional justice. The results from these models do
provide some evidence to suggest that truth commissions, when combined with
reparations, are associated with positive societal outcomes. In particular, truth
commissions coupled with reparations reduce the probability of renewed violence,
increase Polity IV scores, and contribute to positive economic outcomes in the form of
increase levels of per capita GDP. This specific combination seems to provide evidence
to support Hypothesis 5, which states that truth commissions must be coupled with
retributive mechanisms in order to be effective. Across all of the models, truth
commissions, when coupled with amnesties, do not exhibit much of a meaningful effect.
Interestingly enough, however, truth commissions when coupled with trials also do not
exhibit much of a meaningful effect. When coupled with lustrations, moreover, these
bodies actually create negative societal outcomes in the form of declining economic
performance. As a result, there is some evidence to suggest that any positive effect of
truth commissions is heightened when these bodies are coupled with certain retributive
mechanisms over others.

Overall, none of the models demonstrate a clear, causal effect between truth
commissions and positive societal outcomes. The event-year, post-year, five-year, and
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ten-year categories for the democracy and economic models for different truth
commission combinations seem to suggest that truth commissions can be associated with
positive outcomes in these two areas. The coefficients for the pre-year category, however,
are almost identical to the coefficients in these later time intervals, which seems to
suggest that post-conflict countries that are already more democratic and wealthy in
nature are predisposed to these two mechanisms to begin with. In other words, these
models do not provide clear evidence to suggest that truth commissions, when coupled
with reparations, are increasing levels of democratization and economic prosperity.
Instead, the opposite could also hold true.

The results in this chapter are useful in several respects. First, every model
provides clear evidence to suggest that democracy, human rights, economic, and peace
outcomes are closely related. In every model tested, the same vector of controls exhibited
strong, positive effects when used interchangeable as controls and dependent variables.
Second, these results, although not initially hypothesized, suggest an interactive effect
between truth commissions and reparations. This finding is interesting because the most
common form of retributive justice is trials. These findings suggest that democracy,
human rights, peace, and economic outcomes are indeed heightened by coupling a
restorative mechanism in the form of a truth commission with a retributive mechanism;
however, instead of this retributive mechanism being a human rights trial, the models
instead suggest that the appropriate mechanism are reparations. Future research can shed
more insight into these different modes and possibly explore this link between truth
commissions and reparations further. Future research can also attempt to how sequencing
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and timing possibly effects the outcomes associated with coupling different transitional
justice mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 5: RWANDA’S GACACA COURTS: A CASE
STUDY FOR BLENDED APPROACHES TO TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
5.1

Introduction
The Rwandan genocide70 was orchestrated over a 100 day period and

systematically exterminated 70 percent of Rwanda’s Tutsi population and thousands of
moderate Hutu who opposed the killings or tried to prevent them, making it the swiftest
genocide in modern history (Des Forges 1999). The United Nations estimates that over
six million Rwandese were forcefully displaced during and after the killings, with large
numbers of refugees fleeing to Burundi, the DRC, and Uganda (UN 2014). This mass
influx of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) created a widespread
humanitarian crisis and fueled regional instability that governments and the international
community are struggling to contain even today, particularly in the DR Congo. The
genocide raged uncontrolled until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a predominantly
Tutsi rebel group based out of Uganda, seized control of the Rwandan government and
defeated government, Interahamwe (“those who attack together”),71 and génocidaire72
forces, which officially put an end to the killings as well as a broader, protracted civil war
between the RPF and the then Hutu-dominated Rwandan government.

70

The Rwandan government labels the genocide as the “genocide against the Tutsi.”
The Interahamwe was the primary militia group that carried out the planned genocide
against the Tutsi in the summer of 1994. This militia, which was an extension of the
ruling government party, would plunder cities and villages, root out designated Tutsi and
moderate Hutu marked for “extermination,” and man checkpoints throughout
government-controlled areas. Members of the Interahamwe also formed coalitions with
other civilian-comprised killings squads that hunted Tutsi down in the countryside.
72
This term is commonly used to describe government officials, soldiers, or associated
militia that planned or actually orchestrated crimes committed during the genocide.
71
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Ordinary Rwandans remain traumatized by the genocide and still are coming to
terms with the legacy of mass atrocities exceptional for their brutality, speed, and
indiscriminate nature. Further complicating matters, human rights abuses, crimes against
humanity, and acts of genocide were committed by all sides. As Coel Kirkby (2006, 97)
notes, this violence affected all facets of society with entire “families and whole
communities displaced, as massive waves of migration surged across the country when
first Tutsis and targeted Hutus escaped the genocidal militias, and when Hutus fled from
the victorious RPF.”

To rebuild communities and prevent victims or their families from taking justice
into their own hands, the RPF-controlled government adopted one of the largest
transitional justice programs the world has ever seen. Key orchestrators and planners of
the genocide were tried before the UN-backed International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) and through Rwanda’s domestic court system. As a consequence of a
large backlog of cases, the Rwandan government later institutionalized a traditional
dispute resolution mechanism at the grassroots level called gacaca (“grass” in
Kinyarwanda) to dispense “mass justice for mass atrocity” (Waldorf 2006). Adopted
through public law in 2001, the approximately 12,000 gacaca courts had a broad mandate
to investigate crimes committed during the genocide and to establish an official, impartial
record of what transpired. Representing a hybrid approach to transitional justice, gacaca
administered both retributive and restorative justice by sentencing perpetrators, providing
reparations, and encouraging forgiveness for those who admitted their guilt. These courts
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became the face73 of the Rwandan government’s ambitious transitional justice and an
instrument to show the world that Rwanda had moved past the “scourge of genocide”
(Thompson 2011, 373). Above all, these courts were adopted to promote social
reconciliation between Rwanda’s decimated Tutsi minority and its guilt-ridden Hutu
majority74 at the village and communal-level.

This bottom-up nature of the gacaca courts is important considering that much of
the violence and atrocities perpetrated were extremely localized and often involved
neighbor killing neighbor and family members turning on family members. Not only was
the genocide widespread in its scope and reach, the violence orchestrated was extremely
personal with the machete becoming the primary tool to dispense death and rape used as
an instrument to destroy the very fabric of society. What we do not know, however, is
whether this bottom-up approach to transitional justice was susceptible to false testimony,
abuses by those seeking personal gain, or government interference with the intent of
making gacaca a form of victor’s justice.
This chapter uses Rwanda’s unique experiment with the gacaca courts as a case
study for the challenges and successes associated with bottom-up and hybrid approaches
to transitional justice. In contrast to other post-conflict countries in the 1990s, which
utilized top-down approaches to transitional justice in the form of truth commissions
(e.g., South Africa and El Salvador) or criminal tribunals (e.g., Cambodia), Rwanda

73

At the time these courts operated, billboards throughout major cities and the
countryside promoted the gacaca courts as the solution to the genocide.
74
Tutsi have traditionally comprised 15 percent of Rwanda’s population; Hutu, as the
majority, have comprised approximately 84 percent with the Twa comprising less than 1
percent.
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utilized gacaca in conjunction with the ICTR and domestic courts to provide a sense of
closure to victims and perpetrators alike. This unique approach, which combined topdown and bottom-up approaches, provides an excellent case study for exploring the
trajectories and effects of different levels of transitional justice to address mass violence.
The objective of this chapter, then, is to critically explore the complex interchanges
between these approaches and to assess popular perceptions toward these different levels
of transitional justice in Rwandan society. Three critical questions structure the analysis
and methodological approach that guides this chapter. First, was gacaca more effective in
promoting transitional justice in comparison to the ICTR and Rwanda’s domestic court
system? Second, do ordinary Rwandans hold favorable views toward gacaca? If yes,
why? If no, why not? Third, and finally, was gacaca immune from external political
pressure and elite capture? Or, did gacaca ultimately embody the ethnic differences it
was trying to resolve and represent a form of victor’s justice used by the RPF to
consolidate its power?

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section discusses the postindependence political history of Rwanda. The second section carefully traces the events
that led to the genocide, how the genocide unfolded, and the immediate sociopolitical
aftermath that existed after the genocide. The third section describes the foundations and
operations of the ICTR and domestic court system, which the Rwandan government
turned to initially to try serious orchestrators and perpetrators of mass atrocities and
provide a sense of justice to victims of the genocide. Both of these mechanisms
represented the international community’s favored approach to addressing genociderelated crimes and atrocities, which were strongly encouraged to government officials
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grappling with the vexing question of how to move forward while addressing the past.
The fourth section describes the gacaca courts as a bottom-up approach to transitional
justice. These courts, unlike the ICTR, became the main tool to promote transitional
justice as a consequence of misgivings the Rwandan government had toward the ICTR
and due to practical realities on the ground. The fifth section critically examines the three
research questions above through the use of survey data collected by the author over a
two month period in 2016. This chapter concludes with a brief synthesis and discussion
of the findings.

5.2

The Post-Independence Political History of Rwanda
The post-independence political history of Rwanda, much like any other African

country, is one of instability, insecurity, and armed violence that is traced to a legacy of
colonialism. In Rwanda’s case, its territorial borders were artificially shaped by European
powers through the Conference of Berlin in the late-19th century. Initially, Rwanda was a
colonial possession of Germany and, along with modern day Burundi, Kenya,
Mozambique, Uganda, and Tanzania, comprised a key territorial unit of “German East
Africa.” By sheer acreage, German East Africa constituted Germany’s largest territorial
holding in Africa. Due to its proximity to the Belgian controlled “Free Congo Basin”
(modern day DRC) and the British controlled “British East Africa” (Uganda, Kenya,
Sudan), Rwanda represented a key territorial foothold and flashpoint of conflict between
the Germans, Belgians, and British due to its strategic location. Following World War I
and Germany’s concession of its colonial territories as a consequence of the Treaty of
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Versailles, Belgium assumed full administrative and territorial control over Rwanda and
Burundi and combined both into a geographic entity called Ruanda-Urundi.

Under Belgian colonial rule, Rwanda was largely governed through semiautonomous colonial administrations, which favored the interests of the minority Tutsi at
the expense of the majority Hutu. Although these ethnic labels can be traced to precolonial times, in where the label “Tutsi” was traditionally applied to land and cattle
owners and the term “Hutu” was applied to farmers, artisans, and peasants, both the
Germans and later the Belgians institutionalized these arbitrary ethnic divisions. The goal
of the Germans and particularly the Belgians was to exacerbate ethnic tensions and infuse
racial animosities into these labels as a strategy of colonial rule. The term Tutsi was later
applied to those who were lighter in skin color, taller, and found to possess more
“European” qualities, which provided a pretext for the colonists to grant Tutsi elite,
privileged administrative positions in colonial governments (Burnet 2012, 47-48). Hutu,
on the other hand, were perceived by the colonists as being more “African,” meaning
they were darker in skin complexity and considered to be “brutish” by the colonists.
Before colonization, these differences were indeed important; however, they largely
existed in economic terms. From the 14th to 19th centuries, successive lines of Tutsi
Kings, called Mwami, exercised power through feudal systems that fostered patron-client
relationships, with Tutsi land owners giving access to land and livestock in exchange for
labor from Hutu farmers. By infusing racial animosities into this ethnic distinction, the
colonists were extremely successful in institutionalizing distrust and hatred. More
importantly, the colonists were remarkably successful in instilling and perpetrating

162

artificial ethnic categories and creating racist sentiments and divisions that would become
the basis for future communal violence (Des Forges 1995, 44).
This ethnic caste system75 created by the Belgians persisted for much of the
colonial era until Hutu groups rebelled against Dutch rule in 1959, which forcefully
displaced 150,000 Tutsi into modern-day Burundi. After the Belgians granted formal
independence to both Rwanda and Burundi in 1962, negative emotions and attitudes
between Hutu and Tutsi boiled over into violence that forced thousands of Tutsi to
refugee camps in Uganda and Burundi. In turn, the Tutsi-dominated government in
Burundi massacred thousands of Hutu, which forced thousands of Hutu refugees into
Rwanda, sometimes into the former homes of Tutsi who had fled during earlier periods of
violence and instability. Under a pledge to restore order, General Juvenal Habyarimana
seized the Rwandan government via a coup d’état in 1973 and established a one-party
state with the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) recognized
as the only officially state-sanctioned political party. As a consequence of this tit-for-tat
violence, entire families and villages were uprooted and the Habyarimana government
institutionalized disparate laws and policies that effectively discriminated against Tutsi.
A state-sanctioned ethnic quota system, for example, was institutionalized with the intent
of limiting Tutsi to holding only nine percent of available public sector jobs (HRW
2017).

Beginning in the 1980s, Tutsi exiled into Uganda formed the RPF and played a
key role in the Ugandan Bush War fighting alongside Yoweri Museveni’s National
75

The Belgians perpetrated this system through the creation of ethnic identity cards,
which would later play a decisive factor in the identification of Tutsi during the genocide.
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Resistance Movement (NRA). After NRA forces overthrew the government of Milton
Obote and, later, Tito Okello, the RPF was incorporated into Uganda’s national army
where they received training, arms, and outside support. More importantly, the RPF was
given access to military encampments along the Ugandan-Rwandan border, which
allowed it to stage guerilla attacks against Rwandan government forces beginning in
1990. Paul Kagame, who served as head of intelligence for Museveni, assumed command
of the RPF and devised an invasion of northern Rwanda with a force of 4,000 RPF forces,
many of which were veterans of the Bush War. With assistance from the Ugandan
government, the RPF and Rwandan government, which was backed by France, Belgium,
Egypt, and South Africa, waged a protracted, insurgency intermittingly from 1990 to
1994. During this period, the Interahamwe (“those who attack together”) was created as a
paramilitary force by the Rwandan government to help counter RPF attacks. Armed and
supplied by the Rwandan army and trained by the French, the Interahamwe were
responsible for raids in villages throughout the countryside that were thought to be
sympathetic to the RPF. In several documented instances, the Interahamwe rounded up
and killed thousands of Tutsi civilians and RPF sympathizers between 1990 and 1994.
Along with other anti-Tutsi paramilitary groups, including the Impuzamugamgi (“those
with the same goal”), the Interahamwe, which numbered 6,500 men, was successful in
rallying Hutu against Tutsi and, working in conjunction with the Rwandan government
and military, forced thousands of Tutsi into exile (Bartrop and Jacobs 2014, 1746).
Government officials and youth militias were extremely successful in fomenting ethnic
violence and divisions by portraying Hutu as innocent victims and placing blame on Tutsi
for their own misfortunes (Des Forges 1999, 72-82).
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In 1992, the RPF and Rwandan government began official negotiations, known as
the Arusha Accords, to formally bring an end to the violence. From the onset, the Arusha
Negotiations were bogged down by divisions between moderates and hardliners within
Rwanda’s government and over thorny issues of how to create an effective power-sharing
government between Hutu and Tutsi, how to integrate RPF forces into the Rwandan
national army, and how to demobilize soldiers who would be reintegrated back into
society. The Arusha Accords were officially signed in August 1993 and contained several
agreements calling for a new power-sharing government that would give key MRND and
RPF leaders positions of power and contained provisions calling for the creation of a new
national military comprised of government troops and RPF forces, albeit separated into
different units (Des Forges 1999, 123-129). In October 1993, the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 872, which created the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR). The objective of this international peacekeeping force was to help
implement and ensure that Rwandan government and RPF forces abided by their
agreements in the Arusha Accords.

5.3

The Rwandan Genocide
The genocide against the Tutsi started in April 1994 following the downing of

Rwandan President Habyarimana’s plane by unknown assailants as it was approaching
Kigali International Airport on the evening of April 6. This “genocidal spark” led to the
immediate mass mobilization of Rwandan military forces, police, and governmentbacked militia groups, including the Interahamwe and Impuzamugamgi. On the morning
of April 7, members of the presidential guard, Forces armées rwandaises (FAR), police,
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and the Interahamwe constructed roadblocks and manned barricades at strategic
intersections within and around Kigali with the intended goal of identifying, impeding,
and systematically exterminating inyenzi (cockroaches), ibyitso (accomplices), and
“enemies” of the state (Burnet 2012: 4). Targeted killings quickly followed with preidentified Tutsi rounded up and executed and moderate Hutu politicians and opponents to
the Hutu Power movement, including Rwanda’s Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana,
assassinated.

Upon receiving news that the main force of the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) would be pulled out Rwanda, calls to eliminate the
inyenzi and ibyitso from Hutu Power elements in the Rwandan government were
broadcast via radio by the extremist hate-radio Radio-télévision des mille collines
(RTLM) with alarming speed. Orders to execute Tutsi were also relayed by local
government officials who had commands to round-up and kill any Tutsi regardless of
age, sex, education, social status, religion, or occupation (Mironko 2004, 52-53). These
premediated killings were largely carried out by the Interahamwe and the Hutu Power76
wing of the MRND. The main objective of these mass killings was to finally solve the
“Tutsi problem,” which was framed in such a way to suggest that Rwanda’s Tutsi
minority population was responsible for and conspiring with the RPF to overthrow the
Hutu-dominated government (Des Forges 1999).

76

Pronounced “Pawa” in Kinyarwanda, the Hutu Power were radical elements in the
government of Habyarimana that favored the “final solution” to the Tutsi problem. This
radical element blamed the RPF for ongoing violence and violations of cease fires, stirred
up exaggerated claims that the RPF had the intention of committing a Hutu genocide, and
labeled moderate Hutu, such as Prime Minister Agatha Uwilingiyimana, as inyenzi
(Cockroaches or “Puppets of the Tutsi”) (Des Forges 1999, 182-185).
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In the weeks and months that followed, thousands of Tutsi fled to the countryside
from urban centers and had their fates largely decided at the hands of ibitero (killing
squads). These killing squads were comprised of ordinary Hutu civilians that were
recruited at the beginning stages of the genocide to flush Tutsi out from hiding so they
could be killed (Burnet 2012, 4). The ibitero were also charged with investigating cases
where Hutu were accused of hiding or defending Tutsi, with those found guilty meeting
the same fate as those they tried to protect. HRW (2014, 1) comments that these killings
were exceptional for their brutality, speed, and thoroughness. Due to the limited supply of
ammunition, death was dispensed at the hands of machete-wielding killing squads who
summarily executed anyone found to be in possession of a Tutsi identification card or
those that were simply accused of being Tutsi or a Tutsi-sympathizer. Even worse, sexual
violence was used as a tool to sow fear and destroy family units. Although reports vary,
the UN estimates that 250,000 women were raped at some point during the genocide (UN
2014). Infants and small children, moreover, were deliberately targeted as a form of
future population control to eliminate future generations of Tutsi, evident by the fact that
mass graves uncovered at churches and other public spaces throughout the country were
littered with bodies of infants, small children, and women. To this day, members of key
institutions in Rwandan society either admit their culpability in the violence or accept
responsibility for not doing enough to stop the bloodshed.

The genocide ceased in mid-July as the RPF captured Kigali and pushed the FAR
and Interahamwe southward into Burundi and eastward into the DR Congo. Rwandan
society was in complete tatters in what Des Forges (1999, 1) describes as “one of the
most efficient and terrifying episodes of targeted ethnic violence in recent international
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history.” RPF forces, as they captured villages across the country, uncovered mass graves
and entire villages burned to the ground. In “protected areas” or “safe zones”
administered by the French (the Turquoise zone being the most notorious), RPF and
international observers uncovered thousands of Tutsi hacked to death in schools,
churches, and government buildings. The international community, which refused to
intervene during the genocide, was quick to condemn the violence and atrocities that
were perpetrated on such a mass-scale. These mass human rights abuses, ironically,
would form the basis of a growing international norm of a “Responsibility to Protect”
(R2P), which would later be called upon when reports of ethnic violence and genocide
emerged in places such as Darfur.

The genocide was characterized by extremely personal and localized violence that
involved neighbors killing neighbors, friends refusing safe passage to friends, and family
members turning on family members. Both government and RPF forces alike were
responsible for perpetrating large-scale human rights abuses, which ranged from forced
displacement and illegal detention to torture, sexual violence, and summary executions.
In just one instance, the Interahamwe (“those who attack together” or “those who stand
together” in Kinyarwanda) massacred an estimated 5,000 elderly men, women, and
children at the Cyahinda parish church in Nyakizu (UN 2014). Alison Des Forges (1999,
720), moreover, documents numerous cases of RPF soldiers killing unarmed Hutu
civilians in villages they captured and, in some cases, rounding Hutu civilians up and
shooting them upon them returning to their villages. Des Forges (1999, 726) also
uncovered several instances of accused génocidaires being summarily executed rather
than being tried through appropriate legal channels. In total, it is estimated that hundreds
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of thousands of Rwandese -- ranging from soldiers, police, and militia to ordinary
civilians -- took part in the killings and hundreds of thousands of more took part in
wanton property destruction or theft (Straus 2004, 95).

5.4 Response of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda &
Domestic Courts
The immediate response to the genocide was a concerted effort to create a human
rights criminal tribunal fashioned after the Nuremburg Trials. A pressing concern of the
international community was how and under what manner suspected perpetrators should
be brought to justice. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security
Council established the ICTR on November 8, 1994 to “prosecute persons responsible for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of Rwanda and neighboring states in 1994.”77 The ICTR was provided with a
mandate, albeit a limited mandate, to investigated crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (1949), which stipulates
basic protections for war victims. Seated in Arusha, Tanzania to shield itself from
political influence and pressure from the Rwandan government to provide immediate
justice for crimes perpetrated, the ICTR represented a collaborative effort by the United
States and international community to institutionalize the call of “never again.”

Intense lobbying efforts on behalf of the Rwandan government were unsuccessful
in creating an international tribunal based in Rwanda that could compel state compliance
and administer the death penalty to convicted génocidaires. Based on the “New Zealand”
77

The specific mandate can be found at:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/955(1994)
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approach, the ICTR was adopted by the UN Security Council through Resolution 955 by
invoking Chapter VII. As part of the resolution, the ICTR featured an appeals chamber
and chief prosecutor shared with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). In a surprising turn of events, Rwanda, which was a rotating, nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council at the time, voted against the
establishment of the ICTR since it viewed its mandate as limited and its legal recourse as
inadequate to investigate and punish egregious those guilty of committing crimes.
Further, the Rwandan government opposed the use of shared special prosecutor with the
ICTY, criticized the location of the court, and protested against its ability to influence the
nature of individual proceedings.

The ICTR only formally indicted 93 senior military and defense officials as well
as religious, military, and media elites with genocide-related crimes over 20 years78 of
operation (UN 2015). Of these 93, only 73 were tried and received a verdict. 59 of these
73 were eventually convicted, with 14 being acquitted. 88 percent of those convicted
were charged with the crime of genocide, making the ICTR the first international body to
explicitly try and convict genocide-related crimes. Government ministers, politicians,
military leaders, police, and key members of the Interahamwe were among those that
were tried and prosecuted. RPF soldiers guilty of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, however, were not tried and charged through the ICTR. Instead, many “midlevel” organizers and perpetrators of violence were charged and tried through Rwanda’s
domestic court system. In total, approximately 7,000 government officials, ranking
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The first verdict came on November 22, 1995 and the last verdict was issued on
December 14, 2015.
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officers in FAR, and key leaders of the Interahamwe and the Hutu Power” movement
were tried through this domestic court system (UN 2014).

This relatively small workload of the ICTR and domestic courts is a consequence
of their limited mandate and financial resources. Although the ICTR cost a staggering $1
billion to operate, this cost was spread over a two-decade period and often left the ICTR
without the financial resources to operate at full capacity. Rwanda’s domestic court
system, moreover, was decimated by the events that unfolded during the genocide.
Lawyers, judges, and judicial staff were systematically targeted and killed as a way to
prevent future efforts at bringing suspected génocidaires to justice. As Human Rights
Watch (2014, 1) comments, even the best-equipped judicial system would have faced a
difficult and daunting task in delivering justice for atrocities committed on such a mass
scale. This challenge was made even more difficult by the fact that thousands were
rounded up and charged in the absence of solid evidence against them. By the late 1990s
and early 2000s, this large population of suspected génocidaires imprisoned without
charge created a human rights issue of its own, one in which the international community
demanded that the RPF-dominated government address in some form or another.
Although the ICTR and domestic courts were moving forward with trials and
convictions, approximately 130,000 individuals remained imprisoned on charges related
to crimes committed during the genocide by late 1998 (HRW 2014).

5.5

The Gacaca Courts
To rectify this situation, the gacaca courts became the main instrument of

transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda and the primary mechanism to uncover the
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truth and dispense justice to those affected by the extremely personal and localized
violence that marked the genocide. As defined by the government (2012, 1), the
objectives of gacaca were to “reveal the truth about what happened,” “eradicate the
culture of impunity,” and “reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity.” First, these
courts only had a mandate to investigate purported crimes and atrocities committed
during the genocide; they did not have a broader mandate to investigate purported crimes
that were committed by RPF forces after they assumed political and territorial control.
These courts, moreover, could not investigate human rights abuses or violations that were
perpetrated during the broader civil war that raged between 1990 and 1994. Second, these
courts were tasked with dispensing both restorative and retributive justice. Although
penalties or fines were administered (retributive justice), the goal was to reintegrate an
individual perpetrator back into his or her village and restore a lost balance between
perpetrator and victim (restorative justice). In most cases, there were incentives for
perpetrators to admit their guilty rather through receiving a reduced sentence rather than
denying the charges levied against them. Third, and finally, these courts were charged
with promoting national unity. To achieve this goal, gacaca proceedings were structured
in such a way to label victims and perpetrators as Rwandans, not Tutsi or Hutu
(Ingelaere, 521-522). These goals, as outlined by the Rwandan government, provided
gacaca with a broad, yet specific mandate to investigate any crime as long as it was
committed during the 100 days of the genocide (Sarkin 2001; Kirkby 2006; Burnet 2012;
Pozen et al. 2014).

Gacaca operated at the both the cell level and the sector level, with Category I
and Category II offenses were tried at the sector level and Category III offenses being
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held at the cell level. Category I and II offenses involved cases where a defendant was
accused of planning the or physically taking part in the killings, while Category III
offenses, which comprised a majority of gacaca cases, involved cases where a defendant
was charged with property damage or theft. In Rwanda, a cell is the lowest administrative
unit and largely coincides with individual villages; sectors, on the other hand, often are
comprised of multiple villages or, in some cases, are marked by the boundaries of a large
city. In total, 9,000 courts existed at the cell level and approximately 1,500 courts at the
sector level (UN 2014). An additional 1,500 appeals courts operated nationwide. These
12,000 courts, in total, heard an estimated two million cases involving approximately 1.2
million individuals between 2001 and 2012 (UN 2014). The reach of these courts was
sweeping with approximately half of the adult male Hutu population in Rwanda in 1994
being called to appear before a court (Le Mon 2007: 1). 30 percent of these cases ended
with the acquittal or exoneration of the accused, while the remaining 70 percent of cases
ended with the defendant receiving anywhere from a life sentence to community service
(UN 2014).

Gacaca, as a form of grassroots justice in Rwandan society, can be traced back to
the 15th century. During colonial times, these courts were informal dispute resolution
mechanisms utilized by local communities to mitigate and address marital, family, and
land disputes (Burnet 2012, 196). Despite some parallels with the traditional form of
gacaca, such as an emphasis on forgiveness, providing reduced sentences to those who
confessed, and relying on community participation to inform proceedings, the modern
variation of gacaca, which was institutionalized through Public Law in 2001, was a
radically different institution from its predecessor. Instead of being informal courts that
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dealt with minor crimes and functioned outside of the state, modern gacaca became the
primary state organ to address the genocide. As Joanna Pozen, Richard Neugebauery, and
Joseph Ntaganira (2014, 31) comment, gacaca was the Rwandan government’s response
to practical realities on the ground following the genocide. In particular, these courts
were utilized as a way to ease an overburdened criminal justice system, which was
overflowing with thousands of individuals accused or suspected of taking part in the
crimes. This was largely a consequence of the small workload and restricted mandate of
the ICTR, which was limited to the prosecution of lead orchestrators of the genocide.
Rwanda’s criminal justice system, moreover, was severely understaffed as a consequence
of judges, lawyers, and others associated with its domestic legal system being
systematically targeted and eliminated during the genocide itself. Due to these structural
constraints, the gacaca courts were perceived to be the only viable solution to the
problems at hand and the desperate need to dispense justice on a mass scale (Longman
2009; Burnet 2012).

As part of the modern gacaca process, defendants were tried in the villages where
they were accused of committing genocide-related crimes before a panel of locally
elected judges called inyangamugayo (“reliable person” or “trustworthy person” in
Kinyarwanda). These judges, who were elected in the villages in which they served, were
often venerable members of the community and elected based on their perceived ability
to dispense justice both fairly and equitably. These judges, however, did not receive
formal legal training and were free to lead investigations into crimes, question witnesses
and defendants, and collect the facts in a case when deciding the fate of a defendant
(Pozen et al. 2014, 34). In a typical case, the accused would receive a notice requiring
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their attendance at an upcoming meeting. These individuals then had the opportunity to
deny the charges levied against them or admit their culpability. In the case of the latter,
defendants would often receive commuted sentences or fines in exchange for admitting
their guilt. This could take the form of providing reparations (e.g., giving a cow to a
person as a reparation) or even providing labor to victims or their families. In the case of
the former, evidence would be presented against the accused and individual members of
the community would be able to share eye-witness testimony and evidence.
Inyangamugayo would then deliberate on the facts of an individual case and issue their
decision before a meeting adjourned.

5.6

Competing Views on Gacaca
Proponents of the gacaca courts advance that these bodies have been an effective

tool for peacebuilding and a catalyst for social reconciliation due to their therapeutic
nature and their “bottom-up” approach to establishing justice for victims and their
families (Daly 2002; Wierzynska 2004; Venter 2007; Clark 2010; Doughty 2015).
Through interviews with gacaca participants, Phil Clark (2010: 265) finds that the gacaca
process was rehabilitating to whole communities since it dignified victims by giving them
a human face and by providing a forum for victims or relatives to receive comfort from
others in their villages. Erin Daly (2002), moreover, argues that the grassroots nature of
these courts’ deliberations and proceedings made them well-positioned to deliver a fair,
impartial justice and to resolve community conflicts since elected judges were familiar
with village dynamics and capable of dispensing fair, impartial verdicts and penalties.
This “participatory justice” argument is also advanced by Christine Venter (2007), who
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argues that the gacaca process provided an excellent forum for “truth-telling” at the
local-level since it is virtually impossible for false information to be admitted in an
individual case, which reduced incentives for someone to make accusations for personal
or private gain.

Other proponents contend that these courts have advanced a culture of respect for
human rights by strengthening the rule of law and ending a cycle of impunity in postgenocide Rwanda. Cori Wielenga and Geoff Harris (2011), for example, note that the
retributive qualities of these courts provide disincentives for future violence along ethnic
lines since would-be perpetrators know that there will be penalties exacted against them
for doing so. To proponents then, the gacaca courts have been a widely successful tool
for promoting political, ethnic, and social reconciliation, which makes the application of
other forms of “bottom-up” transitional justice highly recommended in other post-conflict
situations (Lundy and McGovern 2008).
Opponents suggest that these courts have been used as a tool to exact victor’s
justice and that these courts have actually deepened underlying tensions and hostilities
along ethnic lines (Sarkin 2001; Court and Joireman 2004; Rettig 2008; Ingelaere 2009;
Longman 2009). Jacques Fierens (2005) draws attention to severe legal shortcomings
associated with these courts as a consequence of them denying due process and a fair trial
for defendants, which reduced the legitimacy of these courts in the eyes of the ordinary
Rwandan. Jeremy Sarkin (2001) and Allison Corey and Sandra Joireman (2004) criticize
these courts for their limited mandate, which does not allow them to investigate human
rights abuses committed during the broader civil war between the RPF and the Hutu-
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dominated government between 1990 and 1994. Corey and Joireman (2004) argue that
these courts increase the specter of continued ethnic divisions since gacaca decisions will
be perceived as being impartial to crimes committed against Hutu civilians (2004: 73).
Sarkin, moreover, argues that this timeline establishes a narrative of Hutus being
perpetrators and Tutsis being victims and does not take into account a long history of
both ethnic groups perpetrating crimes against the other (Sarkin 2001: 161).

Longman (2009) concedes that the exclusion of crimes committed by the RPF and
various interventions by the national unity government into gacaca proceedings created
and perpetrated an impression of impartial, victor’s justice. Bert Ingelaere (2009: 521522) finds that RPF power-brokers at the national and local level used gacaca not as a
means to establish the truth about past atrocities but as part of a broader program by the
RPF to promote legitimacy for the RPF-dominated government. Max Rettig (2008) finds
that gacaca has exacerbated interethnic conflict and ethnic disunity as a consequence of
lies, half-truths, and silence during gacaca proceedings. Susan Thomson (2011),
moreover, finds that the gacaca courts tend to take on the power dynamics in the
communities that they operate in, meaning that these courts are used as a tool by elites
and the RPF to advance their agenda. More importantly, Thomson finds that these courts
are used to manipulate international donors and the international community into thinking
that Rwanda is a nation rehabilitated from the scourge of genocide. Finally, Jeanie Burnet
(2012: 195) comments that these courts did not have legitimacy in the eyes of the average
Rwandan since political influences from the central government controlled the narrative
advanced in the proceedings, which affected “who was heard, what information was
reported, and what the final verdict was.” In sum, the gacaca process simply represented
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a tool the RPF-dominated government used to promote legitimacy as a form of victor’s
justice. Not only did it limit the scope of the proceedings and deliberations, the RPF had a
hand in determining who was charged and what sentences they were given without these
people being afforded basic legal protections and adequate due process.

5.7

Survey & Interview Results

Survey Attitudes toward the Gacaca Process, Procedures, and Outcomes
The survey results in this study provide interesting insight into the claims that
proponents and opponents of gacaca advance. Table 17 presents the survey results from
Form A. A majority of respondents expressed positive attitudes toward the gacaca
process as well as toward the outcomes reached in individual trials. 79 percent of
respondents, for example, agreed with the statement ‘Overall, gacaca has worked well in
your local community’ (Question 6). Similarly, 86 percent of respondents indicated that
they were satisfied with the verdicts reached by gacaca judges (Question 7). When asked
to indicate their attitudes toward the outcomes of gacaca, 86 percent of respondents,
moreover, agreed gacaca promoted national unity and 72 percent agreed that gacaca
uncovered the truth about what happened during the genocide in their local community
when asked in Questions 8 and 9 respectively. 79 percent of respondents also agreed with
the statement, ‘Did gacaca meet your individual needs’ (Question 12). 72 percent of
respondents disagreed that false testimony was presented in individual cases or that
people were threatened during gacaca proceedings as indicated in Questions 14 and 15
respectively. These data appear to provide strong support for the process itself as a means
to address crimes committed during the genocide, to learn more about what happened
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during the genocide itself, and as means for individuals to move past the horrific events
that took place.

Attitudes begin to differ, though, when respondents are asked questions that
pertain to some procedural elements and outcomes associated with gacaca. Half of
respondents indicated that tensions and feelings of distrust still exist in their community
(Question 10). Only half of the respondents agreed with the statement, ‘Gacaca did a
good job investigating all crimes that were committed occurred’ (Question 11) and only
43 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement ‘people lied,’ which suggests that
people had reservations over the types of cases brought before these courts. These three
questions seem to raise concerns over whether the limited mandate of gacaca affected
their ability to be perceived as being an impartial, fair mechanism of transitional justice.
Although most agree that gacaca was an instrumental process that helped individuals
rebuild their local communities, these data appear to illustrate misgivings with some
procedural and structural design elements.

Table 17: Perceptions toward the Gacaca Courts (Form A)
N=14

Agree

Disagree

I don’t know

6. Did Gacaca work
well in your local
community?
7. Were people
satisfied with the
verdicts reached by
inyangamugayo?
8. Did gacaca promote
national unity?

79% (11)

14% (2)

7% (1)

86% (12)

7% (1)

7% (1)

86% (12)

7% (1)

7% (1)

9. Did gacaca uncover
the truth about what
happened during the

72% (10)

14% (2)

14% (2)
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genocide?
10. Are there still
71% (10)
14% (2)
14% (2)
underlying
tensions/feelings of
distrust in your
community?
11. Did gacaca do a
57% (8)
29% (4)
14% (2)
good job investigating
crimes that occurred in
your village?
12. Did gacaca meet
79% (11)
0% (0)
21% (3)
your needs?
13. People told lies
21% (3)
43% (6)
36% (5)
14. People felt
14% (2)
72% (10)
14% (2)
threatened
15. There was false
14% (2)
72% (10)
14% (2)
testimony or evidence
presented
Note: Questions 1-6 recorded a respondents’ demographic information; the
percentages may not add up correctly due to rounding.

The results from Form B in Table 18 closely mirror, for the most part, the results
from Form A in Table 17. 77 percent and 85 percent of respondents, for example, agreed
with Question 6 and Question 7 respectively, which is almost identical to the response
rates (79%; 86%) for both questions on Form A. Response rates for the last three
questions did not fluctuate much between both versions of the survey as well. 57 percent
of respondents disagreed that people told lies on Form B in comparison to 43 percent
who disagreed on Form A. 77% of respondents also disagreed that people felt threatened
and 62% disagreed that false evidence or testimony was presented.

Table 18: Perceptions toward the Gacaca Courts (Form B)
N=13

Agree

Disagree

I don’t know

6. Did Gacaca work in

77% (10)

15% (2)

7% (1)
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your local community?
7. Were people
satisfied with the
outcomes of gacaca?
8. Did gacaca promote
reconciliation?

85% (11)

15% (2)

0% (0)

70% (9)

23% (3)

7% (1)

9. Did gacaca uncover
85% (11)
15% (2)
0% (0)
the truth about what
happened during the
genocide?
10. Are there still
92% (12)
0% (0)
7% (1)
underlying
tensions/feelings of
distrust in your
community?
11. Did gacaca do a
85% (11)
7% (1)
7% (1)
good job investigating
all crimes committed
during the genocide?
12. Did gacaca allow
85% (11)
7% (1)
7% (1)
you to move forward?
13. People told lies
23% (3)
53% (7)
23% (3)
14. People felt
15% (2)
77% (10)
7% (1)
threatened
15. There was false
23% (3)
62% (8)
15% (2)
testimony or evidence
presented
Note: Questions 1-6 recorded a respondents’ demographic information.
Subtle differences do exist between each version. 92 percent of respondents on
Question 10 on Form B, for example, agreed that underlying tensions and feelings of
distrust still exist in their local communities, which is significantly higher than the
response rate (71%) on Form A. 85 percent of respondents agreed in Question 9 on Form
B that gacaca enabled them to learn more about crimes and atrocities that were
committed during the genocide, which is actually 13 percentage points higher than on
Form A. Response rates begin to vary, though, when keywords or wording in individual
questions are manipulated. On Form B, only 70 percent of respondents on Question 8
agreed that gacaca promoted reconciliation. This question was worded differently on
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Form A in where the keyword ‘national unity’ was used instead of reconciliation on
Question 8, which elicited an agree response rate of 86 percent. Further, 85 percent of
respondents on Form B agreed that gacaca did a good job investigating all crimes
committed during the genocide (Question 11). This differs dramatically from Question 11
on Form A, in where only 57 percent of respondents agreed that gacaca did a good job
investigating crimes committed in their village. Responses to Question 12 on both Form
A and Form B differ slightly as well when changing the use of a keyword. 85 percent of
respondents on Form B agreed that gacaca allowed them to move forward, compared to
only 79 percent of respondents on Form A who agreed that gacaca met their needs.

Interview Attitudes toward the Gacaca Process, Procedures, and Outcomes

The study interview questions build upon these survey data and add more clues
and context to the survey responses, which, by nature, are limited in their categories and,
thus, their ability to tell a complete picture of public perceptions toward gacaca. When
asked to respond to why gacaca worked, all 12 interviewees commented that gacaca was
an empowering and participatory process that enabled them to actually see justice or feel
a sense of closure. When probed on what justice actually entails, most respondents
associated the term with closure, which is different than how the term is conceptually
identified with procedural justice in this study. Most interviewees also commented that
gacaca was successful since it provided a localized solution to an extremely personal and
individualized event. In particular, a common theme advanced across all of the interviews
was gacaca represented the only mechanism that was capable of addressing such a large
number of crimes in a short period of time. Most respondents remained skeptical that
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those who were guilty would ever be brought to justice if they were charged through the
ICTR or through the domestic courts. Further, nearly all interviewees expressed their
support of the community-based and participatory nature of these courts. Both of these
features, according to interviewees, generally helped uncover the truth about what
happened and enabled the community, as a whole, to begin a difficult, but necessary
healing process.

In an interview conducted with a gacaca judge in Ruhengeri (Interviewee 1), this
sentiment was conveyed through the comment that gacaca was a “country solution” to a
“country problem.” When asked to further comment on this statement, this individual
commented that the ICTR was ill-prepared to deal the genocide because it focused on
problems at the national level and failed to take into account how localized much of the
violence was. This individual, throughout the interview, continuously highlighted the
need for justice, truth, and healing at the local level, which the ICTR was incapable of
providing. This was largely a consequence of the ICTR only investigating the main
orchestrators of the genocide, according to the respondent, and the fact that it would take
forever to dispense justice to everyone that was affected whether it be through a family
member being killed or a cow stolen.

In another case, an interviewee (Interviewee 3) who had lost his entire family
during the genocide, commented that these courts prevented revenge killings by Tutsi.
Revenge killings, as noted by this respondent, proliferated in the aftermath of the
genocide itself as individuals returned to their villages and learned the fate of family
members. To this interviewee, gacaca was a critical mechanism that prevented future
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violence perpetrated along ethnic lines. Without gacaca, and even with the end of
gacaca, this person worried that ethnic tensions might boil over into future violence. A
colleague of Interview 4 (Interviewee 4), commented that the sentences given in
individual cases allowed those who were charged to seek forgiveness for their crimes,
which they commented was committed during a “time of passion, uncertainty, and
lawlessness.”

Another important theme that was advanced in all of these interviews was that
national unity would not be possible without gacaca. One respondent (Interviewee 12)
commented that this process allowed children of perpetrators and children of victims to
learn in the same classroom. Probed further, this respondent indicated that this process
allowed her to look those who killed her family in the eyes. Asked how she was able to
accept the fact that her family’s killers received reduced sentences, she responded that
gacaca allowed her to see them ask for forgiveness in a way that the entire village could
accept. To this interviewee, gacaca provided a painful close to an extremely traumatic
event. Another respondent (Interviewee 7), who regularly attended gacaca meetings since
his father was a judge, commented that this process forged unity by allowing victims and
families to forgive those who were willing to seek forgiveness for what they had done.
Another respondent (Interviewee 5) commented that this process was extremely difficult;
however, they suggested that “some justice was better than none.”

Nearly all respondents agreed that these courts allowed people to move forward
with their lives. In some cases, verdicts would provide a much-needed sense of closure,
which was critically needed to pick up the pieces. One respondent (Interviewee 6), whose
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brother was sentenced to 20 years in jail, commented that gacaca provided a sense of
closure not only to the family of those affected by his brother’s actions but also to both
him and his family considering that his brother had been held without charge for six
years. To this respondent, gacaca finally ended a ten-year long ordeal and provided a
timetable for which his own family could begin the “healing process”; however, he did
find the sentencing process troubling considering that his brother was sentenced to a
reduced term that did not take into account time he had already served in prison without
formerly being charged with a crime.

Building on concerns over the procedural and structural design elements in the
survey responses, the mandate of gacaca was often raised when respondents were asked
to comment on limitations associated with the process. Nearly all interviewees indicated
that they found the limited scope of gacaca jurisdiction troubling. One respondent
(Interviewee 11) questioned the framing of victims and perpetrators when asking how the
theft of his land after the genocide could not be considered a crime. Even though this
respondent had fled the violence, he found this situation to be unjust since no legal or
government remedy existed for him to raise his grievances. In the interviews conducted
in Ruhengeri, multiple individuals commented that a lack of justice for crimes committed
before and after the genocide remained salient. Most also commented that a lack of
attention to these issues was the main source of hostilities and tensions that remain in
their community. More importantly, these underlying tensions and hostilities fuel the
“silent” mistrust that permeates everyday life in their community.
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Another concern was that the process became increasingly viewed as politicized
as the gacaca courts went on. Interviewee 9 felt that the extension of the original
timetable made herself and others in her community feel as if the process was being
dragged out by the government to increase its visibility and popularity. When probed
further, this respondent commented that ethnic divisions slowly eroded the justice
reached in individual outcomes, with individual courts assuming the ethnic divisions and
dynamics present in a particular community. What originally was a process meant to
uncover the truth, promote healing, and reconcile and ultimately erase ethnic divisions,
slowly began to assume these divides as proceedings went on. More importantly,
Interviewee 9 thought that gacaca was used as a tool to shore up support for the regime.

5.8

Implications
These data tell a positive, yet complicated story about gacaca as an ambitious

transitional justice project. Respondents were overwhelming positive in their assessments
of gacaca when asked to provide their opinions on the ability of gacaca to promote
national unity and uncover the truth about what happened during the genocide itself.
Further, the study interview questions yielded an interesting link between justice and
closure as well as the theme that gacaca, and only gacaca, was capable of administering
this closure (i.e., justice) on a mass scale. These findings largely affirm those found in the
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission’s RRB survey of views and attitudes
toward gacaca in 2016 (see Table 19 below).

With that said, the survey and interview data clearly indicate that Rwandans have
misgivings about structural and procedural elements associated with this process and, in
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particular, seem to feel that broadening the mandate and jurisdiction of these courts
would likely have increased their legitimacy and their societal effect. To some
respondents, there is a growing perception that these courts increasingly became
politicized, which negated their therapeutic potential and tarnished the nature of the
justice that was dispensed. The survey and study interview data, overall, seem to indicate
that ordinary Rwandans are somewhere in between characterizations of the process
advanced by either the Rwandan government or international human rights organizations,
such as HWR or Amnesty International. The former would like to paint a largely benign
picture of gacaca and its political and social effects in post-genocide Rwanda. The latter,
instead, only focuses on the negatives associated with this process, which may cloud
overall perceptions and progress achieved.

Table 19: Select Questions on Gacaca from the Rwandan Reconciliation
Barometer (2016)
N=3,000
Gacaca courts
uncovered the truth
about the genocide
Inyangamugayo
were fair, impartial
Convictions were
fair
Gacaca allowed for
perpetrators to be
reintegrated into
society
Source: NURC, 2016

Agree

Disagree

94%

2%

Neither Agree
or Disagree
3%

83%

7%

6%

89%

6%

3%

95%

3%

2%

Applied to extant findings, the survey and study interview data complement and
challenge existing studies on gacaca. The data conflict with the key argument advanced
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by Susan Thompson (2007), who argues that power dynamics and the use of these courts
by the RPF negated their therapeutic and pacifying effect. The interview data in this
study also picked up on this theme; however, all respondents agreed that gacaca was a
necessary but painful process that allowed them to move forward. Further, the interviews
seem to indicate that this effect that Thompson finds would have been more pronounced
if all genocide-related crimes were addressed through the ICTR or the domestic court
system. The survey data, moreover, confirm some of the findings of Max Rettig (2008).
In particular, Rettig (2008, 37) finds that large majorities in his survey agreed or strongly
agreed that gacaca has functioned well and has promoted national unity. In contrast to
the survey results above, though, Rettig (2008, 41) finds that 90 percent of respondents
either agreed or strongly agreed that people told or that false testimony was included in
gacaca proceedings, which, in Rettig’s opinion, negated the pacifying effect of gacaca
and its ability to promote ethnic reconciliation. Unlike the conclusions advanced by
Rettig (2008), the survey and interview data in this study do closely mirror the
conclusions reached by Pozen, Neugebaurey, and Ntaganira (2014) who, through a
survey of 504 Rwandans from Ngoma Commune in 2011, find gacaca was widely
popular for its ability to promote national unity and allow ordinary Rwandans to move
forward with their lives. Even more importantly, the survey and interview data in this
study also affirm the conclusions reached by Pozen, Neugebaurey, and Ntaganira (2014)
on complaints associated with procedural and structural aspects (e.g., limited mandate
and jurisdiction).

Applied to extant studies that critique the discourse surrounding transitional
justice, the results seem to confirm key arguments made by Lundy and McGovern
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(2008), Fletcher and Weinstein (2004), Schneider (2009), and Baines (2010). In
particular, the survey and interview data seem to support the need to have participatory,
grassroots-based mechanisms as argued by Lundy and McGovern (2008). The semistructured interview responses, which raised the common theme that gacaca was a
country solution to a country problem, also echoes the arguments made by Fletcher and
Weinstein (2009) and Schneider (2009) who both suggest that cookie-cutter, one-sizefits-all transitional justice processes will likely fail unless they are tailored to individual
post-conflict situations. Finally, gacaca, as a traditional dispute-resolution mechanism,
seems to support the argument made by Baines (2010) to incorporate traditional-based
mechanisms in post-conflict countries today. Curiously, though, modern gacaca
ultimately became a tool of a state-led transitional justice process rather than one that
existed autonomously outside of state control as was the case with traditional gacaca.

5.9

Summary
In sum, the gacaca courts were a painful, yet necessary step in post-genocide

Rwanda. Although one would be hard-pressed to argue that these courts alone promoted
or caused peace, justice, national unity, and reconciliation between perpetrators and
victims of genocide-related crimes, these courts appear to have worked as a countryspecific solution to a country-specific problem as a bottom-up approach to transitional
justice. The survey and interview data are optimistic in nature and show that gacaca has
allowed people to learn about what happened during the genocide. More importantly,
these data show that gacaca seems to be associated with the healing process and national
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unity through becoming an avenue for forgiveness and a catalyst for the long and arduous
process of reconciliation.

Rwanda, as a case study for a broader discussion on transitional justice, seems to
illustrate that there is not a one-size fit all solution when addressing past violence, abuses,
and atrocities. In Rwanda’s case, the ICTR itself would’ve been incapable of dealing with
crimes committed on such a mass scale. Even in conjunction with other top-down
mechanisms, it seems highly unlikely that the Rwandan government would have been
capable of delivering justice on such a large scale. To borrow from one of the
interviewees, gacaca was country solution to a country problem. This case seems to
provide evidence to support claims that bottom-up approaches to transitional justice are
increasingly becoming powerful tools for addressing past abuses in order to move
forward. Further, this case seems to provide evidence to support a growing consensus that
the more mechanisms that are adopted increase the overall effect of transitional justice in
a post-conflict country. In this case, gacaca became the workhorse for transitional justice
in Rwanda; however, its use in conjunction with top-down, internationally-backed
mechanisms in the form of the ICTR increased the overall ability of the Rwandan
government to dispense mass justice for mass atrocity.

CHAPTER 6
Conclusion: Synthesis of Findings, Study Limitations, & Areas for Future
Research
6.1

Introduction
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Collectively, post-conflict societies are plagued by weak political-legal
institutions, intergroup hostilities, shattered economies, a cycle of impunity, crumbling
infrastructure, and lingering power dynamics that hold the potential to reignite tensions,
instability, and armed violence. More importantly, contemporary post-conflict countries
are often marked by a blemished human rights record, which makes social reconciliation
a daunting and sometimes insurmountable task. The key question, then, is how can we
create a durable peace that is forward-looking, yet built on a foundation of addressing a
legacy of past abuses in such a way that can mitigate the negative emotions of hate,
anger, and revenge?

This study has attempted to build upon our understanding of what conditions
peace in war’s last phase by examining what role, if any, truth commissions, as a
transitional justice mechanism, play individually and in combination with other
mechanisms in societies emerging from periods of violence, insurrection, or state
repression. Circling back to Chapter 1, transitional justice efforts in both Colombia and
Tunisia today illustrate that uncovering the truth about past abuses is now perceived to be
an essential ingredient in any political transition. In Colombia’s case, a truth commission
is being utilized as part of a broader transitional justice project that includes a criminal
tribunal and amnesties, with the intended goal of formally bringing an end to the longest
running insurgency in the world. Tunisia, on the other hand, has adopted a truth
commission largely is isolation from other mechanisms; however, the goal is to propel a
successful democratic transition forward by investigating and shedding light on past
abuses committed by state-sponsored security forces. Despite their divergent paths,
transitional justice efforts in both countries reflect a growing international norm that
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victims and their families have a basic right to know what transpired, the identity of
individual perpetrators, or the fate and whereabouts of those who “disappeared.”

This chapter serves as the concluding discussion for this study. A brief synthesis
of the results in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 as well as concluding remarks on the
implications of these findings are provided. The first section presents a short synthesis of
the overall results. The second section then discusses the implications of these results in
relation to extant studies on the topic. In particular, this section discusses how the
findings reached in this study contribute to different segments of the literature on
transitional justice processes. The third section identifies the limitations and weaknesses
associated with the research design adopted and the various ways in which the models
and case study can be improved. The fourth section identifies future areas of research
and general ideas for how we can improve our understanding of truth commissions and,
more importantly, the overall effect of transitional justice in post-conflict countries. I end
this study with overall remarks on the topic and where I hope to go with future research
projects pertaining to transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding.

6.2

Synthesis of Findings & Results
The results in Chapter 4 indicate that truth commissions, individually, do not

appear to make a meaningful difference in post-conflict societies. The data in each of the
first four models suggest that these bodies are not associated with sustained, long-term
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improvements in democratization or human rights protections. Even more, there is some
evidence to suggest that truth commissions are associated with an increased probability of
violence reigniting after a decade and decreased wealth when using GDP per capita as a
measure of economic vitality. The key theme, it seems, is that truth commissions are no
more or less likely to be associated with improvements in democratization, human rights
protections, and the durability of peace in countries that adopt them in comparison to
post-conflict societies that lack these investigative bodies. This negative, statistically
significant relationship between truth commissions and economic performance,
moreover, should force policymakers, third party IGOs, human rights INGOs, or
international donors to pause before promoting their application, especially in postconflict situations where markets are perceived to be the best instrument for fostering
cooperation between former belligerents.

This somewhat negative view of truth commissions largely holds true for most of
the transitional justice mechanisms included as part of a broader dataset used in this study
to examine transitional justice outcomes and effects between 1970 and 2010. Trials,
amnesties, and lustrations do not exhibit a meaningful, positive effect on most of the
post-conflict indicators used as dependent variables in each of the four first models.
Individually, all of the additional mechanisms are associated with an increased
probability of violence reigniting and decreased economic outcomes. Even more, trials
exhibit a consistently negative impact on levels of democratization, whereas lustrations
and amnesties are associated with negative outcomes when estimating their effects on
democracy and human rights respectively. If anything, it appears the key take away for
truth commissions also applies to each of these mechanisms as well; policymakers, third193

party IGOs, and independent donors should be careful when applying a single transitional
justice mechanism in any post-conflict situation without first projecting the effects of that
mechanism on various post-conflict indicators.

This complicated narrative for transitional justice processes to change when truth
commissions are paired with different types of mechanisms. In particular, truth
commissions, when coupled with reparations, appear to exhibit a positive, statistically
significant effect on three of the four79 societal indicators used to measure the
performance of transitional justice processes. When paired with the other mechanisms in
the dataset, however, the effect of truth commissions remains muted and not much
evidence exists to suggest that these bodies make a difference or not regardless of
whether these mechanisms are retributive or restorative in nature. Truth commissions and
amnesties do seem to exhibit a positive effect on democracy outcomes to a certain point,
while there is some statistical evidence to suggest that truth commissions paired with
lustrations actually decreases wealth in post-conflict situations.

The statistical results, as a whole, seem to lend partial support for the first four
hypotheses advanced in Chapter 1. Table 20 provides a brief synthesis of these
hypotheses and whether the null hypothesis is accepted or rejected based on the results
obtained from Chapter 4. As initially hypothesized in all four cases, post-conflict
countries that adopt truth commissions, alone, are unlikely to experience improvements
in levels of democratization, human rights protections, economic development, or the
durability of peace. When combining truth commissions with reparations, which are a
79

This unique pair exhibits a positive, yet very weak, short-term effect on human rights
protections.
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form of retributive justice, truth commissions do exhibit a positive effect as initially
hypothesized as well. With that said, truth commissions do not exhibit a similar, positive
effect when paired with trials or lustrations. If anything, it appears that coupling truth
commissions with trials actually is associated with negative outcomes in some contexts.
This causes a partial rejection of the null in each of these four hypotheses. This is a
consequence of the fact that there is not overwhelming evidence to suggest that the effect
of truth commissions is enhanced by simply coupling them with any retributive
mechanism. It is important to note, though, that this research is not confidant of whether
truth commissions, even when paired with reparations, are the cause of these positive
societal outcomes or merely associated with a larger process at play in some wealthier or
more democratic post-conflict countries. This is a consequence of the fact that the
coefficients for the pre-year category are largely similar to the coefficients, in both size
and direction, in the later time categories in the democracy, economic, and durability of
peace models.

Table 20: Key Findings for Research Questions 1 & 2

Results for Hypotheses 1-4
H1

Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less likely to
experience advancements, or improvements, in levels of democratization in
comparison to those that adopt truth commissions in combination with one or
more retributive mechanisms.

H0

There is no relationship between truth commissions and levels of democracy
when they are coupled with retributive mechanisms in post-conflict countries.
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Dependent Variable
Democracy

Independent Variable
Truth commission

Null Hypothesis
Partially Reject

H2

Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less likely to
experience improvements in human rights protections in comparison to those
that adopt truth commissions in combination with one or more retributive
mechanisms.

H0

There is no relationship between truth commissions and human rights
protections when they are coupled with retributive mechanisms in post-conflict
countries.
Dependent Variable
Human Rights

Independent Variable
Truth commission

Null Hypothesis
Partially Reject

H3

Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less likely to
experience improvements in economic development in comparison to those
that adopt truth commissions in combination with one or more retributive
mechanisms.

H0

There is no relationship between truth commissions and levels of economic
performance when they are coupled with retributive mechanisms in postconflict countries.

H4

H0

Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Null Hypothesis
Economic
Truth commission
Partially Reject
development
Post-conflict countries that adopt truth commissions alone are less likely to
remain at peace in comparison to those that adopt truth commissions in
combination with one or more retributive mechanisms.
There is no relationship between truth commissions and the durability of peace
when they are coupled with retributive mechanisms in post-conflict countries.
Dependent Variable
Durability of peace

Independent Variable
Truth commission

Null Hypothesis
Partially Reject

The implications of these findings are interesting on several fronts. First, these
results seem to indicate that uncovering the truth about past crimes, atrocities, or human
rights violations may not be enough in the post-conflict stage. As theorized in Chapter 1,
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restorative mechanisms, like truth commissions, can indeed be helpful as “victimcentered” approaches; however, these investigative bodies, in isolation from other
mechanisms, are unlikely to promote positive societal outcomes in the form of increased
levels of democratization, economic performance, human rights records, or the durability
of peace. Second, the results do indicate that one combination of a restorative and
retributive mechanism was helpful; however, the results appear to be contradictory since
truth commissions, when paired with trials and lustrations, produce inconsequential and,
in some cases, negative effects, which is not theorized in Chapter 1. Finally, this study
does seem to justify a growing consensus that the effect of transitional justice is
heightened when more than one mechanism is adopted in a post-conflict situation.

Building on the statistical results in Chapter 4, the survey and interview results in
Chapter 5 providing interesting insight into the use of hybrid, grassroots-level transitional
justice processes. These data seem to provide positive support for Hypothesis 5, which
stipulates that top-down approaches must be used in tandem with local, grassroots-level
mechanisms that are capable of dispensing justice to the “ordinary” victim or citizen (see
Table 21). Ironically, these data also seems to verify the statistical results in Chapter 4.
Gacaca, at its core, was a hybrid transitional justice mechanism that dispensed restorative
and retributive justice through uncovering the truth and punishing most perpetrators
through reparations in the form of community service or monetary payments.

Table 21: Key Findings for Research Question 3

Results for Hypothesis 5
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H5

Post-conflict countries that combine top-down approaches with grassroots
level mechanisms are more likely to experience improvements in levels of
societal peace, democratization, economic development, and human rights in
comparison to those that only adopt top-down mechanisms.

H0

There is no relationship between adopting top-down approaches in
conjunction with grassroots, bottom-up approaches and positive societal
outcomes in post-conflict countries.
Dependent Variables Independent Variable
Null Hypothesis
Democracy,
Top-Down
Reject
economic
Mechanism +
development, human Grassroots (i.e., Local
rights protections,
or Bottom-Up)
durability of peace
Mechanism

The implications of the case study results are important in several respects as
well. Although imperfect, the frame surrounding gacaca as a “country solution for a
country problem,” appears to be a widely shared public sentiment, which has garnered
public support and legitimacy for this project over the ICTR. It is important to note that
Rwanda is an outlier in studies on transitional justice due to the scope and severity of the
Rwandan genocide; however, the key take away from Chapter 5 is that top-down,
externally imposed mechanisms would likely have failed if they were adopted over
gacaca as a traditional, dispute-resolution mechanism in Rwandan society. This is
important considering the abundance of non-Western, non-legalistic mechanisms that
exist in most post-conflict countries around the world. This is not to say that top-down
approaches are obsolete; however, Chapter 5 provides evidence to suggest that these
approaches and the overall transitional justice process can be enhanced by simply
utilizing different mechanisms at different levels of society.

6.3

Contribution to Literature
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The statistical aspect of this study builds upon extant studies in several ways.
Similar to Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010), this study primarily focuses on the application and
outcomes of truth commissions; however, the findings from the different statistical
models in both studies differ on one key front. Whereas Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) finds
that truth commissions have no effect on democracy and a negative effect on human
rights, this study, instead, reaches the opposite conclusion: truth commissions have no
effect on human rights and a negative effect, albeit a weak effect, on levels of
democratization in post-conflict countries. These differences in results can possibly be
attributed to the use of different datasets and indicators. This study relied on transitional
justice mechanisms coded by the Transitional Justice Database Project, while
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) coded truth commissions based on country-specific
information from the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). With that said, what unites
both studies is a failure to provide a clear, empirical link that truth commissions matter in
post-conflict societies that adopt them in comparison to those that do not.

In comparison to past studies that have examined the effects associated with
different combinations of mechanisms, this study reaches different conclusions as well.
Olsen et al. (2010) find that truth commissions, alone, produce negative effects on human
rights protections, which is similar to the findings reached by Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010).
When testing the effect of truth commissions in combination with other mechanisms, the
authors find that coupling these bodies with amnesties produces positive effects for
democratic and human rights outcomes. This study, on the other hand, finds that truth
commissions coupled with reparations was the most important combination. These
differences in conclusions and results are interesting considering that both studies use the
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same unit of analysis, similar coding schemes for key independent and dependent
variables, and similar time intervals.

Finally, the gacaca case study seems to lend empirical support to critics who
question the discourse surrounding top-down approaches and those who have
championed the use of micro-level approaches, which are perceived to be more
participatory and inclusive in nature (e.g., Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003; Lundy and
McGovern 2008; McEvoy 2008; Baines 2010; Gready and Robins 2014). This study, in
particular, finds that the gacaca courts were instrumental in promoting a sense of closure
to victims and perpetrators alike. More importantly, these courts provided an avenue for
“mass justice for mass atrocity,” which was a feature that was lacking in the ICTR or
Rwanda’s domestic court system (Waldorf 2006). Although the survey and interview data
are imperfect, they seem to provide some evidence to conclude the growing consensus
advanced by these skeptics or champions of micro-level, country-specific approaches:
top-down approaches that are perceived to be externally imposed or forced on a postconflict country face an up-hill battle when promoting transitional justice since they lack
basic legitimacy among the people they are structured to serve.

6.4

Study Limitations & Potential Error
To be sure, this research is not devoid of limitations. In terms of the statistical

aspect of the study, several issues affect the dataset and subsequently the statistical
models used to test each of the research questions and hypotheses. Manually inputting
Polity IV scores, GDP per capita measures, Physical Integrity scores, and measures of
armed violence for more than 1,100 observations from different data sources that are
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complex and sprawling in nature will inevitably lead to coding mistakes. Further, the
large number of missing data for certain variables (e.g., Physical Integrity scores) in the
dataset possibly skews the results in each of the eight models tested. Reparations and
amnesties, moreover, are highly collinear, which created complications in the first four
models by causing reparations to be omitted. With that said, the models did not change
dramatically when using amnesties over reparations or reparations over amnesties in the
models. Finally, the large number of missing data for some of the observations included
after 2000 may have potentially skewed the models as well.

As for the survey and interview aspect of this study, the small-N nature of the
sample size limits the generalizability of the findings. This small-N nature may also lead
to potential erroneous inferences being made in comparison to other studies that have, on
average, made inferences based on a sample size of 500 to 1,000 gacaca participants
(e.g., Rettig 2008 and Pozen et al. 2014). Despite efforts to obtain a representative
sample, moreover, the demographics of the survey respondents’ does not neatly match
average demographic statistics for Rwandan society. By increasing the sample size in the
future, this could mitigate both of these limitations and the potential for erroneous
inferences. A final concern is related to the issue of replicability. The sample was
identified through irregular means at best, which creates concerns over whether a person
attempting to replicate the sample method in this research could achieve or even perform
the same research. This study tries to mitigate this concern by including the interview
methods table; however, this is obviously an issue or key methodological problem
associated with the research design process.
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6.5

Future Areas of Research
There are numerous avenues and areas in which scholars interested in transitional

justice processes can pursue or focus on to build upon our understanding of what
conditions an enduring and durable peace and also how to best address a legacy of past
abuses and violations. Despite a burgeoning literature in recent decades, our
understanding of transitional justice as a field of inquiry is complicated by its fragmented
nature. Some scholars prefer to use more qualitative, case-study driven analyses or
historical techniques to isolate and trace the outcomes of transitional justice processes in
a particular country or over time. Other scholars instead have turned to increasingly
complicated and complex statistical models and techniques to parse out the effects of
these mechanisms and processes in countries emerging from a period of state repression,
political violence, or armed conflict. Regardless of a scholars comfort zone or favored
approach, multi-method research designs will remain extremely useful and
methodologically powerful when trying to understand the outcomes associated with
transitional justice. This is largely a consequence of the fact that statistical approaches
remain incapable of clearly determining cause and effect relationships between
transitional justice mechanisms and different post-conflict indicators.
One simple way to improve our understanding is to branch out beyond the “big
five” mechanisms -- criminal trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, and
lustrations -- that are examined in most studies, including this one. By focusing on these
five mechanisms alone, this allows for cross-study comparisons; however, doing so also
limits our sample population and universe of post-conflict cases we are fixated on. By
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expanding our analyses to different types of mechanisms, such as public memorial
projects or constitutional changes, this might provide a thicker understanding of ways in
which post-conflict societies can confront a legacy of past abuses.

A second way to improve our understanding of transitional justice is to move
closer, rather than farther apart, on issues related to semantics. Some studies define truth
commissions in this way based on this set of criteria, whereas others either relax or add
specific requirements for an investigate body to be considered a truth commission.
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2010) and Olsen et al. (2010), for example, come to different
conceptual definitions considering whether an investigate body constitutes a truth
commission or not. These conceptual definitions cause the former not to label the
Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda in 1974, which is
considered by Hayner (2001) to be among the first truth commissions, whereas the latter
includes this particular case in an overall dataset on transitional justice processes from
1970 onward. The term post-conflict itself is highly debated, which causes some studies
to consider “case x” a post-conflict situation while other studies do not consider this very
same case a post-conflict situation because of competing measures or operational
definitions. These differences in semantics do matter. One of the most difficult aspects of
this study were choices involving conceptual definitions -- or decisions to restrict or relax
measures, definitions, or metrics in certain areas to produce cross-study analyses.

A third crucial area in which to explore further is to empirically determine
whether sequencing and timing matter when combining different mechanisms, including
restorative and retributive mechanisms. This is especially important considering a
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growing consensus in favor of “more is better” as it relates to transitional justice
mechanisms. This means future work needs to address the outcomes of specific
combinations across geographic groupings of countries. Further, timing remains an
elusive component in most studies on transitional justice. Does it matter if a combination
of mechanisms is applied directly before or after a transition? Does it matter if one
mechanism is adopted initially and then another is adopted six months later, a year later,
or two years later?

This issue of timing and sequencing appears to be at play in this study. Even
though this study finds evidence to suggest that coupling truth commissions with
reparations is beneficial for several of the societal indicators used as dependent variables,
might this relationship be reverse under circumstances where a truth commission is
adopted first, then followed by reparations? Does it matter if reparations are adopted first
and then a truth commission after ‘x’ period of time? What about the effect for other
mechanisms paired with truth commissions? Might adopting a truth commission first,
followed by a criminal tribunal or lustration program produce optimal results in postconflict countries? The overall theory advanced in this study seems to suggest that
adopting a restorative mechanism first, followed by a retributive mechanism second
would yield fruitful results in post-conflict situations.

6.6

Concluding Remarks
My goal, which I realize was extremely ambitious and time-consuming now, was

to isolate the effects of truth commissions as well as other mechanisms of transitional
justice. I believe the results obtained in this study are important; however, I also have
204

come to realization that the literature on transitional justice remains fragmented,
decentralized, nascent, and conflicting in nature as a consequence of transitional justice
processes themselves. Variation between and within mechanisms makes cross-cultural,
cross-regional, and cross-study comparisons extremely difficult to conceptualize,
implement, and formalize in research designs.

Further, debates over semantics and the reliability and validity of measures has
frozen progress on an extremely important and timely topic. Studies of post-conflict
countries are important considering what is at stake in these countries -- most will remain
weak and fragile states that lack institutional capacities and resources to deliver basic
needs to their citizens. Further, inadequate approaches to redressing past crimes and
abuses is potentially sowing the seeds for renewed violence and a repeat of these very
same crimes and abuses. This means scholars of transitional justice need to do better
considering that there is indeed a “human face” behind our work, results, and analyses.

Studies of transitional justice processes complement our understanding of postconflict countries by continuing to remind policymakers, outside donors, and those
operating in the non-profit sector that addressing past abuses and ending a cycle of
impunity is an essential component in any equation developed for addressing the needs of
these fragile, yet highly complex societies. Inattention will only breed future grievances,
hostilities, and underlying feelings of distrust and anger, which will be exploited by
trigger events. It is my sincere hope that continued work on whether transitional justice
“works” through the use of diverse multimethod and mixed research designs will become
a catalyst for renewed interest and engagement in perennial questions that continue to
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bog down the field. We have benefited tremendously from those who have documented
convincing evidence for why certain countries choose certain mechanisms (e.g., Olsen et
al. 2010; Rothe and Maggard 2012).

Appendix A
Truth Commissions & Commissions of Inquiry, 1974 - 2015
Country

Official Title

Time

Started by

Type*

Uganda

Commission of Inquiry into
the Disappearance of People
in Uganda since the 25th of
January, 1971

1974

Executive

Official

Brazil

No More

1979-1982

NGO

Bolivia

National Commission for
Investigation For Forced
Disappearances

1982-1984

Executive

Official

Argentina

National Commission on the
Disappeared
(“Never Again”)

1983-1984

Executive

Official

Unofficial
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Zimbabwe

Commission of Inquiry into the
Matabeleland Disturbances

1983-1984

Executive

Official

Uruguay

Commission for the Investigation
of the Situation of the Disappeared
and Related Events

1985

Legislature
Official
(Amnesty Law)

Uruguay

Investigating Commission on the
Kidnapping and Assassination of
National Representatives Zelmar
Michelini and Hector Gutierrez Ruiz

1985

Legislature

Official

Peru

Commission of Inquiry to Investigate
the Massacre of Prisoners

1986-1988

Legislature

Official

Uganda

Commission of Inquiry into
Violations of Human Rights

1986-1994

Executive

Official

Philippines

Presidential Committee on Human
Rights

1986-1987

Executive

Official

Chile

National Commission for Truth
and Reconciliation
(“Rettig Commission”)

1990-1991

Executive

Official

Nepal

Commission of Inquiry to Locate
The Persons Disappeared during the
Panchayat Period

1990-1991

Executive

Official

Chad

Commission of Inquiry into the
Crimes and Disappropriations
Committed by ex-President Habre,
his Accomplices, and/or Accessories

1991-1992

Executive

Official

South Africa

Commission of Inquiry into
Complaints by Former African
National Congress Prisoners and
Detainees (“Skweyiya Commission)

1992

Legislature

Official

El Salvador

Commission on the Truth
for El Salvador

1993-1993

Peace
Official
Agreement (UN)

Germany

Commission of Inquiry for the
Assessment of History and
Consequences of the SED
Dictatorship in Germany

1992-1994

Legislature

Rwanda

International Commission of
Investigation on Human Rights
Violations in Rwanda Since
October 1, 1990

1993

NGO

Official

Unofficial
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South Africa

Commission of Inquiry into
Certain Allegations of Cruelty
And Human Rights Abuse Against
ANC Prisoners and Detainees by
ANC Members

1993

Legislature

Official

Honduras

Independent Inquiry Undertaken by the
National Commissioner for the
Protection of Human Rights

1993-1994

Executive

Official

Ethiopia

The Special Prosecution Process by
the Office of the Special Prosecutor

1993-2007

Executive

Official

Haiti

National Truth and Justice Commission

1994-1996

Executive

Official

Germany

Commission for the Overcoming of the
Consequences of the SED Dictatorship
In the Process of German Unity

1995-1998

Legislature

Official

South Africa

Commission of Truth and Reconciliation

1995-2002

Legislature

Official

Sri Lanka

Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary
Removal and Disappearances of Persons
in Western, Southern, and
Sabaragamuwa Provinces

1995-2000

Executive

Official

Ecuador

Truth and Justice Commission

1996-1997

Ministerial
Accord

Official

Guatemala

Commission for the Historical
Clarification of Human Rights

1997-1999

Peace
Official
Agreement (UN)

Violations and Act of Violence
which Caused Suffering to the
Guatemalan People
Nigeria

Human Rights Violations
Investigation Commission

1999-2002

Executive

Official

Rwanda

National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission

1999-present
(permanent
body in 2002)

Legislature/
Public Law

Official

Cote d’Ivoire

Mediation Committee for
National Reconciliation

2000-2001

Executive

Official

South Korea

Presidential Truth Commission
on Suspicious Deaths

2000-2004

Executive

Official

Uruguay

Commission for Peace

2000-2002

Executive

Official

Peru

Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Commission

2001-2003

Executive

Official

Panama

Panama Truth Commission

2001-2004

Executive

Official
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Serbia and
Montenegro

Truth and Reconciliation Commission
for Servia and Montenegro

2002-2003

Executive

Official

Grenada

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

2001-2006

Parliament

Official

Algeria

Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission in Charge
of the Question of Disappearances

2003-2005

Executive

Official

Ghana

National Reconciliation Commission

2003-2004

Executive

Official

Sierra Leone

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

2002-2004

Peace
Agreement
Executive/
Legislature

Official

Timor-Leste
(East Timor)

Commission for Reception, Truth, and
Reconciliation

2002-2005

UNTAET

Official

Democratic
Republic of
Congo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

2003-2007

Constitution

Official

Chile

National Commission on
Political Imprisonment and Torture
(“Valech Commission”)

2003-2005

Executive

Official

Paraguay

Truth and Justice Commission

2004-2008

Legislature

Official

Indonesia

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

2004

Legislature

Official

Morocco

Equity and Reconciliation Commission

2004-2005

Royal Decree

Official

South Korea

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

2005-2010

Legislature

Official

Liberia

Truth and Reconciliation Commission
of Liberia

2006-2009

Peace
Agreement
Legislature

Official

Ecuador

Truth Commission to Impede Impunity

2007-2009

Ministerial
Accord

Official

Kenya

Independent Review Commission of the
General Elections (“Kriegler Report”)

2008

African Union

Official

Kenya

Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation

2009-?

Legislature

Official

Mauritius

Truth and Justice Commission

2009-2011

Legislature

Official

Nepal

*Proposed

2009-?

?

?

Honduras

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

2010-2011

Executive

Official

Solomon
Islands

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

2010-2011

Legislature

Official
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Columbia

*Proposed

2017-?

Peace
Agreement

Official

Appendix B
CODEBOOK
Mechanism Type
1 = Truth Commission
2 = Reparations
3 = Lustrations
4 = Criminal Trials/tribunals
5 = Amnesty
Region
1 = Asia
2 = Africa
3 = Latin America
4 = North America
5 = Western Europe
6 = Eastern Europe
7 = Oceania
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Country
Individual country where transitional justice mechanism was adopted.
Countries included in the dataset:
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Central African Republic Chad
Chile
China
Columbia
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Republic of the Congo
Cote D’Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia
Dominican Republic
East Germany
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
France
Gabon
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Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Nicaragua
Nigeria
North Korea
North Yemen
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Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papa New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Serbia and Montenegro
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
South Yemen
Soviet Union
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Sweden
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Yugoslavia
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Zambia
Zimbabwe
Year
Calendar year in which a mechanism was adopted.
Start-date
Day, month, and year in which a mechanism started.
-99 = missing
End-date
Day, month, and year in which a mechanism ended.
-99 = missing
CID
CoW country ID number for the individual country where a transitional justice
mechanism was adopted.
Mechanism Level
1 = Domestic
2 = International
3 = Hybrid
Target
1 = Government
2 = Non-government
3 = Both
PreHR1
CIRI’s PHYSINT score the year before a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
HREventYear
CIRI’s PHYSINT score the year a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
HR1
CIRI’s PHYSINT score one year after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
HR5
CIRI’s PHYSINT score five years after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
HR10
CIRI’s PHYSINT score ten years after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
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-99 = missing
EconPre
GDP per capita one year before a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
EconEvent
GDP per capita the year a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
EconPost
GDP per capita one year after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
Econ5
GDP per capita five years after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
Econ10
GDP per capita ten years after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
PolityPre
PolityIV score one year before a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
PolityEvent
PolityIV score the year a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
PolityPost
PolityIV score one year after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
Polity5
PolityIV score five years after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
Polity10
PolityIV score ten years after a TJ mechanism was adopted.
-99 = missing
ConflictPre
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battledeaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism.
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths
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0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths
-99 = missing
ConflictEvent
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battledeaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism.
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths
-99 = missing
ConflictPost
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battledeaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism.
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths
-99 = missing
Conflict5
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battledeaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism.
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths
-99 = missing
Conflict10
Dummy variable indicating whether conflict, measured by more than 25 annual battledeaths, occurred one year before a TJ mechanism.
1 = More than 25 annual battle-related deaths
0 = Less than 25 annual battle-related deaths
-99 = missing
Tc
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission or not. 1 = yes, 0 =
no.
Trial
Dummy variable for whether a country adopt a criminal trial, or tribunal, or not. 1 = yes,
0 = no.
Amnesty
Dummy variable for whether a country adopt an amnesty program or not. 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Lustration
Dummy variable for whether a country adopt a lustration program or not. 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Reparation
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Dummy variable for whether a country adopt reparations or not. 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Tctrial
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission and trial. 1 = yes, 0 =
no.
Tcamnesty
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission and amnesty
program. 1 = yes, 0 = no.
Tcrep
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission and reparations. 1 =
yes, 0 = no.
Tclust
Dummy variable for whether a country adopted a truth commission and lustration policy.
1 = yes, 0 = no.

Appendix C
Diagnostics for Statistical Models
A. Peace Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 1)
1. Outliers (appear to be somewhat problematic)
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Standardized Residuals

5

0

-5
0

500

1000

Observation Number

4

Cook's Statistic

3

2

1

0
0

500

1000

Observation Number

B. Democracy Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 2)
1. Multicollinearity
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Variable

VIF

1/VIF

tc
trials
lustrations
amnesty
econ1
hr1
peace1
nregion
2
3
4
5
6
7
mechtarget

2.18
4.53
1.79
5.88
4.29
1.91
1.55

0.458369
0.220656
0.558514
0.170065
0.233262
0.523380
0.645866

1.73
1.51
2.90
2.28
1.55
1.06
1.24

0.578637
0.662209
0.345011
0.439310
0.643415
0.947391
0.805703

Mean VIF

2.46

2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors

Test of Heteroskedasticity
10

Residuals

5

0

-5

-10

-15
-5

0

5

10

15

Fitted values

3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do
not appear to be problematic)
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Kernel density estimate
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kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.2596

1.00

Normal F[(e-m)/s]
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0.00
0.00
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1.00

Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)
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20

Residuals

10

0

-10

-20
-20

-10

0

10

20

Inverse Normal

C. Human Rights Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 3)
1. Multicollinearity
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

tc
trials
lustrations
amnesty
lecon2
polity2
peace2
nregion
1
2
3
4
5
6
mechtarget
1
2

2.26
4.61
1.75
6.02
2.19
1.76
1.15

0.442871
0.216720
0.572466
0.166098
0.455586
0.568614
0.870566

36.99
44.56
29.90
3.96
9.11
18.43

0.027032
0.022444
0.033446
0.252699
0.109724
0.054245

2.60
2.52

0.384203
0.396686

Mean VIF

11.19
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2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors

Test of Heteroskedasticity

Residuals

5

0

-5
0

2

4

6

8

Fitted values

3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do
not appear to be problematic)

Kernel density estimate
.25

Density

.2

.15

.1

.05
Kernel density estimate
Normal density

0
-5

0

5

Residuals
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.3916
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1.00

Normal F[(e-m)/s]

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00
0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)

Residuals

5

0

-5
-5

0

5

Inverse Normal
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D. Economic Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 4)
1. Multicollinearity
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

tc
trials
lustrations
amnesty
hr2
polity2
peace2
nregion
1
2
3
4
5
6
mechtarget
1
2

2.25
4.55
1.72
5.92
1.94
1.75
1.67

0.444985
0.219967
0.580448
0.168788
0.515515
0.571409
0.599611

37.28
44.43
30.06
3.80
8.92
18.45

0.026825
0.022508
0.033268
0.263169
0.112124
0.054210

2.59
2.51

0.385730
0.398105

Mean VIF

11.19

2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors

Test for Heteroskedasticity
3

Residuals

2

1

0

-1

-2
6

7

8

9

10

11

Fitted values
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3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do
not appear to be problematic)

Kernel density estimate
.5

Density

.4
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.2

.1
Kernel density estimate
Normal density

0
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-2

0

2

4

Residuals
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.1926

1.00

Normal F[(e-m)/s]

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00
0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)
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1.00

Normal F[(e-m)/s]
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0.00
0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)

F. Combination Peace Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 5)
1. Outliers (appear to be somewhat problematic)
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Cook's Statistic
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0
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G. Combination Democracy Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 6)
1. Multicollinearity
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

tctrials
tcamnesty
tclust
tcrep
lecon2
hr2
peace2
nregion
1
2
3
4
5
6
mechtarget
1
2

1.96
2.19
1.59
1.54
2.14
1.90
1.66

0.509435
0.456691
0.627038
0.647809
0.467684
0.526616
0.601179

37.14
44.36
30.06
3.96
9.11
18.45

0.026925
0.022544
0.033269
0.252757
0.109751
0.054201

2.61
2.48

0.383595
0.403534

Mean VIF

10.74
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2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors

Test for Heteroskedasticity
10

Residuals

0

-10

-20
-5

0

5

10

15

Fitted values

3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do
not appear to be problematic)

Kernel density estimate
.08

Density

.06

.04

.02
Kernel density estimate
Normal density

0
-20

-10

0

10

20

Residuals
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 1.2103
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1.00

Normal F[(e-m)/s]
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0.50
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0.00
0.00
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0.75

1.00
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Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)
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0
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-10

0
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F. Combination Human Rights Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 7)
1. Multicollinearity
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Variable

VIF

1/VIF

tctrials
tcamnesty
tclust
tcrep
lecon2
polity2
peace2
nregion
1
2
3
4
5
6
mechtarget
1
2

1.96
2.18
1.59
1.56
2.19
1.76
1.15

0.509805
0.458182
0.627470
0.641395
0.455586
0.568614
0.870566

36.99
44.56
29.90
3.96
9.11
18.43

0.027032
0.022444
0.033446
0.252699
0.109724
0.054245

2.60
2.52

0.384203
0.396686

Mean VIF

10.70

2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors

Test for Homoskedasticity

Residuals

5

0

-5
0

2

4

6

8

Fitted values
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3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do
not appear to be problematic)

Kernel density estimate
.25

Density
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.15
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.05
Kernel density estimate
Normal density

0
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0

5

Residuals
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.3916

1.00
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0.00
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1.00

Empirical P[i] = i/(N+1)
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Residuals

5

0

-5
-5

0

5

Inverse Normal

G. Combination Human Rights Model Diagnostics (for Event Year Category in Model 8)
1. Multicollinearity
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

tctrials
tcamnesty
tclust
tcrep
hr2
polity2
peace2
nregion
1
2
3
4
5
6
mechtarget
1
2

1.96
2.19
1.59
1.53
1.94
1.75
1.67

0.508964
0.457084
0.629160
0.654484
0.515515
0.571409
0.599611

37.28
44.43
30.06
3.80
8.92
18.45

0.026825
0.022508
0.033268
0.263169
0.112124
0.054210

2.59
2.51

0.385730
0.398105

Mean VIF

10.71
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2. Violation of Homoskedasticity and justification for robust standard errors

Test for Heteroskedasticity
3
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Fitted values

3. Model fit/functional form (appears to be appropriate) and test of outliers (do
not appear to be problematic)
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Appendix D
Study Survey & Interview Consent Form
Dear Participant:
You are invited to participate in a research study that explores how the gacaca
courts have contributed to reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. You can decide not to
participate. The following information is provided in order to help you make a decision
whether or not you would like to participate. If you have any questions, please do not
hesitate to ask.
Project: Did the Gacaca Courts Promote Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation in PostGenocide Rwanda?
Purpose of the study: This study is an aspect of a dissertation focusing on what builds
peace in the aftermath of war. In particular, this study is interested in exploring the ways
in which the gacaca courts have contributed to social and political reconciliation in postgenocide Rwanda. As part of a broader dissertation that examines the effectiveness and
use of different transitional justice mechanisms worldwide (e.g., international criminal
tribunals, truth commissions, amnesty provisions), the gacaca courts are used as a case
study to explore whether hybrid approaches to transitional justice can work and whether
the gacaca courts can be replicated in other post-conflict societies coming to terms with a
legacy of human rights abusers and atrocities.
Procedures: This interview will take approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete. You
will be asked a series of questions that ask your opinion and views on the gacaca courts.
Risks and/or discomforts: Some questions may create difficult memories. If you feel as
if you would like to stop the interview, you can do so at any time. You are more than
welcome to end the interview at any time.
Confidentiality: Your answers and information will be kept confidential. To ensure so,
you are assigned a participant identification number, which will enable me to input and
code your answers anonymously. After inputting the data, I will destroy all records I
have.
Benefits: The information gained from this study will help scholars, policymakers, and
practitioners better understand what builds peace in the aftermath of war. In particular,
your responses will help establish whether the gacaca courts can be replicated elsewhere.
Your answers will also provide real-life data that is missing in existing studies.
Contact information:
Eric Royer, PhD Candidate
Department of Political Science
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University of Missouri, St. Louis
Email: ebr3m4@mail.umsl.edu
Phone: 314.803.7220
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Appendix E
Semi-Structured Interview Questions
(All interviews were conducted by the author in English or through a translator)
Date of Interview:
Participant ID:
Demographic Data
Age:
Sex:
Profession/occupation:
Place of residence:
Highest level of education:
Background Specific Questions
1. For starters, could you please give me a brief description of your experience with the
gacaca courts?
2. Were you a participant?
3. How many cases did you witness?
4. What kinds of cases were held here?
5. Do you think that most people were satisfied with the process?
Gacaca Specific/Transitional Justice Questions
1. It is my impression that the gacaca courts were an important step for Rwandans to
move past the genocide. In your opinion, how has gacaca contributed to reconciliation?
What else contributed to Rwanda’s post-genocide emergence?
2. In what ways has gacaca built positive relations? Are there still underlying tensions?
Was there any viable alternative to gacaca, in your opinion?
3. Based on your personal experience, what are two or three strengths of the gacaca
courts? What are two or three challenges?
4. Could you please comment and/or give your opinion on the following questions:
 What are two or three ways in which gacaca has contributed to human rights in
Rwanda? Can you give me concrete examples?
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What is justice, and what does justice mean to you? What are two or three ways
that gacaca has helped promote justice since the genocide? Can you give me
concrete examples?
What are two or three ways in which gacaca has contributed to better
relationships in Rwanda since the genocide? Can you give me concrete examples?
What are two or three ways in which gacaca is associated with economic
development in Rwanda since the genocide? Can you give me concrete examples?

5. Other countries in Africa, notably South Africa, have had a positive experience dealing
with the past. Desmond Tutu said that it’s better to remember the past, rather than forget,
in order to move forward. Can you give me two or three reasons why this is important?
Or, can you give me two or three reasons why you think otherwise?
6. Did gacaca help uncover what happened during the genocide? Has this process met
your needs? What about victims and their families?
7. Would you recommend this process to another country emerging from a period of war?
How would a system similar to gacaca be beneficial?
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Appendix F
Survey Form A
1. What is your age? ____________
2. What is your sex?
1) Male
2) Female
3. What is your highest level of education?
4. What is your occupation? _______________
5. What is your place of residency? _______________
6. Did gacaca work in your local community?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
7. Were people satisfied with the verdicts reached by inyangamugayo?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
8. Did gacaca promote national unity?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
9. Did gacaca establish the truth about what happened in your village during the genocide?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
10. Are there still underlying tensions/feelings of distrust in your community?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
11. Did gacaca do a good job investigating crimes committed in your village?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
12. Did gacaca meet your needs?
1. Agree
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2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
13. People told lies.
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
14. People felt threatened.
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
15. There was false evidence or testimony presented.
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
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Appendix G
Survey Form B
1. What is your age? ____________
2. What is your sex?
3) Male
4) Female
3. What is your highest level of education?
4. What is your occupation? _______________
5. What is your place of residency? _______________
6. Did gacaca work in your local community?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
7. Were people satisfied with the outcomes of gacaca?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
8. Did gacaca promote reconciliation between victim and perpetrator?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
9. Did gacaca uncover what happened during the genocide?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
10. Are there still underlying tensions/feelings of distrust in your community?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
11. Did gacaca do a good job investigating crimes committed in your village?
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
12. Did gacaca allow you to move forward?
1. Agree
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2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
13. People told lies.
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
14. People felt threatened.
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
15. There was false evidence or testimony presented.
1. Agree
2. Disagree
3. I don’t know
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Appendix H
Interview Methods Table
___________________________________________________________________________
ID
Interviewee
Status
Source/Loc* Format
Length**
1

Gacaca judge

Conducted
via email
& in person

Sample (R)

Semi-structured

1hr

2

Gacaca judge

Conducted
via email
& in person

Sample (K)

Semi-structured

1hr

3

Gacaca participant

Conducted
in person

Sample (R)

Semi-structured

45min

4

Gacaca participant

Conducted
in person

Sample (R)

Semi-structured

40min

5

Gacaca attendee

Conducted
in person

Sample (R)

Semi-structured

15min

6

Gacaca participant

Conducted
in person

Sample (R)

Semi-structured

20min

7

Gacaca attendee
1hr15min

Conducted

Sample (R)

Semi-structured

in person
8

Gacaca attendee

Conducted
in person

Sample (K)

Semi-structured

35min

9

Gacaca participant

Conducted
in person

Sample (K)

Semi-structured

15min

10

Gacaca attendee

Conducted
in person

Sample (R)

Semi-structured

30min

11

Gacaca attendee

Conducted
in person

Sample (R)

Semi-structured

45min

12

Gacaca attendee

Conducted
Sample (K)
Semi-structured
1hr15min
in person
___________________________________________________________________________
*Interviews conducted in Ruhengeri are marked by a (R); those conducted in Kigali are
marked by a (K)
**All times were rounded up to the nearest five-minute interval.
243

References
Abrams, Jason and Priscilla Hayner. (2002). “Documenting, Acknowledging, and
Publicizing the Truth,” in Mark Bassiouni (ed.), Post-Conflict Justice. Ardsley:
Transnational Publishers.
Amstutz, Mark. (2005). The Healing of Nations: The Promise and Limits of Political
Forgiveness. Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers.
Andreas, Peter. (2004). “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in
Bosnia.” International Studies Quarterly 48(1): 29-51.
Aron, Raymond, (1981). Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, Garden
City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
Arthur, Paige. (2009). “How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual
History of Transitional Justice.” Human Rights Quarterly 31: 321-367.
Austesserre, Séverine. (2006). “Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar “Settlement” in
the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003-2006).” African Studies Review 49(3): 1-29.
Austesserre, Séverine. (2009). “Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and
International Intervention.” International Organization 63(2): 249-280.
Baines, Erin. (2010). “Spirits and Social Reconstruction after Mass Violence: Rethinking
Transitional Justice.” African Affairs 109(436): 409-430.
Baker, Catherine and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik. (2016). “Mapping the Nexus of
Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding
10(3): 281-301.
Barnett, Michael. (2006). “Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War.”
International Security 30(4): 87-112.
Banks, William. (2011). “Toward an Adaptive Humanitarian Law: New Norms for New
Battlefields,” in William Banks (ed.), New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical
Debates on Asymmetric Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bar-On, Dan. (2007). “Reconciliation Revisited for More Conceptual and Empirical
Clarity,” in Janja Bec-Neumann (ed.), Darkness at Noon: War Crimes, Genocide,
and Memories. Sarajevo: Centre for Interdiscplinary Postgraduate Studies.
Bass, Gary. (2004). “Just Post Bellum.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32(4): 384-412.
Bartrop, Paul and Steven Jacobs. (2015). Modern Genocide. Santa Barbara, CA: ABCCLIO.
244

Belloni, Roberto. (2001). “Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
Journal of Peace Research 38(2): 163-180.
Berdal, Mats. (2003). “How “New” are “New Wars”? Global Economic Change and the
Study of Civil War.” Global Governance 9(4): 477-502.
Berdal, Mats. (2009). Building Peace after War. London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
Bickford, Louis. (2007). “Unofficial Truth Projects.” Human Rights Quarterly 29: pp.
994-1035.
Binningsbø, Helga Malmin, Jon Elster, and Scott Gates. (2005). “Civil War and
Transitional Justice, 1946-2003: A Dataset,” Working Paper Presented at the
“Transitional Justice and Civil War Settlements” Workshop in Bogota, Colombia,
18-19 October 2005.
Bilson, John. (1982). “Civil Liberty: An Econometric Investigation.” Kyklos 35: 94-114.
Bollen, Kenneth. (1993). “Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in CrossNational Measures.” American Journal of Political Science 37: 1207-1230.
Boot, Max. (2013). Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient
Times to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Boraine, Alex. (2000). “Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way,” in
Robert Rotberg and David Thompson (eds.), Truth V. Justice: The Morality of
Truth Commissions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. (1992). An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations.
Braithwaite, John. (1999). “Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts.” Crime and Justice 25: 1-127.
Brody, Reed. (2001). “Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?” The Nation. Retrieved from:
http://www.thenation.com/article/justice-first-casualty-truth. Last accessed 14
June 2015.
Brounéus, Karen. (2010). “The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the
Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 54 (3): 408-437.
Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, James Morrow, and Randolph Siverson.
(2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: MIT Press.

245

Burnet, Jennie. (2012). Genocide Lives in Us: Women, Memory, and Silence in Rwanda.
Madison: WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Call, Charles and Venessa Wyeth. (2008). Building States to Build Peace. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Caplan, Richard. (2005). International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and
Reconstruction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chandler, David. (2004). “The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’.”
International Peacekeeping 11(1): 59-81.
Chandler, David. (2008). “Post-Conflict Statebuilding: Governance Without
Government,” in Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner, Whose Peace?
Critical Perspectives on the Political Economic of Peacebuilding. New York:
Palgrave McMillian.
Clark, Janine Natalya. (2008). “The Three Rs: Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice,
and Reconciliation.” Issues in Criminal, Social, and Restorative Justice 11(4):
331-350.
Clark, Phil. (2010). The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in
Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and
Nicholas Sambanis. (2003). Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and
Development Policy. Washington, D.C.: Copublication of the World Bank and
Oxford University Press.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford
Economic Papers 56: 563-595.
Collier, David and Colin Elman. (2008). “Qualitative and Multi-Method Research:
Organization and Publication, and Reflections on Integration,” in David Collier
and John Gerring (eds.) Concepts and Method in Political Science: The Tradition
of Giovanni Sartori. London: Routledge.
Cooper, Neil. (2007). “On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace.” Conflict, Security, &
Development 7(4): 605-616.
Cooper, Neil, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh. (2011). “The End of History and the
Last Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris.” Review of International
Studies 37(4): 1995-2007.
Corey, Allison and Sandra F. Joireman. (2004). “Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts
in Rwanda.” African Affairs 410(103): 73-89.
246

Corn, Geoffrey. (2011). “Extraterritorial Law Enforcement or Transnational
Counterterrorist Military Operations: The Stakes of Two Legal Models,” in
William Banks (ed.), New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric
Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press.
Cravo, Teresa Almeida. (2017). “Peacebuilding: assumptions, practices, and critiques.”
JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations 8(1): 44-60.
Creswell, John. (2003). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method
Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Dahl, Robert. (1956). A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Dahl, Robert. (1973). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale
University Pres.
Dahl, Robert. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Daly, Erin. (2002). “Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda.” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 34:
355-396.
Darabont, Clara. (2010). “Are Contemporary Wars ‘New’?” Romanian Journal of
European Affairs 10(1): 52-63.
David, Roman. (2003). “Lustration Laws in Action: The Motives and Evaluation of
Lustration Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland (1989-2001).” Law & Social
Inquiry 28(2): 387-439.
de Greiff, Pablo. (2009). “Articulating the Links between Transitional Justice and
Development: Justice and Social Integration,” in de Greiff, Pablo and Roger
Duthie (eds.), Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections. New
York: Social Sciences Research Council.
de Greiff, Pablo and Roger Duthie. (2009). Transitional Justice and Development:
Making Connections. New York: Social Science Research Council.
de Nevers, Renee. (2006). “The Geneva Conventions and New Wars.” Political Science
Quarterly 121(3): 369-395.
DeShaw Rae, James. (2009). Peacebuilding & Transitional Justice in East Timor.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

247

de Soto, Alvaro and Graciana del Castillo. (2016). “Obstacles to Peacebuilding
Revisited.” GlobalGovernance 22(2): 209-227.
de Waal, Frans. (2012). “Perspective: The Antiquity of Empathy.” Science 336: 874-876.
Des Forges, Alison. (1995). “The Ideology of Genocide.” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 23
(2): 44-47.
Des Forges, Alison. (1999). Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New
York: Human Rights Watch.
Diehl, Paul, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall. (1998). “International Peacebuilding and
Conflict Resolution.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 33-55.
Doughty, Kristen. (2015). “Law and the Architecture of Social Repair: Gacaca Days in
Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 21(2):
419-437.
Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. (2000). “International Peacebuilding: A
Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis.” The American Political Science Review
94(4): 779-801.
Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. (2006). Making War and Building Peace: United
Nations Peace Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Doyle, Michael and Nicholas Sambanis. (2007). “The UN record on peacekeeping
operations.” International Journal: 62(3): 495-518.
Duffield, Mark. (2014). Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of
Development and Security. London: Zed Books.
Elster, Jon. (2004). Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fearon, James D. 2005. ‘Comments on the Ex Ante/Ex Post Problem in Transitional
Justice,’Paper presented at the ‘Transitional Justice and Civil War Settlements’
workshop in Bogotá, Colombia 18-19 October 2005.
Fierens, Jacques. (2005). “Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality.” Journal of
International Criminal Justice 3(4): 896-919.
Fischer, Martina. (2004). “Recovering from Violent Conflict: Regeneration and (Re-)
Integration as Elements of Peacebuilding.” Berghof Handbook on Conflict
Transformation. Retrieved from http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/
download/fischer_handbook.pdf.

248

Fletcher, Laurel, Harvey Weinstein, and Jamie Rowen. (2009). “Context, Timing, and the
Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective.” Human Rights
Quarterly 31: 163-220.
Fletcher, Laurel. (2009). “Institutions from Above and Voices from Below: A Comment
on Challenges to Group-Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation.” Law and
Contemporary Problems 72(2): 51-55.
Flores, Thomas Edward and Infran Nooruddin. (2012). “The Effect of Elections on
Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction.” The Journal of Politics 74(2): 558-570.
Fukuyama, Francis. (1992). The End of History and The Last Man. New York: Avon
Books.
Galtung, Johan. (1965). “On the Meaning of Nonviolence.” Journal of Peace Research
2(3): 228-257.
Geddes, Barbara. (1990). “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get:
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2: 131-169.
Geertz, Clifford. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Gibson, James. (2006). “Do Strong Group Identities Fuel Intolerance? Evidence from the
South African Case.” Political Psychology 27(50): 665-705.
Gibson, James. (2009). “On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth
Commissions.” Law and Contemporary Problems 72(2): 123-141.
Goldstein, Joshua. (2011). Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict
Worldwide. New York: Dutton.
Goldstone, Richard. (1995). “Exposing Human Rights Abuses: A Help or Hindrance to
Reconciliation.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 22: 607-621.
Goldstone, Richard. (1996). “Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions
and International Criminal Tribunals.” New York University Journal of
International Law and Politics 28(3): 485-503.
Goodhand, Jonathan. (2006). Conditioning Peace? The Scope and Limitations of Peace
Conditionalities in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Hague: Netherlands Institute of
International Relations Clingendael.
Gready, Paul and Simon Robins. (2014). “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A
New Agenda for Practice.” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 8(3):
339-361.

249

Grodsky, Brian. (2009). “International Prosecutions and Domestic Politics: The Use of
Truth Commissions as Compromise Justice in Serbia and Croatia.” International
Studies Review 11(4): 687-706.
Hamber, Brandon. (2001). “Does the Truth Heal? A Psychological Perspective on
Political Strategies for Dealing with the Legacy of Political Violence,” in N.
Biggar (ed.), Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil
Conflict. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Hammes, Thomas. (2008). “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation,” in Terry Terriff,
Aaron Karp, and Regina Karp (eds.), Global Insurgence and the Future of Armed
Conflict: Debating Fourth-Generation Warfare, 21-44. New York: Routledge.
Hamre, John and Gordon Sullivan. (2002). “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction.” The
Washington Quarterly 25(4): 85-96.
Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie, and Molly Bauer. (2010). “Economic Liberalization
via IMF Structural Adjustment: Sowing the Seeds of Civil War?” International
Organization 64(2): 339-356.
Hartzell, Caroline. (2014). “Peacebuilding after Civil War,” in Edward Newman and
Lark DeRouen, Jr. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars, 376-386. London:
Routledge.
Hayner, Priscilla. (1994). “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative
Study.” Human Rights Quarterly 16(4): 597-655.
Hayner, Priscilla. (2011). Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of
Truth Commissions. New York: Routledge.
Herman, Judith Lewis. (1997). Trauma and Recovery. New York: BasicBooks.
Huyse, Luc. (1995). “Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in
Dealing with the Past.” Law and Social Inquiry 20(1): 51-78.
Hofferbert, Richard and David Cingranelli. (1996). “Democratic Institutions and Respect
for Human Rights,” in Human Rights and Developing Countries, edited by David
Cingranelli. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Horowitz, Donald. (2008). “Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in
Post-conflict States.” William and Mary Law Review 49(4): 1213-1248.
Human Rights Watch. (1999). “Leave None to Tell the Story.” Available at:
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/geno1-3-09.htm. Last accessed 18
October 2017.

250

Human Rights Watch. (2014). “Rwanda: Justice after Genocide - 20 Years On.”
Available at https://www.hrm.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-aftergenocide-20-years. Last accessed 12 March 2017.
Huntington, Samuel (1993). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
Howarth, Kirsten. (2014). “Connecting the dots: Liberal peace and post-conflict violence
and crime.” Progress in Development Studies 14(3): 261-273.
Ingelaere, Bert. (2009). “Does the Truth Pass across the Fire without Burning? Locating
the Short Circuit in Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts.” The Journal of Modern African
Studies 47(4): 507-528.
Ignatieff, Michael. (1996). “Articles of Faith.” Index on Censorship 5: 110-122.
Jong, Ho-Won. (2005). Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Jenkins, Rob. (2013). Peacebuilding: From Concept to Commission. London: Routledge.
Jensen, Eric Talbot. (2011). “Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Concept Broad Enough
for Today’s Targeting Decisions,” in William Banks (ed.), New Battlefields/Old
Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Jick, Todd. (1979). “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in
Action.” Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4): 602-611.
Kaldor, Mary. (2004). “Nationalism and Globalization.” Journal of the Association for
the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism 10(1-2): 161-177.
Kaldor, Mary. (2006). New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Kaldor, Mary. (2013). “In Defense of New Wars.” Stability 2(1): 1-16.
Kalyvas, Stathis. (2001). “New and Old Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? World Politics
54(1): 99-118.
Kaplan, Seth. (2008). Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development. London:
Praeger Security International.
Kaplan, Robert. (2015). “The Art of Avoiding War.” The Atlantic. Available at:
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/the-art-of-avoidingwar/392060. Last accessed 17 October 2017.
251

Kashyap, Rina. (2009). “Narrative and Truth: A Feminist Critique of the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” Issues in Criminal, Social, and
Restorative Justice 12 (4): 449-467.
Kaufman, Stuart. (2001). Modern Hatreds – The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. New
York: Cornell University Press.
Keith, Linda Camp (2002). “Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights
1966-1977: Are They More than Mere Window Dressing.” Political Research
Quarterly 55: 111-143.
Kegley, Charles and Shannon Blanton. (2010). World Politics: Trend and
Transformation, 2009-2010 Update. Boston: Wadsworth.
Kerr, Rachel and Eirin Mobekk. (2007). Peace and Justice. New York: Polity.
King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry:
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Kim, Hunjoon and Kathryn Sikkink. (2010). “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human
Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries.” International Studies Quarterly
54(4): 939-963.
Kirkby, Coel. (2006). “Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: A Preliminary Critique.” Journal of
African Law 50(2): 94-117.
Kiss, Csilla. (2006). “The Misuses of Manipulation: The Failure of Transitional Justice in
Post-Communist Hungary.” Europe-Asia Studies 58(6): 925-940.
Kritz, Neil. (1996). “Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights.” Law and Contemporary
Problems 59(4): 127- 152.
Labonte, Melissa. (2012). “From Patronage to Peacebuilding? Elite Capture and
Governance from Below in Sierra Leone.” African Affairs 111(442): 90-115.
Lambourne, Wendy. (2009). “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass
Violence.” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3(1): 28-48.
Leebaw, Bronwyn Anne. (2008). “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice.”
Human Rights Quarterly 30(1): 95-118.
Leblang, David. (1997). “Property Rights, Democracy, and Economic Growth.” Political
Research Quarterly 49: 5-26.
252

Lederach, John Paul. (1996). Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Le Mon, Christopher. (2007). “Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts.” Human Rights Brief
14(2): 1-5.
Levistky, Steven and Lucan Way. (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lieberson, Stanley. (1991). “Small N’s and Big Conclusions: An Examination in the
Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases.” Social
Forces 70(2): 307-320.
Lind, William, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph Sutton, and Gary Wilson.
(2008). “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” in Terry
Terriff, Aaron Karp, and Regina Karp (eds.), Global Insurgency and the Future of
Armed Conflict: Debating Fourth Generation Warfare, 13-20. New York:
Routledge.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1959). “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review
53(1): 69-105.
Londregan, John and Keith Poole. (1994). “Does High Income Promote Democracy?”
World Politics 49: 1-30.
Longman, Timothy. (2009). “An Assessment of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts.” Peace
Review: A Journal of Social Justice 21(3): 304-312.
Lundy, Patricia and Mark McGovern. (2008). “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional
Justice from the Bottom Up.” Journal of Law and Society 35(2): 265-292.
Macdonald, Anna. (2015). “From the Ground Up: What Does the Evidence Tell Us about
Local Experiences of Transitional Justice?” Transitional Justice Review 1(3): 72121.
Mac Ginty, Roger. (2011). International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid
Forms of Peace. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mac Ginty, Roger and Oliver Richemond. (2013). “The Local Turn in Peace Building: A
Critical Agenda for Peace.” Third World Quarterly 34(5): 763-783.
Mack, Andrew. (2005). Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st
Century. New York: Oxford University Press.

253

Mamdani, Mahmood. (2001). When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and
the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mani, Rama. (2002). Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Manning, Carrie and Monica Malbrough. (2010). “Bilateral Donors and Aid
Conditionality in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Case of Mozambique.” The
Journal of Modern African Studies 48(1): 143-169.
Maxwell, Joseph. (2005). Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Mayer-Rieckh, Alexander and Pablo de Greiff. (2007). Justice as Prevention: Vetting
Public Employees in Transitional Societies. New York: Social Science Research
Council.
McEvoy, Kieren. (2008). “Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a Thicker Version of
Transitional Justice,” in Kieren McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds.), Transitional
Justice from Below. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Meernik, James, Angela Nichols, and Kimi King. (2010). “The Impact of International
Tribunals and Domestic Trials on Peace and Human Rights after Civil War.”
International Studies Perspectives 11(3): 309-334.
Mendeloff, David. (2004). “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict
Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?” International Studies Review 6(3): 355380.
Mezarobba, Glenda. (2010). “Between Reparations, Half Truths and Impunity: The
Difficult Break with the Legacy of the Dictatorship in Brazil.” International
Journal on Human Rights 7(13): 7-26.
Mironko, Charles. (2004). “Igitero: Means and Motive in the Rwandan Genocide.”
Journal of Genocide Research 6(1): 47-60.
Minkkinen, Panu. (2007). “Resentment as Suffering: On Transitional Justice and the
Impossibility of Forgiveness.” Law and Literature 19(3): 513-532.
Minow, Martha. (1998). Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after
Genocide and Mass Violence. Boston: Beacon Press.
Moghalu, Kingsley. (2005). Rwanda’s Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.

254

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. (2016). “Rwandan Reconciliation
Barometer.” Available at
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=70&no_cache=1&tx_drblob_pi1
%5BdownloadUid%5D=55. Last accessed November 5, 2016.
Nettelfield, Lara. (2010). Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague
Tribunal’s Impact in a Postwar State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Newman, Edward. (2004). “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is
Needed.” Security Dialogue 35(2): 173-189.
Newman, Edward, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond. (2009). “Introduction,” in
Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (eds.), New Perspectives
on Liberal Peacebuilding, 3-26. Tokyo:
United Nations University Press.
Nino, Carlos Santiago. (1996). Radical Evil on Trial. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Odermatt, Jel. (2013). “Between Law and Reality: “New Wars” and Internationalised
Armed Conflict.” Amsterdam Law Forum 5(3): 19-32.
Olsen, Tricia, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter. (2010). “Transitional Justice in the
World, 1970-2007: Insights from a New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research
47(6): 803-809.
Olsen, Tricia, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter. (2010). Transitional Justice in Balance:
Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy. Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press.
Olsen, Tricia, Leigh Payne, Andrew Reiter, and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm. (2010). “When
Truth Commissions Improve Human Rights.” International Journal of
Transitional Justice 4(3): 329-354.
Olson, Mancur. (1993). “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American
Political Science Review 87: 567-576.
Olson, Susan and Albert Dzur. (2004). “Revisiting Informal Justice: Restorative Justice
and Democratic Professionalism.” Law & Society Review 38(1): 139-176.
Orend, Brian. (2002). “Justice after War.” Ethics and International Affairs 16(2): 43-56.
Paris, Roland. (1997). “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism.”
International Security 22(2): 54-89.
Paris, Roland. (2004). At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

255

Paris, Roland. (2009). “Does Liberal Peacebuilding Have a Future?” In New Perspectives
on Liberal Peacebuilding, Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond
(eds.), 97-111. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Paris, Roland. (2010). “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding.” Review of International Studies
36(2): 337-65.
Patterson, Pat. (2016). “Transitional Justice in Columbia: Amnesty, Accountability, and
the Truth Commission.” Perry Center Occasional Paper (January 2016).
Retrieved from http://chds.dodlive.mil/files/2016/01/pub-OP-paterson3.pdf.
Philpott, Daniel. (2012). Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pinker, Steven. (2011). The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined.
New York: Penguin Books.
Poe, Steven and Neal Tate. (1994). “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in
the 1980s: A Global Analysis.” American Political Science Review 88(4): 853872.
Poe, Steven, Neal Tate, and Linda Keith. (1999). “Repression of the Human Right to
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years
1976-1993.” International Studies Quarterly 43(2): 291-313.
Popkin, Margaret and Naomi Roht-Arriaza. (1995). “Truth as Justice: Investigatory
Commissions in Latin America.” Law and Social Inquiry 20(1): 79-116.
Porter, Elisabeth. (2007). Peacebuilding: Women in International Perspectives. London:
Routledge.
Porter, Elisabeth. (2015). Connecting Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Posen, Barry. (1993). “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival 35(1): 2747.
Posner, Eric and Adrian Vermeule. (2004). “Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice.”
Harvard Legal Review 117(3): 761-825.
Pozen, Joanna, Richard Neugebauer, and Joseph Ntaganira. (2014). “Assessing the
Rwandan Experiment: Popular Perceptions of Gacaca in Its Final Phase.”
International Journal of Transitional Justice 8(1): 31-52.
Przeworski, Adam. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and WellBeing in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
256

Pugh, Michael, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner. (2008). Whose Peace? Critical
Perspectives on the Political Economic of Peacebuilding. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Pugh, Michael. (2009). “Towards Life Welfare,” in Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and
Oliver Richmond (eds.), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, 78-96.
Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Quinn, Joanna and Mark Freeman. (2003). “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned
from Inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa.” Human
Rights Quarterly 25(4): pp. 1117-1149.
Quinn, Joanna. (2009). “Haiti’s Failed Truth Commission: Lessons in Transitional
Justice.” Journal of Human Rights 8(3): 265-281.
Quinn, Joanna. (2010). The Politics of Acknowledgement: Truth Commissions in Uganda
and Haiti. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Raiten, Jesse. (2015). “Lesson of the Gacaca.” Journal of the American Medical
Association 314(5): 451-452.
Rawls, John. (1999). A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Rettig, Max. (2008). “Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict
Rwanda?” African Studies Review 51(3): 25-50.
Richemond-Barak, Daphné. (2011). “Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts: Issues of
Distinction and Reciprocity,” in William Banks (ed.), New Battlefields/Old Laws:
Critical Debates on Asymmetric Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press.
Richmond, Oliver. (2011). A Post-Liberal Peace. New York: Routledge.
Rochester, J. Martin. (2012). Between Peril and Promise: The Politics of International
Law. Los Angeles: Sage.
Rochester, J. Martin. (2016). The New Warfare: Rethinking Rules for an Unruly World.
New York: Routledge.
Roman, David and Susanne Choi Yuk-ping. (2005). “Victims on Transitional Justice:
Lessons from the Reparation of Human Rights Abuses in the Czech Republic.”
Human Rights Quarterly 27(2): 392-435.
Rotberg, Robert and Dennis Thompson. (2000). Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth
Commissions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
257

Rotberg, Robert. (2004). When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Rothe, Dawn and Scott Maggard. (2012). “Factors that Impede or Facilitate Post-Conflict
Justice Mechanisms? An Empirical Investigation.” International Criminal Law
Review 12(2): 193-217.
Rose, Gregory. (2011). “Preventive Detention of Individuals Engaged in Transnational
Hostilities: Do We Need a Fourth Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva
Convention?” in William Banks (ed.), New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical
Debates on Asymmetric Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rummel, R.J. (1997). Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of NonViolence. New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. (2001). Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company.
Rwandan Government. (2017). “Gacaca Community Justice.” Available at gacaca.rw.
Last accessed 18 October 2017.
Sarkin, Jeremy. (1999). “The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda.” Human Rights Quarterly 21: 767-823.
Sarkin, Jeremy. (2001). “The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda:
Politics, Human Rights, Due Process, and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in
Dealing with Genocide.” Journal of African Law 45(2): 143-172.
Scharf, Michael. (1997). “The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission.”
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 7: 375-403.
Schneider, Andrea Kupfer. (2009). “The Intersection of Dispute Systems Design and
Transitional Justice.” Harvard Negotiation Law Review 14: 289-315.
Sikkink, Kathryn and Carrie Booth Walling. (2007). “The Impact of Human Rights Trials
in Latin America.” Journal of Peace Research 44(4): 427-445.
Singer, Max and Aaron Wildavasky. (2001). The Real World Order: Zones of Peace /
Zones of Turmoil. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers.
Skarlato, Olga, Eyob Fissuh, Sean Bryne, Peter Karari, and Kawser Ahmed. (2013).
“Peacebuilding, Community Development, and Reconciliation in Northern
Ireland: The Role of the Belfast Agreement and Implications for External

258

Economic Aid,” in Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process, Timothy
White (ed.), pp. 198-226. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Sloan, James. (2011). The militasization of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century.
Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Snyder, Jack. (2000). From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist
Conflict. New York: W.W. Norton.
Snyder, Jack and Leslie Vinjamuri. (2003). “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism
in Strategies of International Justice.” International Security 28: 5-44.
Stacey, Robert. (1994). “The Age of Chivalry,” in Michael Howard, George
Andreopoulos, and Mark Shulman (eds.), The Laws of War: Constraints on
Warfare in the Western World, 27-39. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stahn, Carsten. (2007). “ ‘Jus ad Bellum,’ ‘Jus in Bello,’ … ‘Jus post Bellum’? –
Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force.” The European Journal
of International Law 17(5): 921-943.
Strauss, Scott. (2004). “How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide?
An Estimate.” Journal of Genocide Research 6(1): 85-98.
Stedman, Stephen. (1997). “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security
22(2): 5-53.
Stewart, Brandon and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm. (2017). “The Quantitative Turn in
Transitional Justice Research: What Have We Learned about Impact?”
Transitional Justice Review 1(5): 97-133.
Stiglitz, Joseph. (2003). Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company.
Stover, Eric and Harvey Weinstein. (2004). My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and
Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Subotic, Jelena. (2009). Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Taylor, Laura. (2015). “Transitional Justice, demobilisation and peacebuilding amid
political violence: examining individual preferences in the Caribbean coast of
Colombia.” Peacebuilding 3(1): 90-108.
Teitel, Ruti. (2000). Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

259

Teitel, Ruti. (2003). “Transitional Justice Genealogy (Symposium: Human Rights in
Transition).” Harvard Human Rights Journal 69(16): 69-94.
The Economist. (1997). “Of memory and forgiveness.” Available at
www.economist.com/node104292. Last accessed 18 October 2017.
Thompson, Susan. (2011). “The Darker Side of Transitional Justice: The Power
Dynamics Behind Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts.” Africa 81(3): 373-390.
Tutu, Desmond. (1999). No Future without Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday.
Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (2013). “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2013,
1946-2012.” Retrieved from
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/.
Last accessed 10 May 2014.
Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (2017). “Conflict Tracker 2017.” Available at:
http://ucdp.uu.se/ Last accessed 17 October 2017.
United Nations. (2010). “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations
Approach to Transitional Justice.” Available at:
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf.
Last accessed 18 October 2017.
United Nations. (2014). “Background Information on Preventing Genocide.” Available
at: www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgpreventgenopcide.shtml.
Last accessed 18 October 2017.
United Nations. (2014). “The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda: Background
Note.” Retrieved from
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder Justice2014.
pdf. Last accessed 31 October 2016.
United Nations. (2015). “News: ICTR Expected to close down in 2015.” Available at:
unictr.unmict.org/en/news/ictr-expected-close-down-2015. Last accessed 18
October 2017.
United Nations. (2017). “History of Peacebuilding.” Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history. Last accessed 17 October
2017.
United Nations University. (2014). “Conflict Trends and the Changing Nature of Global
Violence.” Retrieved from: https://unu.edu/projects/conflict-trends-and-thechanging-nature-of-violence.html. Last accessed September 17, 2017.

260

United States Institute of Peace. (2017). “Truth Commission: El Salvador.” Available at:
www.usip.org/publications/1992/07/truth-commission-el-salvador. Last accessed
18 October 2017.
Venter, Christine. (2007). “Eliminating Fear Through Recreating Community in Rwanda:
The Role of the Gacaca Courts.” Texas Wesleyan Law Review 13: 577.
Waldorf, Lars. (2006). “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as
Transitional Justice.” Temple Law Review 79(1): 1-87.
Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg. (2001). “Armed Conflict, 1989-2000.”
Journal of Peace Research 38: 629-644.
Walter, Barbara. (2004). “Does Conflict Beget Conflict: Explaining Recurrent Civil
War.” Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 371-388.
Walzer, Michael. (2002). “The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of
Success).” Social Research 69(4): 925-944.
Weiss, Thomas. (2013). “Prologue,” in Rob Jenkins, Peacebuilding: From Concept to
Commission. New York: Routledge Global Institutions Series.
Weissbrodt, David and Paul Fraser. (1992). “Report of the Chilean National Commission
on Truth and Reconciliation (book review).” Human Rights Quarterly 14(4): 601622.
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Eric. (2010). Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The
Impact on Human Rights and Democracy. New York: Routledge.
Wierzynska, Aneta. (2004). “Consolidating Democracy through Transitional Justice:
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts.” New York University Law Review 79(5): 1934.
Wielenga, Cori and Geoff Harris. (2011). “Building Peace and Security After Genocide:
The Contribution of the Gacaca Courts of Rwanda.” African Security Review
20(1): 15-25.
Wigglesworth, Gillian. (2008). “The End of Impunity? Lessons from Sierra Leone.”
International Affairs 84(4): 809-827.
Williams, Robert and Dan Caldwell. (2006). “Jus Post Bellum: Just Way Theory and the
Principles of Just Peace.” International Studies Perspectives 7: 309-320.
Williams, Robert. (2014). “Jus Post Bellum: Justice in the Aftermath of War,” in Caron
Gentry and Amy Eckert (eds.), The Future of Just War: New Critical Essays.
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

261

Yin, Robert. (2009). Case Study Research Design and Methods. Los Angeles: Sage
Publications.
Zakaria, Fareed. (1997). “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76(6): 22-43.
Zoli, Corri. (2011). “Humanizing Irregular Warfare: Framing Compliance for Nonstate
Armed Groups at the Intersection of Security and Legal Analyses,” in William
Banks (ed.), New Battlefields/Old Laws: Critical Debates on Asymmetric
Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press.

262

